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Abstract 
Incentive programs aimed at encouraging private landowners to set aside areas of 
forest for their conservation value have existed in Australia for more than two 
decades. Many programs restrict the use of the land by legal agreements or other 
means and some programs offer the landowner financial compensation. Most 
programs are based on voluntary entry by landowners. 
Programs available in Tasmania have added significantly to the total forest area 
conserved on private land. Nevertheless, in some regions more than 80 percent of 
land with conservation value remains unprotected and programs routinely fail to meet 
enrolment targets. This has resulted in considerable debate about the design of 
programs and has resulted in an increase in the amount of compensation offered and 
the introduction of more flexible conservation management options. In a limited 
number of situations, the option of forcing landowner entry into conservation 
incentive programs has also been considered. 
The objective of tltis study is to provide information for policy makers that hasn't 
existed before and that can be used in designing conservation programs. An improved 
understanding of landowners' decision framework, their motivation and the strength 
of their behavioral response will facilitate better forecasting of landowner 
participation decisions which may lead to an increase in landowner enrolment in 
programs. 
In this dissertation a conceptual model of landholders' participation choice is 
developed that combines a traditional utility maximisation framework with 
information about landowner attitudes. An empirical model of landowners' 
conservation incentive program choice is then developed. The model is estimated 
using stated preference data from a Best-Worst and a Choice survey. The responses 
to the Best-Worst survey, which was carried out first, were used to determine the 
choice set for the subsequent Choice survey. The Best-Worst survey was also used to 
explore differences between the perceived importance of program attributes by 
program designers and administrators, and landowners. 
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The Choice survey gathered information on landowner preferences for incentive 
program attributes, the socio-economic characteristics of the landowner and their 
attitudes, and property characteristics. 
Landowners were presented with two experiments mimicking program choice in a 
voluntary and forced choice scenario. Landowner heterogeneity was accounted for 
using a latent class approach to estimating preference parameters. These were 
compared to preferences estimated using a two step logit approach. 
Three latent classes of landowners with different attitudes to the role and outcome of 
establishing conservation reserves on private land were identified: multi-objective 
owners; environment owners; and production owners. 
Preferences for program attributes and estimated welfare impacts when forced to enter 
a 'restrictive' program are found to differ significantly between the landowner classes. 
Estimated welfare losses were lowest for environment owners and highest for 
production owners. Results suggest that compensation is not a main driver of 
program choice for any of the groups when entry is forced. 
Only a small proportion of landowners were willing to voluntarily join a conservation 
program. Preferences for program attributes were not significantly different between 
landowner classes, even though groups differed in their attitude. The welfare 
implications of voluntarily joining a 'restrictive ' program were small and 
compensation funding was, again, only of secondary importance in determining 
program choice. The research also showed little difference in the perceived relative 
importance of different program attributes between landowners and program 
designers and administrators. 
The results of this study will be of use to policy makers in the design of better targeted 
incentive programs. For instance, results suggest that when designing forced entry 
programs for environment owners special attention should be paid to the provision of 
logistical assistance, which is relatively important to this group. Furthermore, 
programs that do not permit any productive use of reserved areas do not deter entry by 
production owners. 
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1 Introduction 
Conservation incentive programs that encourage landowners to set aside areas of 
privately owned forest have existed in Australia for more than two decades (Figgis 
2004). Nevertheless, a comprehensive analysis of the way in which landowners make 
decisions about whether to join such programs has not previously been undertaken. 
This dissertation provides such an analysis by combining information about 
landowners' socio-economic and property characteristics and their attitudes, with 
incentive program choice data gathered by means of a Choice survey, withln an 
econometric model of landowner behaviour. Incentive programs are modelled as 
'bundles of attributes', allowing a comprehensive representation of incentive program 
choice. Landowner heterogeneity is accounted for by using a latent class approach to 
estimation. The results reported in this dissertation provide information that may be 
useful to policy makers wanting to forecast landowner participation decisions and to 
design programs that target particular groups of landowners. 
1.1 Motivation 
Australia possesses flora and fauna that is both highly endemic and has great species 
richness compared to many other parts of the world (Department of the Environment, 
Sport and Territories n.d.). However, much of Australia's rich biodiversity 1 is 
threatened with extinction due to habitat loss or the degradation of habitat quality. 
The Australian Government has, on many occasio~s, indicated its commitment to 
avoiding further loss of biodiversity by increasing the area of reserves, while at the 
same time preventing further land clearing (Luzar and Diagne 1999). 
Over 60 percent of land in Australia is managed by private landholders (Productivity 
Commission 2001). Consequently, many threatened ecosystems2 in Australia occur 
1 
"Biological diversity or biodiversity refers to the variety of life fonns: the different plants, animals 
and microorganisms, the genes they contain, and the ecosystems they fonn" (Department of the 
Environment, Sport and Territories n.d.). 
2 An ecosystem is " ... the dynamic and interrelating complex of plant and animal communities and 
their associated non-living environment'' (www.biology-online.org/dictionary/ecosystem viewed on 5 
October 2005). For instance a forest ecosystem is characterised by the predominance of trees, and the 
fauna, flora and ecological cycles (energy, water, carbon and nutrients) with which they are closely 
associated. 
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on private land. It is important, therefore, to consider the role of private landholders 
in conserving high value biodiversity areas. 
Standard presentations of the economics of biodiversity argue that undefined or 
inadequately defined property rights for this environmental resource may lead to 
reduced incentives for landowners to protect biodiversity on their own land. The 
market for biodiversity conservation on private land does not deliver an efficient or 
Pareto optimal outcome (e.g. Kahn 1995). This result underpins the suggestion that 
implementing policies to protect biodiversity on private land is a legitimate role of 
government (e.g. Callan and Thomas 2000). All levels of governments can provide 
incentives to motivate landowners to undertake conservation action and protect 
additional areas of private land with high nature conservation value. Motivation can 
be through financial incentives such as grants obtained by participation in incentive 
programs and tax breaks, but also through, for instance, education. Governments can 
also use other policy instruments such as direct legislation or the development of 
regional strategies. 
Landowners make decisions about the implementation of conservation management 
actions and participation in conservation oriented programs in a complex 
environment. Landowner decisions in general have been shown to involve many 
factors including culture, social setting, property structure, finances, and perception 
(Vanclay and Lawrence 1995). The framework within which the decision to enrol 
land in legally-binding conservation incentive programs is made, is expected to be 
equally complex. Crase and Maybery (2004) find that by revealing the intricacies of 
the individual's decision framework and understanding their behavioural responses, 
incentive programs with high success rates can be designed. 
By 2002 Tasmanian private landholder participation in incentive programs resulted in 
the protection of more than 32 000 hectares of land for the purpose of biodiversity 
conservation (Resource Planning and Development Commission 2003). Nevertheless, 
landowner enrolment in conservation incentive programs in Tasmania has fallen short 
of achieving the total area targeted to be set aside for conservation. In some regions 
of Tasmania, more than 80 percent of the total targeted areas remained unprotected in 
2003 (Resource Planning and Development Commission 2003). A significant 
proportion of this area occurs on private land. The Tasmanian Government has a 
stated commitment to protect additional areas on private land through funding 
8 
incentive programs for private landholders (Department of the Environment and 
Water Resources 2004). 
Research and anecdotal evidence both suggest that landholder participation in 
incentive programs will vary with the expected private costs and benefits of 
conserving land of conservation significance, as well as with various landowner, 
property and business characteristics such as productive income (e.g. Wilson 1996; 
Drake, Bergstrom et al. 1999; Greiner, Herr et al. 2003). Non-financial motives and 
environmental attitudes are also likely to play a role in the decision to enrol land in a 
conservation incentive program (e.g. Wynn, Crabtree et al. 2001). Lastly, the 
attributes of the incentive program itself are expected to play an important role in the 
participation decision (e.g. Purvis, Hoehn et al. 1989; Cooper and Keirn 1996). 
The attributes of conservation incentive programs, such as the legal implications and 
the restrictions placed on the use of land, are generally determined by the government 
officials who design and implement these programs. 3 Since landowner participation 
rates are affected by program attributes, a better understanding of the importance 
ascribed by landowners to various attributes can potentially lead to the more effective 
design of programs. 
Conservation incentive programs in Australia are currently based largely on voluntary 
entry into the program by landowners (CSIRO Wildlife and Ecology 2001) and there 
are only a few examples where government has compulsorily acquired land of 
conservation significance (e.g. Western Australian Public Works Act 1902 quoted in 
Stoneham, Crow et a/. 2000). Continuing low private land enrolment rates may mean 
that governments are called upon to consider forcing landowner participation in order 
to achieve stated policy objectives. This possibility makes an understanding of 
landowners' preferences for program attributes in the context of forced program entry 
both relevant and important. 
Overall, an improved understanding of landowners' decision framework, their 
motivation, and the strength of their behavioural responses in the context of both 
forced and voluntary entry could lead to better tailoring of programs to suit particular 
landowners or groups of landowners. At the same time it would increase the 
3 Although the development of government programs frequently occurs in consultation with the target 
audience (e.g. Department of the Environment and Water Resources 2004). 
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likelihood of achieving program goals and could result in more efficient fmancing of 
conservation targets. 
1.2 Objectives 
The overall aim of this dissertation is to contribute to an improved understanding of 
the way in which landowners make decisions about participating in incentive 
programs aimed at conserving biodiversity on private land in Tasmania as a basis for 
improving program design. 
The following policy related research objectives are central to achieving this: 
• To investigate landowner preferences for incentive program attributes in the 
context of both forced and voluntary choice. This involves identifying and 
quantifying the tradeoffs that landowners make between incentive program 
attributes, and exploring how such tradeoffs are affected by the socio-
economic characteristics of landowners, landowner attitudes and property 
characteristics. 
• To compare the welfare implications of program 'restrictiveness' when choice 
is forced and voluntary. 
• To compare landowners to program designers and administrators with respect 
to the perceived importance of incentive program attributes in the landowner 
decision framework. 
1.3 Methodological overview 
Achieving the above objectives involves the development of a theoretical model that 
describes landowner decisions to conserve biodiversity through participation in 
conservation incentive programs. A conceptual model of landholders' participation 
choice is developed that combines the traditional utility maximisation framework with 
information about landowner attitudes. The development of this model follows a 
review of the literature related to the economic modelling of the decision to 
participate in incentive schemes and the literature related to environmental attitudes 
and their measurement. 
10 
The empirical study of choice and participation in incentive programs may be 
undertaken using information about landowner preferences as revealed by their actual 
participation in available programs or by eliciting stated preferences for incentive 
programs using survey methods. In this research an empirical model of landowner 
participation in conservation incentive programs is developed using data gathered by 
means of two separate, but related, stated preference surveys: a Best-Worst (BW) and 
a Choice survey. A review of existing programs and policies informs the design of 
both surveys. 
The responses to the Best-Worst survey, which was carried out first, are used to 
determine the choice set for the subsequent Choice survey. The Best-Worst survey 
was also used to explore differences between the perceived importance of program 
attributes by program designers and administrators, and landowners. 
The Choice survey gathered information on landowner preferences for incentive 
program attributes, the socio-economic characteristics of the landowner and their 
attitudes, and property characteristics. 
Landowners were presented with two choice experiments mimicking program choice 
in a forced choice and voluntary scenario. Landowner heterogeneity was accounted 
for using a latent class approach to estimating preference parameters. 
1.4 Contribution of this research 
The approaches taken in this research are innovative for several reasons. Firstly, the 
Choice survey gathered information on landowner preferences for incentive program 
attributes. Although choice studies are frequently carried out to explore issues in 
environmental economics, a review of the literature has not shown any previous 
studies that applied this approach to the design of policy instruments in Australia. 
Investigating incentive program choice using choice modelling is a state of the art 
application of this approach for the design of new policy. 
Secondly, the choice question in the survey was phrased in such a way that made it 
possible to consider landowner preferences for program attributes both in a situation 
where entry into a program is voluntary and where entry is compulsory or forced. 
The simulation and comparison of a forced and voluntary entry choice situation has 
not been carried out in Australia or elsewhere, in the context of conservation incentive 
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programs. The comparison is important as different policy options for Australian 
Government incentive programs may need to be considered in the future if voluntary 
programs do not achieve their stated conservation aims. 
Thirdly, to my knowledge, no other study has carried out an economic analysis of 
landowners' decision framework surrounding participation in incentive programs in 
which four classes of independent variables have been combined: socio-economic 
characteristics of landowners; landowner attitudes; property and business 
characteristics; and incentive program attributes. This study advances the 
understanding of attributes that are important in influencing incentive program choice 
which can therefore be targeted in future government initiatives aiming to increase 
landowner participation. 
Moreover, the assessment of landowner attitudes is based on 'outcome evaluation' 
which varies from the more traditional classification of attitudes on the basis of a 
general environmental characterisation of the landowner. To my knowledge, this type 
of attitude variable has not previously been included in a model of incentive program 
choice and greatly adds to the comprehensiveness of the economic analysis. 
Fourthly, the trade-offs between incentive program attributes are modelled using a 
latent class technique, rather than the more traditional two-stage cluster I logit 
approach. The latent class technique accounts for heterogeneity among landowners. 
Key variables that explain landowner participation can be identified using this 
method. The application of a latent class regression model to conservation program 
choice data, in which the difference in landowner choice behaviour is explained by 
landowner heterogeneity in terms of observable and unobservable characteristics, is 
novel. The results of the latent class estimation technique are compared to the more 
traditional two-stage cluster I logit regression approach. 
Lastly, although Best-Worst and Choice surveys have been combined in other studies 
(e.g. Sawtooth Software 2002), a Best-Worst survey has not previously been used to 
set attributes for a subsequent Choice survey. This type of Best-Worst survey 
application is an innovative and comprehensive survey approach which can lead to 
better Choice survey design. The Best-Worst survey was also used to explore 
differences between program designers and administrators, and landowners in relation 
to the perceived importance of different program attributes. This innovative use of 
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the Best-Worst survey allows an appraisal of program designers' understanding of the 
importance of program attributes to stakeholder. A Best Worst survey has not 
previously been applied in this manner. 
1.5 Outline of the dissertation 
This dissertation is organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 describes the current status and historical development of biodiversity 
conservation in Australia. The traditional economic treatment of biodiversity 
conservation as a public good and the occurrence of market fai lure is established. An 
outline of current incentive programs aimed at nature conservation in Australia in 
general, and Tasmania in particular, and participation in these programs is presented. 
The empirically based literature related to modelling private landowner land use 
choice and the decision framework surrounding the participation in incentive 
programs is reviewed in Chapter 3. Previous application of the stated preference 
techniques used to gather data in this research is also reviewed. 
The description of landowner choice in a utility maximising framework is presented 
in Chapter 4 followed by the behavioural theories which form the foundation of 
stated preference techniques. A brief introduction to decision making models in 
psychology as they relate to the development of a comprehensive model of landholder 
utility is presented. 
The estimation technique and statistical methods applied in this dissertation are the 
subject of Chapter 5. In this chapter the use of the latent class estimation approach to 
account for heterogeneity in data is presented. The statistical indicators for the latent 
class, the Best-Worst, and the attitude data are also discussed. 
The development of the Best-Worst and Choice survey instruments and the survey 
application methods are presented in Chapter 6. Survey design considerations are 
also discussed. 
The empirical results for the Best-Worst and Choice models are reported in Chapter 
7 and Chapter 8. In each chapter a descriptive analysis of the socio-economic and 
property characteristics data is followed by the statistical analysis of the data. 
13 
The results are discussed in Chapter 9 and implications of the findings are presented. 
The tradeoffs that landowners make between incentive program attributes, and how 
these are affected by various socio-economic characteristics of landowners, 
landowner attitudes, and property characteristics are discussed. This is followed by a 
discussion of the effect of forced entry into conservation programs on landowner 
preferences for program attributes. Welfare estimates of changes in program 
restrictions under the two choice scenarios are also compared. Latent class estimates 
are then compared to the results obtained from a two-stage cluster analysis I logit 
regression. This is followed by a brief conclusion and recommendations for further 
research. 
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2 Biodiversity conservation 
In this dissertation conservation incentive programs are modelled as a bundle of 
attributes. In this context it is important to understand the makeup of existing 
programs, how they work, and where they fit into the current policy envirorunent. 
This chapter begins with an outline of the current status of biodiversity conservation 
in Australia followed by a discussion of the traditional treatment of biodiversity 
conservation in economics. A discussion of policy tools available to government is 
followed by an outline of current incentive programs and participation in these 
programs. 
2.1 Conservation in Australia 
It is well established that there is a great species richness of plants and animals in 
Australia. Over 80 percent of Australian flowering plants, mammals, and inshore, 
temperate-zone fish are endemic (Department of the Envirorunent, Sport and 
Territoriesn.d.). However, habitat loss or the degradation of habitat quality threatens 
much of Australia's rich biodiversity with extinction. 
A natural rate of species extinction has occurred throughout the ages with the 
occasional massive and rapid extinction, such as that of the dinosaur (e.g. IDCN 
World Conservation Union 1999). Scientists have acknowledged that the relatively 
rapid rate of recent species extinctions cannot be attributed to naturally occurring 
envirorunental change but rather is the result of anthropogenic or human based factors 
(Kahn 1995). Maintaining current biodiversity levels, or at least slowing further 
species extinction, requires maintenance of habitat (e.g. Soule 1991 ). 
Traditionally, the responsibility for the conservation of biodiversity in Australia has 
rested in the public domain. Recognising that habitat degradation needs to be halted, 
governments are spending funds in all sectors of the economy to protect biodiversity. 
The latest available Australian Bureau of Statistics (1997) information suggests that 
annual household expenditure on the protection of biodiversity and landscape in 
Australia was approximately $169 million in 1996-97 and the amount spent by 
industry was approximately $173 million in that same year. Some of the money spent 
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on biodiversity conservation includes setting aside areas as reserves specifically 
aimed at preserving biodiversity. 
The protection of biodiversity has to date been achieved largely through the creation 
of public parks and reserves. The conservation of biodiversity in these parks was 
often incidental because the parks were mainly created for their natural beauty and 
recreational values and less frequently for the protection of threatened species 
(Thackway and Olsson 1999). Governments have now detennined, on behalf of 
society, that biodiversity conservation should be increased above current levels 
(Productivity Commission 2001) by creating more conservation reserves (Aretino, 
Holland et a!. 2001 ). 
2.1.1 Meeting biodiversity targets 
The Australian national and state governments' recognition of their role in setting 
targets for biodiversity conservation reached a new level in 1992 through their 
commitment to conserve a " ... comprehensive, adequate, and representative sample 
of Australia's ecosystem types" (Thackway and Olsson 1999, p.89). The Interim 
Biogeographic Regionalisation for Australia (ffiRA) provided a framework for setting 
protection priorities at a regional and national level (Thackway and Cresswell 1995; 
Thackway and Olsson 1999) for both private and public land. 
Both the 1992 National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development and the 
subsequent 1996 National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia's Biological 
Diversity (Department of Environment and Water Resources 1992) recognised the 
need for partnerships among all levels of government, industry and the community 
(Thackway and Olsson 1999). To ensure adequate representation of ecosystems in the 
process of conservation of biodiversity in Australia, protection needed to be on land 
of various tenure, and by both the public and private sectors (Productivity 
Conunission 2001). To facilitate the process of biodiversity conservation, 
biodiversity resource reservation targets were determined by an external scientific 
process for each of the States and Territories in Australia. 
As over 60 percent of land in Australia is managed by private landholders, many of 
the threatened and under-represented ecosystems in Australia occur on private land. It 
is therefore important to consider the role of private landholders in conserving 
important areas for biodiversity conservation. The question arises why, in a country 
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such as Australia that is so reliant on markets, the market does not deliver the desired 
level in relation to biodiversity conservation? In other words, why do markets fail 
when it concerns the conservation of biodiversity? 
2.2 A case for government intervention 
Most resource and environmental economics textbooks classify biodiversity as an 
environmental resource that is a public good, that is, what Samuelson (1954) referred 
to as non-excludable and non-rival. Biodiversity is non-excludable because it is not 
possible to stop anyone from "consuming or enjoying" the good. It is non-rival as the 
enjoyment of biodiversity by someone does not reduce the amount of biodiversity 
available to others. For example, it is not possible for a landowner who protects an 
area of land on their property, thereby conserving biodiversity, to stop the neighbour 
enjoying the increasing number of native animals. At the same time, the neighbour's 
enhanced enjoyment will not reduce the farmer's own ability to enjoy the presence of 
these animals. 
The non-rival and non-excludable nature of public goods may cause problems for 
their supply. These goods are one of several categories of goods where market failure 
may apply (Kahn 1995). Because no private individual or organisation can reap all 
the benefits of a public good which they have produced or made available, there will 
be insufficient incentive to produce it voluntarily. Consumers can take advantage of 
public goods without contributing sufficiently to their creation. This is called the 
'free rider' problem (e.g. Samuelson 1954). 
Specific to the production or protection of biodiversity, landowners may not have an 
incentive to protect biodiversity if they are unable to encourage others to contribute to 
the benefit they enjoy. Similarly, there may not be an incentive if the landowners are 
able to enjoy the benefits regardless of their own contribution. The landowner is able 
to free ride and will not incur the cost of producing the good (Soderqvist 2003). It 
may therefore be argued that an allocatively efficient outcome of biodiversity 
provision is not established with natural market incentives (Callan and Thomas 2000). 
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A characteristic of biodiversity is that property rights4 are inadequately defined or are 
unprotected. Undefined or inadequately defined property rights mean that there are 
no valid claims to exclusive use of the resource and the resource cannot be sold. 
Property rights are generally limited by law and through social customs (Callan and 
Thomas 2000). The attribute of biodiversity as a public good in combination with 
insufficiently specified property rights makes it different from "an ordina~y resource 
and leads to deficient market valuation" (Lerch 1998, p.286). Further, until recently 
biodiversity was perceived to be available in abundance. Property rights are generally 
not an issue where resources are not perceived as scarce (Anderson and Hill 2004). 
In relation to deficient market valuation the Coase theorem suggests that "proper 
assignment of property rights to any good . . . will allow bargaining between the 
affected parties such that an efficient solution can be obtained, regardless of which 
party is assigned those rights" (Callan and Thomas 2000, p.87). Some major 
obstacles in relation to the assignment of property rights to biodiversity exist, such as 
the development of equitable allocation methods. Additionally, potentially 
prohibitive transaction costs in trading may apply once property rights are allocated 
(e.g. Whitten and van Bueren eta/. n.d). 
Thus, the above discussion indicates that the public good nature of biodiversity is 
recognised and that government has a potential role to encourage the provision of 
biodiversity which will otherwise not be achieved through markets. The next section 
provides an overview of the instruments available to government to encourage 
biodiversity conservation, particularly on private land. 
2.2.1 Government instruments 
Governments may use regulations, suasion, and incentive programs to encourage 
biodiversity conservation actions on private land by landowners. Figure 1 
summarises a variety of policy tools available to government for managing 
environmental outcomes, as broadly defined in the relevant literature. 
4 
"Property rights include the right to acquire property, the right to dispose of property; the right to 
exclude others, the right against trespass, the right to quiet enjoyment and, importantly, the right of 
active use - with the general proviso, of course, that one may do so only as long as these rights do not 
hinder the rights of others to enjoy or use their property" (Nahan 1999). 
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Figure 1: Policy tools available for managing environmental outcomes (based on Young and 
Gunningham 1996). 
As is shown in Figure 1 above, conservation incentives provided to private 
landholders by different levels of government currently comprise grants (including 
management and stewardship payments 5 ), subsidies, tax relief, rate relief, offset 
payments, development incentives, the creation of environmental markets, and market 
based incentives (MBis). These incentives are aimed at encouraging management 
change and thereby improving environmental outcomes, such as water quality and the 
protection of biodiversity (e.g. James 1997). 
Governments often use a combination of (overlapping) policy instruments, in 
particular incentives and legislation, to realise the full value of the biodiversity 
resource (e.g. Young and Gunningham 1997; Binning and Young 1999; Mountford 
and Keppler 1999). The focus of the next section is on the source of the funding the 
government uses to encourage conservation. 
5 Stewardship payments are to assist landowners to carry out tasks they have an obligation to do in any 
case. This implies some sort of duty of care on the landowner's behalf. A management payment is for 
a specific action and fini shes when the action is carried out. Management and stewardship payments 
are often provided with the direct aim of protecting biodiversity and areas of conservation significance 
through specific management actions or reservation of land (Kabii 2004). 
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2.2.2 Who should pay? 
The public good nature of biodiversity suggests insufficient private incentive to 
conserve biodiversity and to use it in a sustainable way. The provision of incentives 
may encourage private landholders to set aside areas for conservation. However, 
there remains an argument as to who should bear the cost of conserving biodiversity 
on private land (Bates 2001). 
Article 11 of the Convention on Biological Diversity raises the issue that individuals 
are likely to personally bear the costs associated with their conservation effort, 
however, " ... most, if not all, of the associated benefits would accrue to society-at-
large" (United Nations Environment Program n.d.). 
Numerous elements contribute to resolving this issue (Commonwealth of Australia 
2001 ), but two central themes can be identified. These are referred to as equity6 and 
duty of care, which can be translated into a number of questions: . 
• Should the public pay landowners for conserving biodiversity? 
• Which management actions should they be compensated for? 
• 
• 
Which landowners who undertake these actions should be paid? and 
How much should they be paid? 
According to Coase (1960), the compensation obligation depends on who has the 
property rights. The property rights of private landowners are well defined in the 
Australian constitution, but the biodiversity values that occur on that private land are 
not (Wiebe, Tegene eta/. 1997). 
Where government compulsorily acquires property - for instance to protect 
biodiversity values - the compensation issue seems to be relatively straightforward. 
Legally, Part V - Powers of the Parliament, Section 51 (xxx.i) of the Australian 
constitution states that if the government acquires property from any State or person 
"full and adequate compensation" has to be paid (Nahan 1999). 7 However, where 
biodiversity conservation is achieved by changing management practices, but 
retaining private ownership, the government may be reluctant to pay compensation. 
6 Equity is interpreted here as the need to share the costs and benefits necessary to achieve biodiversity 
conservation (Kabii 2004). 
7 The 'just compensation' clause does not appear in the State's own constitutions. 
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In this situation, the govenunent may be perceived to compulsorily acquire part of the 
'bundle' of property rights, while leaving the title with the landowner. 
Birming and Young (1997) argue that conservation of biodiversity is a normal part of 
the production process for any landowner. After all, the landowner also captures 
some of the benefits of conservation. This means that the landowner has a "duty of 
care" and govenunents should not provide financial assistance to landowners to 
protect this biodiversity. Only those activities that go beyond the normal duty of care 
should be considered for cost sharing arrangements as the landowner is providing a 
community service by maintaining environmental quality beyond what is expected 
(Binning and Young 1997). 
Nevertheless, the argument remains as to what constitutes more than the norm. Some 
studies seem to indicate that there is a relatively high level of community support for 
compensation payments to landholders independently of defining what is expected. 
For example, Whitten and Bennett (2001) undertook a Choice survey in the upper 
southeast of South Australia and the Murrumbidgee to investigate views on options 
for managing land in the region. In both regions, 68 percent of survey respondents 
felt that compensation should be paid to farmers if they were made worse-off by 
changes in land management practices to improve the environment. Only 9 percent of 
respondents felt that farmers should not be compensated, while the remainder were 
unsure. A Finnish study by Home (2004) suggested that a "clear majority of citizens 
are in favour of full compensation to the forest owners for lost revenues and possible 
costs of nature conservation action" (Home 2004, p.2). These Finnish citizens 
indicated that they supported forest owners' sovereignty in forest management 
decisions. 
Even though in Australia there seems to be strong support from community members 
for compensation payments to landowners, many landowners themselves remain 
unconvinced of the benefits that they are capturing by, for instance, retaining remnant 
vegetation areas on their farms. They indicate concern as to the effect on profitability. 
Not only are these landowners unsure about the benefits, they feel inadequately 
compensated for any costs arising from changing management actions aimed at 
conservation. Accordingly in the absence of attractive financial incentives or change 
in attitudes, the majority of farmers are likely to remain disinterested in the protection 
and management of conservation areas (Denys-Slee & Associates 1998). 
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A discussion of the programs and financial incentive available in Australia and 
Tasmania follows. Prior to this discussion however, a review of the relevant national 
and state regulation and suasion programs is presented. This review is not intended to 
be comprehensive, but rather to illustrate the range and extent of government 
involvement. 
2.3 Regulation and suasion 
The Commonwealth Government and through it, the states, is party to a number of 
conventions that pertain to conserving biodiversity. The International Convention on 
Biological Diversity is most relevant in this context (Nature Conservation Branch 
2000). 
A number of inter-governmental agreements exist between Tasmania and the 
Commonwealth which outline the respective responsibilities of the jurisdictions for 
various conservation related matters, such as the National Strategy for the 
Conservation of Australia's Biological Diversity (1996). 
The Australian Government legislative mechanism for national envirorunent 
protection and biodiversity conservation is by means of the Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conse1vation Act 1999 (EPBC Act). The Act provides for the 
protection of critical habitat, the preparation of protection plans, and the preparation 
of conservation agreements, among other things . When the EPBC Act was 
introduced, a national list of threatened species, ecological communities, and 
threatened processes that were endangered, vulnerable or extinct, was carried forward 
from the preceding Endangered Species Protection Act 1992. The list was expanded 
to include categories of threatened species that were critically endangered, 
conservation dependant, or extinct in the wild. 
In Tasmania, the Threatened Species Protection Act 1995 provides for the 
conservation of threatened species and management of threatening processes. 8 
Schedules of the Act list more than 600 species of threatened plants and animals in 
8 A threatened process is defined in the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 as such if it " .. . threatens or may threaten the survival, abundance or evolutionary development 
of a native species or ecological community". 
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Tasmania (Department of Primary Industries and Water- Threatened Species Section 
2007). 
The protection of biodiversity through the creation of conservation covenants is 
enabled under the Nature Conservation Act 2002. The Act sets out broad guidelines 
regarding the appropriate private reserve types (Protected Areas on Private Land 
Program 2003). Covenants and management agreements are enabled under the Land 
Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993. Section 71 of this Act allows a planning 
authority to enter into an agreement with a landowner and grant approval to register a 
covenant on the title which prohibits the clearing of vegetation (Binning and Young 
1999). As well as legislation that underpins the conservation of biodiversity 
nationally and at a state level, the Australian Government supports many programs 
that can collectively be categorised as suasion (Figure 1 ). 
Extension is achieved through, for example, the provision of funding to each State for 
a Threatened Species Network Coordinator. The coordinators provide advice and 
facilitate community involvement in the conservation of nationally listed species. A 
National Threatened Species Day is held every year to encourage biodiversity 
conservation. There are many more programs aimed at increasing the knowledge base 
with the ultimate aim of increasing conservation efforts. These programs include 
resource kits (e.g. Hands-on for habitat) and music kits (e.g. Logs have life inside), 
threatened species publications, threatened species networks, national poster 
competitions, and flora and fauna networks. 
Idea and information exchange is also achieved by means of, for example, funding 
facilitators for the Land for Wildlife program in each State. The Federal Government 
funds Aboriginal education programs such as the Aboriginal Landcare Education 
Program in the Northern Territory (delivered through Greening Australia). 
Aside from legislation and suasion, the government provides incentive programs 
aimed at biodiversity conservation. These are discussed in the next section. 
2.4 Australian incentive programs 
Much has been written about the different Federal, State and Municipal incentive 
programs aimed at achieving environmental outcomes that presently exist (e.g. James 
1997; Bateson 2001; Comerford and Binney 2004). The programs that are on offer 
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vary in their focus, and they are aimed at achieving different environmental outcomes: 
e.g. salinity reduction, soil degradation reduction, water quality improvement, and 
biodiversity conservation. A multitude of programs provide funding to undertaking 
management actions that are of benefit to conservation such as fencing and planting 
trees (e.g. Department of Environment and Water Resources 2006). In this study the 
focus is on programs that are aimed at biodiversity conservation through reservation. 
The incentive programs aimed at biodiversity conservation have traditionally been 
delivered primarily by the three levels of government. Increasingly, however, the 
trend is to deliver the programs through Natural Resource Management (NRM)9 for 
instance Catchment Management Authorities (CMAs), stakeholder organisations such 
as farmers' federations, dedicated conservation organisations, and Non Government 
Organisations (NGOs). A summary of the delivery routes is shown in Figure 2. 10 
NGO's 
(e.g. ABHF, TLC) 
Stakeholder 
organisation 
(e.g. PAPL) 
Statutory 
authority 
(revolving funds) 
Commonwealth 
Not for profit 
organisation 
(e.g. WWF, GA) 
State 
government 
(e.g. PFRP) 
Figure 2: Delivery routes of Commonwealth funding. 
NRM groups 
(e.g. CMAs) 
Indigenous groups 
(e.g. IPA) 
Municipal 
government 
One increasingly important method of achieving biodiversity conservation is through 
NGOs (see Bennett 1995). Funds donated to these NGOs to conserve biodiversity 
are, in most cases, fully tax deductible. Organisations such as the Australian Wildlife 
Conservancy (A WC), the Australian Bush Heritage Fund (ABHF), the former Earth 
9 The delivery of NRM relies on the cooperation of Commonwealth, state and local governments, as 
well as that of regional NRM bodies specifically established to ensure del ivery of at the regional level. 
Joint Austral ian and State/Territory Government steering committees are responsible for managing the 
delivery of the NAP and NHT across the states and territories. NRM is delivered via the integrated 
implementation of the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality (NAP) and the Natural 
Heritage Trust (Australian Government 2007). 
10 In this figure only Commonwealth funding is shown, obviously the States also collect and allocate 
taxes while NGOs also receive funding through private donations. 
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Sanctuaries, and local organisations such as the Tasmanian Land Conservancy (TLC), 
buy land of conservation significance and tum private property into nature reserves.11 
The Australian Government indirectly provides these NGOs with means through 
which individual citizens can commit to protecting habitat (Kahn 1995). 
The Corrunonwealth National Reserve System funding program (NRS) provides 
funding to local government, corrununity groups, industry, and non-government 
conservation agencies to protect areas of land they purchase. The program provides 
two-thirds of the purchase price if the area is legally protected by means of a covenant 
and the proponents take responsibility for the management. This funding is not 
available to individual landowners (Department of Environment and Water Resources 
2007). 
Biodiversity is also protected by means of so-called revolving funds, which are a 
fmancially and legally effective method of ensuring conservation outcomes on private 
land (Mortimer 2003). The Corrunonwealth Department, Environment Australia 
(EA), developed a "Bush for Wildlife Revolving Fund" which is administered by 
statutory authorities or NGOs. The authorities that run these revolving funds purchase 
properties that contain an area of conservation significance. The authority 
subsequently protects the property by legal means (e.g. covenant on title) after which 
it is re-sold. After the re-sale of the land, the funds are returned for new acquisitions. 
Revolving funds have been established in New South Wales (Nature Conservation 
Trust ofNSW), South Australia (Nature Foundation SA), Victoria (frust for Nature), 
Queensland (Queensland Trust for Nature) and Western Australia (National Trust of 
Australia - Western Australia). These organisations are partly funded by Federal 
Government grants aimed at scheme establishment, covering administration costs, or 
creating employment opportunities. The Bush Brokers program in Western Australia 
was established in 1999 and also administers a revolving fund. The Brisbane City 
Council has a bushland acquisition program that is funded by an environmental levy, 
11 The growth in the private land conservation sector has been significant. For instance, incoming 
funds for the A we increased from $2.5 million to $5.5 million in just one year. The " ... A We now 
owns and manages 10 properties across Australia covering more than 575,000 hectares (1.3 million 
acres) in the Kimberley, north Queensland, western NSW, the Flir.ders Ranges and the forests of 
southwestern Australia" (Australian Wildlife Conservancy 2002). 
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which revolves properties after protecting their nature conservation values through re-
zoning or covenants. 
Federal government "devolved grants" have been issued to Greening Australia (GA) 
to establish the Remnant Vegetation Fencing Incentive Scheme which grants 
conservation works for areas not necessarily under permanent protection. Funds are 
available through this scheme in New South Wales, Tasmania, Victoria, Queensland, 
and the Australian Capital Territory. Grants for on-ground conservation works for 
priority grassland are available through the Grassy Ecosystems Grants managed by 
the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). 
Federal funds are provided to assist Indigenous landholders to manage protected areas 
on their land through the Indigenous Protected Areas (IP A) program. As well as the 
above direct grants programs, funds are delivered using different methods, for 
example Market Based Incentives (Ivffiis). 
The majority of MBI schemes to date address land and water degradation problems. 
Transferable water entitlements in the irrigation regions of the Murray Darling in the 
early 1980s and the performance bonds scheme implemented by the Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park Authority in 1987 (van Bueren 2001) were some of the earliest 
quantity based MBis in Australia other than fisheries quota systems12• 
Property rights are an underpinning requirement for market creation and all tradeable 
right systems for different resources are based on this premise 13 • MBis rely on 
enabling legislation and need a 'cap', or total load, to be set for a particular area 
(whether it be catchment or local government area) within which trading takes place. 
Although the idea of biodiversity trading systems is widely debated at various forums 
(e.g. Key Issues in Australia's Biodiversity September 2000 Seminar Series, 
Discovery Centre, CSIRO, Black Mountain, Canberra) there is currently no such 
system that operates in Australia. However, recently an agreement for a biodiversity 
trading scheme was signed between the Environment Minister and the South 
Australian Farmers Federation (SAFF). Although no trading between farmers will 
12 The most well known MBI is the tradeable quotas that have been used in the fisheries industry for 
decades (for instance the Southern Bluefin Tuna Fisheries quota system commenced in 1984). 
13 The Agriculture and Resource Management Council of Australia Jnd New Zealand (ARMCANZ) 
produced guidelines in relation to the creation of property right for water in 1995. 
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take place, this agreement will allow farmers in the upper south-east of region South 
Australian to trade off their salt water drainage levy payments by protecting native 
vegetation and undertaking management activities on their property (Upper South 
East 2003). In a successful biodiversity trading market, landholders would protect an 
endangered ecological community or species, if the option is financially attractive 
when compared to other use options. 
There are many concerns related to the feasibility and desirability of a system of 
biodiversity credits some of which centre around the intractable difficulties of creating 
markets in biodiversity due to the difficulties in allocating property rights (Doremus 
2003). Some other issues that have been raised are the definition of trading units, the 
potential thinness of the market, the long production timeframe, and the geographical 
boundaries of the trading market. 
The Department of Sustainability and Environment (2007) has been testing a system 
of auctioning government funds ("Bush Tender Trial") that may be used to undertake 
environmental management actions on private properties. 14 This funds dispersal 
system is frequently categorised as a market-like approach. Prior to the auction, field 
officers visit the interested landholders in an area and agree on a management plan 
best suited to their property and which achieves optimal environmental outcomes. 
The landowner then submits a sealed bid nominating the amount of money required to 
undertake the management on their property. Assessing the nature conservation 
priority on the property and value for money, the auctioning body detennines who 
will receive funding. Those who are elected to receive funding then sign at least a 
three-year agreement. 15 
An advantage of the process of auctioning the money available for environmental 
management is that it reveals market information about the minimum cost of various 
environmental management options. Because the auctioning process pays landowners 
at the price level they are willing to accept, the flexibility may result in a higher 
number of landowners being successful in obtaining these funds. 
14 Sometimes referred to as "price based MBis" (Action Salinity and Water Australia 2002). 
15 As at February 2002, there had been 126 expressions of interest, 98 bid submissions and 73 accepted 
bids, accounting for $400,000 in payments (Stoneham, Chaudhri et at. 2002 quoted in Chan, Laplagne 
et at. 2003). 
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In Tasmania no auctioning of government funds has taken place to date. However, 
several programs disperse funding to landowners for conservation purposes. These are 
the subject of Section 2.5. 
2.5 Tasmanian incentive programs 
In Tasmania a number of incentive programs are available to landowners to protect 
biodiversity. The Private Forest Reserves Program (PFRP) offers landowners funding 
for areas of high conservation significance if conservation covenants are placed on the 
land, or management agreements are entered into. The program was established 
through a $30 million grant from the Commonwealth to the PFRP delivered through 
the State Government (Department of the Environment and Heritage n.d.). The 
program has been finalised and was replaced by the Forest Conservation Fund (FCF) 
Commonwealth program in mid 2006.16 
The PFRP offered two types of legally-binding conservation management 
agreements. 17 The first was referred to as "a covenant", which is an agreement that is 
binding upon the title of the land. The second, referred to as "management 
agreements" involved personal contracts. Both these types of conservation 
agreements are " . . . contracts between a government authority, or NGO, 18 and 
landholder, and they prescribe terms and conditions under which the landholder 
agrees to manage their land" (Public Land Use Commission 1996, p.37). The size and 
shape of the area of land to which the contract applies is detennined in the agreement. 
In both types of conservation agreements, ownership of the land remains with the 
landowner. 
The duration of conservation agreements can be fixed-term or permanent. A fixed-
term, legally-binding management agreement is established through negotiation 
between the landowner and an NGO or government agency. The terms of the 
16 At the time this dissertation was commenced the PFRP was still in operation. Reference will thus be 
made to this program rather than the one that replaced it in 2006. 
17 Non-legally-binding management agreements also exist where the landowner is not required to enter 
into contractual arrangements to receive funding. Land for Wildlife is an example of a non-binding 
program which encourages and supports landholders to provide habitat for native plants and animals on 
their property (e.g. Department ofSustainability and Environment 2005). 
18 The agreement can also be between all three: landowner, government authority and a NGO. 
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agreement can only be altered with the agreement of all parties. The Private Forest 
Reserve Program in Tasmania offered temporary management agreements for periods 
up to 20 years. 19 
Covenants in perpetuity, also called permanent covenants, are developed in 
negotiation between the landowner and a government agency (or a government 
funded organisation). The document containing the covenant outlines the restrictions 
on the land and the management obligations and entitlements of the landowner 
(Binning and Young 1997). A management plan that sets out practical vegetation 
management actions is typically prepared in conjunction with a covenant. After the 
establislunent of a covenant on title, the landowner may be able to access funds and/or 
assistance to achieve the vegetation management actions outlined in the management 
plan, such as technical assistance. The amount of technical advice and assistance 
available to landowners varies between covenanting scheme providers. 
By 2005, protective conservation measures, including covenants, management 
agreements and operation plans, had been placed on 26,468 hectares comprising 180 
properties under the PFRP. The program has paid an average of $536 per hectare to 
secure these covenants, which was then approximately one third of the estimated 
market price. In exceptional cases, where no other options exist to protect a forest 
type, properties were purchased at an average cost of $1,022 per hectare (Smith 
2001). A total of21 properties (5,453 hectares) had been purchased by the program at 
that time (Department of Primary Industries and Water n.d.). 
Assistance and a range of incentives are provided by the Tasmanian Protected Areas 
on Private Land Program (PAPL) to place covenants or fixed-term management 
agreements on land. "P APL is a joint initiative between the Natural Heritage Trust's 
National Reserve System, the Department of Primary Industries, Water and 
Environment, the Conservation of Freshwater Ecosystem Values Project, the 
Tasmanian Fanners and Graziers Association, and the Tasmanian Land Conservancy" 
(Department of Primary Industries and Water 2007). P APL does not provide direct 
fmancial incentives in return for fixed-term conservation agreements, but does offer 
19 A 30 year agreement of the Remnant Vegetation Protection Scheme is offered in Western Australia 
(Kabii 2004); a 20 year property agreement is offered under the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 
1997 in New South Wales. The Queensland Vegetation Incentives Program, the Heritage Agreement 
Scheme in South Australia offer temporary management agreements for periods up to 20 years. 
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free technical advice, free drafting and registration of agreements. P APL also assists 
in obtaining exemptions from State land tax for covenanted titles; and, in 15 of the 
State's 29 municipal areas, rate rebates for covenanted titles. Currently in Tasmania 
over 100 properties now have covenants established under P APL (Jim Mulcahy, 2006, 
pers. comm.). 
The development of management plans for Tasmanian properties is enabled through 
Private Forests Tasmania (PFT) as part of the property management planning process. 
PFT is a "government funded authority established to specifically promote, foster and 
assist the private forest sector to sustainably manage native forests and encourage the 
expansion of plantations" (Private Forests Tasmania 2006). The main focus of the 
program is forestry and plantation management but it has a limited provision for 
assistance in conservation matters. The program does not provide funds directly, but 
refers landowners to available programs in Tasmania. 
Currently, no schemes provide funding to establish covenants and fixed-term 
management agreements on private land directly by municipal authorities in 
Tasmania. Fifteen out of 29 municipalities in Tasmania20 offer rate rebates for land 
that is protected by means of a covenant or management agreement. In some 
municipalities, a developer may negotiate to set aside some area for nature 
conservation in exchange for rezoning or other concessions. Rezoning is often 
referred to as a bonus development right where the developer foregoes the ability to 
develop a portion of a site. 
Another tool for local councils is the so-called Green Offset. This is a market-based 
tool underpinned by the premise that the negative impact of a development can be 
offset by a positive environmental action on, or nearby, the development site. The 
organisation or person who wants to undertake the development will have to pay for 
the offset to take place or pay someone else to undertake the environmental action 
(Environment Protection Authority 2002). 
The placement of a management agreement or covenant over a parcel of land is 
sometimes a prerequisite for gaining access to other monetary benefits, rebates, or 
20 These include: Burnie, Clarence, Devonport, George Town, Glamorgan/Spring Bay, Hobart, Huon 
Valley, Kentish, Kingborough, Latrobe, Launceston, Meander Valley, Sorell, Waratah/Wynyard, and 
West Tamar. Break O'Day had a scheme and cancelled it in April of 2005. 
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concessions. For instance, tax relief is provided to landowners on the proviso that 
land is protected by means of a covenant or management agreement.21 Further, the 
landowner has access to subsidies and stewardship payments provided by all levels of 
government for the purpose of assisting the undertaking of further management 
actions on reserved land. For instance, P APL monetary grants are available in some 
circumstances to assist with conservation works associated with conservation 
agreements (e.g. fencing). In some circumstances, entry into an agreement through 
P APL may also attract priority assistance from other programs (Jim Mulcahy, 2006, 
pers. comrn.). 
The preceding discussion focussed on biodiversity conservation on private land 
through participation in a wide range of incentive schemes with different funding 
avenues. In the next chapter the literature concerned with the uptake of incentive 
programs and related conservation choice is reviewed. 
21 The Federal Minister for the Environment and Heritage approved several covenanting programs for 
the purposes of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997. In Tasmania the PFRP and PAPL were approved 
(Department of Environment and Water Resources 2006). 
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3 Literature review 
The previous chapter reviewed the incentive programs available to Australian 
landowners to conserve biodiversity on private land. Landowners are encouraged to 
participate in various incentive programs to formally protect areas of conservation 
significance on their land. By making such schemes available, governments in 
Australia are aiming to increase landowner participation in conservation, thereby 
adding to currently existing areas of land set aside for biodiversity conservation. A 
better understanding of the decision framework surrounding the participation m 
incentive programs may help increase the total area of land set aside for biodiversity 
conservation in Australia. 
An understanding of landowner participation can be gained through descriptive 
studies that look at, for instance, participation rates and areas managed sustainably 
(for instance in the annual reports of the former Private Forest Reserve Program in 
Tasmania; Vercoe 2003). Case studies can also provide an understanding of 
landowner behaviour. For instance, conservation auctions have provided information 
on the relationship between landowner participation and the level of compensation 
payment (Connor, Ward eta/. 2007). Further, experimental economics can be used to 
understand landowner behaviour. This method was used to, for instance, test the 
efficacy of policy approaches and also to guide the " ... design of an on-ground trial 
of a recharge cap and trade scheme" (Connor Ward eta/. n.d., p.l). In addition, more 
complex studies based on behavioural models, ·having their origins in different 
disciplines, can also be undertaken to develop a complete picture of the decision to 
participate. 
In this chapter the literature related to incentive program uptake and conservation-
related choice is reviewed. The focus of this review is on empirical studies carried 
out in the USA, Canada, Europe and Australia from the mid 1980s onwards and 
includes literature drawn from various disciplines. The review begins with an 
overview of biodiversity conservation by voluntary activity without receipt of 
fmancial assistance. This is followed by a review of the behavioural models used in 
economics to study participation in incentive programs: profit maximisation and 
utility maximisation. These sections give an overview of the empirical literature as it 
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relates to the behavioural models. Four groups of variables that are corrunonly found 
to affect participation are described. The last section of this chapter reviews different 
econometric approaches used to analyse the decision to participate in incentive 
programs, focussing particularly on the latent class method used in this dissertation. 
3.1 Voluntary conservation without participation in an incentive 
program 
Biodiversity values on private land can be protected by means of participating in an 
incentive program. However, biodiversity values can also be protected by voluntary 
activity without receipt of any fmancial or other assistance from any government or 
privately funded programs. The motivation for voluntarism may be the so-called 
"warm-glow effect" it generates (Becker 1992), but may also be explained by, for 
instance, tradition, reputation, or the desire for recognition by a community 
(Economic Focus 1998). AdditionaUy, the landowner's short-term as well as long-
term self-interest may be to protect biodiversity (Gunningham and Young 2001). 
Voluntarism is not necessarily inconsistent with economic theory, which traditionally 
assumes that homo economicus operates in the pursuit of rational self-interest. From 
the perspective of behavioural economics 22 it may be argued that self-interested 
individuals behave altruistically because they get some utility from doing so (e.g. 
Andreoni 1988, 1990). 
Defining the characteristics of landowners who are likely to display voluntary 
behaviour is complex. Some studies have focussed on landowner experience as an 
important driver of voluntary behaviour. These studies have found that control and 
knowledge of the outcome of an action increases voluntarism (Slavic 1987; 
Kamppinen and Walls 1999). The more complex a system is believed to be, or the 
lower the level of knowledge about a system, the more cautious people are likely to be 
about change (Kamppinen 1997). 
This finding is consistent with the success of education and awareness campaigns 
aimed at increasing the landowner's knowledge base which successfully increases 
22 
"A branch of economics that concentrates on explaining the economic decisions people make in 
practice. Behavioural economists " ... seeks to use psychology to inform economics" (Camerer 1999, 
p.l0575). 
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voluntary protection of biodiversity by landowners (e.g. Kaplan 1984; Scherer 1990; 
Schrader 1995; Gilfedder and Kirkpatrick 1997). Gunningham and Young (2001, p.4) 
emphasise that motivational instruments and mechanisms that develop a "custodial 
ethic" and "community nonn" are fundamental to successful biodiversity 
conservation. 
The literature concludes that if there is a gap between public interest in biodiversity 
conservation and the private interests of the landowner it will make it more difficult to 
rely on voluntarism alone to meet conservation targets (Gunningham and Young 
2001). Biodiversity values may be lost in the future if the reliance to conserve was 
solely on voluntary implementation of conservation practices, making a case for a 
range of policy instruments to be used (Chapter 2). 
3.2 Economic approach to studying landowner choice 
The importance of understanding the decision making process with regard to 
participation in policy programs was recognised, for instance, by Brotherton (1989). 
This recognition led to a focus on the development of theoretical behavioural models 
in economics (e.g. Lynne, Shonkwiler et a/. 1988; Beedell and Relunan 2000), 
psychology, and the other social sciences (e.g. Sinden and King 1990). 
In economics, the development of models explaining the decision of whether or not to 
participate in incentive programs have been based on two different behavioural 
assumptions: profit maximisation and utility maximisation. While the theoretical 
basis of these two behavioural approaches is discussed in Chapter 4, the empirically 
based literature that applies these models is reviewed in this section. 
In a profit maximising framework, the decision of a landowner to participate in a 
conservation incentive program is guided by maximising profit in a single period or 
over time. Parks and Schorr (1997) define the landowner's problem as maximising 
profit by choosing the optimum area of land to enrol in a program. This maximisation 
problem includes the option of selling the land. 
Studies based on the profit maximisation framework clearly establish the link between 
participation rates and program funding amounts and the fmancial and resource 
constraints of landowners (Greiner, Herr eta!. 2003). Plantinga, Alig eta/. (2001) 
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also find that policy instruments that offset higher opportunity costs are more 
attractive and encourage participation. 
In a utility maximising framework other objectives the landowner may have for their 
land, including non-economic motivations can be incorporated (Chapter 4). These 
non-economic motivations have traditionally mainly been the focus of other 
disciplines (e.g. Vanclay and Lawrence 1995; Schaberg, Holmes eta/. 1999; Vanclay 
2004). More recently, however, many economic studies have found that both land 
ownership and management are strongly related to these non-economic variables (e.g. 
Erickson, Ryan et al. 2002; Jennings and van Putten 2003). These variables, which 
are now recognised as potentially having a significant impact on management 
decisions and participation rates, cannot be easily encompassed in a strict profit 
maximising framework. In this context a utility maximisation framework is a less 
restrictive framework and will accommodate these non-economic variables (Lynne, 
Shonkwiler eta!. 1988). 
A sizable empirical literature in economics has been developed, particularly 
agricultural economics, that examines the impact of a range of landowner 
characteristics, property characteristics, and the business aspects of the farm 
operation, on participation in incentive schemes within the utility maximising 
framework. For instance, several models were developed to describe landowner 
participation in programs aimed at changing management practices, in particular soil 
management (e.g. Ervin and Ervin 1982; Esseks and Kraft 1986; Drost, Long et a/. 
1996). 
Where the utility maximising approach has been applied to the incentive scheme 
participation decision four main groups of variables form the landowners ' decision 
framework: program characteristics; landowner characteristics; property and business 
characteristics; and landowner attitude (e.g. Purvis, Hoehn et a!. 1989; Cooper and 
Keirn 1996). 
The next sections review the literature that has investigated participation in incentive 
schemes from the perspective of one or more of these four groups of variables. Not 
all studies reviewed apply the utility maximising approach and some studies are from 
other disciplines, such as, psychology. The headings of the sections below reflect the 
variable group on which that section focuses. 
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3.3 Program characteristics 
An incentive program may be characterised by a number of attributes, such as, 
funding amount, length of the commitment, and legal implications. A small number 
of studies has focused on the link between program attributes and landowner utility 
maximisation and the impact of the program attributes on the decision framework 
(e.g. Purvis, Hoehn eta!. 1989; Cooper and Keirn 1996). 
Much of the literature linking the likelihood of participating in a scheme to the 
monetary rewards offered is based on findings from the soil conservation and 
management programs in the USA. These empirical studies confirm the relationship 
between the size of an inducement payment and the likelihood of participation. 
Farmers are found to be more likely to participate in a soil conservation program with 
higher payments for the implementation of a series of management actions (Purvis, 
Hoehn et a/. 1989). This fmding is confirmed by Cooper and Keirn (1996) and 
Greiner, Herr et a/. (2003) who found that the likelihood of implementing soil 
conservation practices increased with higher inducement payments. Lynch, Hardie et 
a/. (2002) also found that installation of riparian buffer zones in Maryland in the USA 
increased with higher incentive payments. 
Higher payments also increased participation in conservation reserve programs for 
highly erodable cropland in the USA (Esseks and Kraft 1986). Stevens, White et a/. 
(2002) found that US landowners were guided by monetary motives and required 
'realistic' levels of compensation in order for them to agree to participate in programs 
where they lose private rights such as access and timber rights (see also Chisholm and 
Dumsday 1988 in Australia).23 
The positive relationship between higher payments and increased participation seems 
to be straightforward. However, there is little information on the shape of the curve 
describing this relationship. It is also unclear from the above studies whether there 
are any 'groups' for whom the response to higher payments varies, that is, who would 
not, under any circumstance, participate. 
Several other program characteristics have also been found to impact on participation 
rates. Wynn, Crabtree et al. (2001), who studied the effect of participation in 
23 The study finds that US landowners are very reluctant to loose these rights. 
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environmental schemes on farm income in Scotland, found that high compliance cost, 
which effectively reduces total farm income and effort required after joining the 
program, would both decrease the likelihood of participation. 
Many studies also suggest that longer periods of commitment to a scheme had a 
significant negative impact on the uptake of a program (Esseks and Kraft 1986; 
Gasson and Hill 1990; Stevens, White et a/. 2002; Home 2004). The relationship 
between scheme duration and the likelihood of scheme participation was not found to 
be significant in a study in the UK by Wilson (1997). 
Program flexibility, in particular allowing for easy succession planning for families, 
was also found to affect participation (Wilson 1997). Johnston, Swallow et a/. ( 1999) 
found in a valuation study, which estimated citizens' willingness to pay (WTP) for a 
watershed management plan in the USA, that confidence in the payment mechanism 
as an efficient and guaranteed funding source had a significant positive impact on 
program uptake. Dedrick, Hall et a/. (2000) found that landowner attitude towards the 
agency responsible for delivering the program also determined participation. 
Home {2004) examined the factors that affect the acceptability of biodiversity 
conservation and the amount of compensation needed in private forests in Finland. In 
tllis study it was found that the legal implications of joining a conservation incentive 
program had an impact on the acceptability of entering into a contract to protect 
biodiversity. 
3.4 Landowner characteristics 
Although only a small number of studies included program characteristics in their 
economic analysis (reviewed above) , many studies have included the influence of 
socio-economic factors on landholder decision making and participation in incentive 
schemes. Wilson ( 1996), Drake, Bergstrom et a/. ( 1999) and Greiner, Herr et a/. 
(2003) all reported that socio-economic characteristics, such as age, education, and 
residency, were important in explaining farmer conservation behaviour and 
participation. 
Younger people who were preoccupied with pursuing other activities were found less 
likely to participate in incentive schemes than older people by Steel (1996) and 
Lynch, Hardie eta/. (2002) in the USA and Dupraz, Vanslembrouck eta/. (2003) in 
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Europe. Higher education had a positive effect on likely participation in Europe 
(Wilson 1997; Dupraz, Vanslembrouck et al. 2003) and longer residency increased 
the willingness to enter an incentive program in Wales in the UK (Wilson 1997). 
Landowner tenure has also been found to have an impact on the willingness to 
participate in incentive programs in a number of studies. For instance, landowners 
were associated with faster entry into programs in Scotland than those who rented 
their land (Wynn, Crabtree et al. 2001). Further, non-farmers were more likely to 
participate in erosion control programs than full-time farmers (e.g. Force and Bills 
1989; Kraft, Lant et a!. 1996), possibly because non-farmers were in a more 
favourable financial situation. 
Mixed results were found in studies that included the effect of succession plans on 
participation in incentive programs. The intention to transfer a farm to a successor, 
thereby extended the planning period length to include the successor, may discourage 
a landowner from addressing an environmental issue by means of participating in a 
scheme. Long term planning horizons may tend to discourage landowners from 
incurring costs to address environmental issues in the short run. In contrast, Ervin and 
Ervin (1982) found that longer planning periods were associated with lower discount 
rates which are associated with making participation more attractive. However, 
Wynn, Crabtree et a/. (200 I) report that in Scotland, the presence of a successor to 
take over the farm did not have an impact on the likelihood of farmer participation in 
conservation schemes. 
Landowner awareness of an environmental problem also has a significant impact on 
likely participation in incentive programs. Esseks and Kraft (1986) in the USA, and 
Sinden and King (1990) in Australia found that landowners who know of an 
environmental problem on their farm, were more likely to implement measures to 
control these problems on their property. 
Landowner awareness of available incentive programs and the options provided by 
the programs, also impacted on participation. Landowners who did not participate in 
conservation incentive schemes were generally less aware of, and less informed about, 
available incentive schemes than those who participated. A history of prior 
participation in incentive schemes in Europe also significantly increased the 
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likelihood of entry into another scheme (Drake, Bergstrom et a!. 1999; Wynn, 
Crabtree et a!. 2001 ). 
Awareness of incentive schemes is frequently gained tlrrough neighbourhood 
networking. Networking increases the probability of participation in a program 
(Skerratt 1994 quoted in Wynn, Crabtree et al. 2001). Drake, Bergstrom eta!. (1999) 
also found that participating neighbours and relatives had a positive influence on the 
likely participation of a landowner. 
3.5 Property and business characteristics 
Business and property characteristics that have been found to play a role in the 
decision framework include property size, agricultural use, income, and household 
debt. Landowners with larger farms in Europe were more likely to participate in 
environmental programs (Drake, Bergstrom eta!. 1999; Dupraz, Vanslembrouck eta!. 
2003). Increased participation is likely to be due to economies of scale for larger 
farms in producing conservation benefits because fencing, for instance, can be carried 
out using existing infrastructure. Higher participation of larger farms may also be 
attributable to lower marginal utility of lost income. 
An evaluation of the Environmentally Sensitive Area scheme (ESA) in the United 
Kingdom found that one of the main factors determining participation was the 
changes required to the land (Wynn, Crabtree et al. 2001). Where the scheme 
prescription fitted the farm situation better24 , the probability of participation in a 
scheme increased. If there were many changes required to the way the farm was 
being managed, it was likely to impact negatively on the decision to participate in an 
incentive program (Vanclay and Lawrence 1995; Drost, Long eta!. 1996) as it was 
more costly to enter. 
Similarly, Esseks and Kraft (1986) found that participation in a conservation reserve 
program in the USA was more likely when some grazing was allowed, suggesting that 
this would allow landowners to continue their current practices relatively unaltered, 
thus making it less costly. A report prepared by Gilfedder and Kirkpatrick (1995) 
24 This can also be interpreted as the attribute of a scheme (section 3.3). However it is presented in this 
section as the focus is on changes to existing property characteristics. 
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indicated that higher participation rates in Tasmania were likely when the landowner 
was paid for changing management practices while maintaining some productive 
capacity of the land. 
The role of off-farm income has been found to have two potential effects on 
participation in incentive schemes: it may reflect the availability of additional funds 
(Loftus and Kraft 2003); and, on the other hand, it may reflect the need of the family 
to have additional income to cover living expenses (e.g. Tisdell and Harrison 1999). 
Farmers in the USA who were less reliant on farm income were found to be more 
likely to participate in a conservation reserve program (Loftus and Kraft 2003). 
Farmers, whose primary income source was from farming, who anticipated 
production losses, and hence lower farm income, from conserving biodiversity by 
setting aside forested areas were less likely to participate in incentive programs in 
Australia (Tisdell and Harrison 1999). 
Landowners with larger farm debt, and who depended on farming for their income, 
were less likely to participate in incentive schemes or to implement conservation 
actions (Loftus and Kraft 2003). The authors speculated that these landowners may 
not have been financially able to incur what was perceived to be the high opportunity 
cost of setting aside productive areas of their property. Farmers with high debt levels 
may be forced to place greater weight on financial returns, which may not include 
conservation. 
Force and Bills (1989) indicate that opportunity costs explained much of the 
participation in the soil conservation scheme in New York State. Landowners who 
were reliant on the income obtained from farming only, were less likely to participate 
in incentive programs. Landowners with fewer financial constraints were also more 
likely to join an incentive program (Gasson and Potter 1988). 
The studies reviewed thus far found that a range of program characteristics, 
landowner characteristics, and property and business characteristics impacted on the 
decision to participate in an incentive program. The utility maximisation approach 
(discussed in detail in Chapter 4) also accommodates a range of non-economic 
motivations, including attitudes to environmental issues and conservation. The 
behavioural foundation for the role of attitudes in decision making originates in 
psychology (discussed in detail in Chapter 4). The Hbility to 'measure' attitudes 
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allows them to be incorporated into an economic model. The effect of attitudes on 
participation is the subject of the next section. 
3.6 Landowner attitudes 
Attitudes25 have been found to play a significant role in decision making processes. 
In this context, a number of studies have related environmental attitudes to the choice 
of participation in incentive programs aimed at conservation. Other studies that have 
incorporated a variable for attitude in landowner decision models have generally 
based this variable on the measurement of an individual's pro-environmental or anti-
environmental attitude or belief (e.g. Aldrich et al. 2005). The measurement of 
environmental attitude was operationalised by Dunlap and van Liere (1978). Studies 
that incorporate environmental attitudes frequently measured these attitudes using 
Likert (1932) scale rating systems applied to questions that weigh the value of nature 
versus economic growth (Corbett 2002). 
Klosowski, Stevens et al. (200 1) established that those landholders who participated 
in incentive programs had a more favourable attitude towards the environment. Luzar 
and Diagne (1999) and Drake, Bergstrom et a/. ( 1999) also found that their results 
supported the hypothesis that landowners with a positive environmental attitude were 
more likely to participate in reserve programs. In Europe Dupraz, Vanslembrouck et 
a!. (2003) found that attitudinal characteristics towards the environment strongly 
affected participation in different agri-environmental schemes. Gasson and Potter 
(1988) in the UK found that farmers' responses to incentives were dependent on their 
attitude to conservation. 
A variety of papers have examined the influence of attitude on conservation 
behaviour. For example, Soderqvist (2003) found that a landowner with a positive 
environmental attitude was guided by the feeling of ' doing some good for the larger 
community' and concluded that the relevance of the "public environmental benefits 
were a rather important motive for farmer participation" in incentive programs 
(Soderqvist 2003, p. 117). Lynne, Shonkwiler et a!. (1988) also found that stronger 
conservation attitudes raised voluntary conservation effort in the USA and concluded 
2s Attitudes are learned stable psychological tendencies to evaluate particular entities with favour or 
disfavour. 
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that this may reduce the need for net incoming-enhancing programs. Wynn, Crabtree 
et a/. (200 1) found that landowner attitude to conservation explained early entry into 
conservation schemes (timing) but did not impact on the probability of entry. The 
link between attitude and entry into a program is also questioned by Vanclay and 
Lawrence (1995) who indicated that landowner behaviour may change due to 
intervening factors, such as financial opportunity, even if the attitude remained the 
same. 
As the literature discussed so far suggests, the participation decision is expected to 
depend on a number of variables that can be loosely classified as program 
characteristics, landowner characteristics, property and business characteristics, and 
landowner attitude. 
As mentioned in Section 3.3, the attributes of an incentive program are expected to 
play a role in a landowner's decision to participate in a program. The Choice survey 
approach gathers data in a way that allows the measurement of the contribution of 
different attributes of a good or service, or in this case incentive program, to the 
choice. A brief review of the choice modelling literature, in particular environmental 
choice modelling, is given below. 
3. 7 Choice survey 
The choice modelling approach investigates " ... people's willingness to give up some 
amount of an attribute26 in order to achieve more of another'' (Bennett 1999, p.3). 
Variation in the level of the environmental alternatives and an associated cost with at 
least one of the attributes means that the marginal rate of substitution of the attributes 
can be found or can be used to derive implicit prices or to develop welfare measures 
(Bennett 1999). 
Choice modelling was first used in a marketing context (e.g. Wittink and Cattin 1989; 
Farber and Griner 2000) to elicit responses to goods and services with various 
potential combinations of attributes (e.g. Earnhart 2002 in the context of housing 
decisions). The choice technique was later used to assess the dollar value of goods, 
26 An attribute is the description of the environment/product/service (for example the colour red is the 
attribute of a car which is the product). 
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such as environmental goods, that are often not traded in a market. More recently 
choice modelling has been used to investigate equity preferences in benefit cost 
analyses (Scarborough, Bennett eta!. 2004), to value recreation, transport, health, and 
in the context of cultural valuation. The question of allocating funds to policy 
programs so that welfare is maximised can be addressed by measuring the effect of 
different policies and estimating the change in utility between different groups in 
society. 
Rolfe, Bennett et a/. (2000, p.i) used a choice experiment to " ... estimate the values 
held by Brisbane residents for both environmental and social factors associated with 
tree clearing in the Desert Uplands region of central-western Queensland". 
Mallawaarchchi, Blarney eta!. (2001) examined placing a value on the protection of 
natural vegetation in areas suitable for cane production. Whitten and Bennett (200 I) 
identified the non-market value of wetlands in the southeast and eastern region of 
Australia. The value of watershed quality improvements was investigated by Farber 
and Griner (2000) in the USA. A paper by Kerr and Sharp (2004) used choice 
modelling to estimate the types and scale of mitigation that were acceptable to local 
communities in New Zealand to compensate for adverse environmental effects in 
streams from development projects. Choice modelling was also used to assess the 
value of amenities and quality improvement of recreation locations by Schroeder and 
Louviere ( 1999) and Hearne and Salinas (2002) in Costa Rica. The latter study 
demonstrated that in general tourists preferred improving infrastructure, information, 
and low entrance fees. Tourists from outside the country preferred restrictions in the 
access to some trails and had a higher marginal willingness-to-pay for information. 
Choice modelling has been used to estimate cultural values and trade-offs. Rolfe and 
Windle (2003) estimated the non-use value of protecting cultural heritage sites in 
relation to further water allocations to irrigation. Cultural values for large increases in 
protected areas, as estimated by non-indigenous groups, were lower than for 
aboriginal people. However, non-indigenous groups held positive values for small 
increases of protected cultural heritage site. A similar study was carried out by 
Windle and Rolfe (2002) that looked at the values held by aboriginal people and other 
groups in society on floodplain development. Again, differences between the way 
non-indigenous people and indigenous people value water were evident. The general 
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community was more concerned about environmental issues than additional 
protection of cultural heritage sites. 
Choice modelling has been used in the medical and health care sectors eliciting non-
use value for several health related issues. For instance, Scott, Watson eta!. (2003) 
used choice modelling to determine patient preferences for 'out of hours' care. 
Farrara, Ryana et a!. (2000) showed that choice modelling was useful within the area 
of health care priority setting to estimate cost per unit of benefit ratios for competing 
clinical service developments. 
Very few studies have applied choice modelling to study preferences for the attributes 
of policy instruments. Conjoint analysis 27 was used in a policy context to " . .. 
examine landholder attitude toward specific management program attributes and 
requirements" by Stevens, White et a!. (2002, p.169). The study found that US 
landowners were reluctant to lose private rights such as access and timber rights and 
would not participate in incentive programs without realistic levels of compensation 
of between US$ 53 and US$ 185 per hectare per year. 
A study by Horne (2004) carried out in Finland was the only study at the time of 
writing that used choice modelling for a decision problem similar to that of this 
research. Horne (2004, p.3) examined factors that affect the "acceptability of 
voluntary contracts of biodiversity in non-industrial private forests and the amount of 
compensation needed". If the forest owner is the initiator of the contract, an average 
compensation of 224 euro per hectare would be needed to protect small areas of forest 
for 1 0 years. 
An overview of the econometric modelling methods that were used in the literature is 
presented in the next section. The econometric methods include logit, probit, 
multinomial logit models, tobit models, and latent class analysis. The latent class 
analysis is used in this current research. 
27 Conjoint analysis is a statistical technique used to detennine how people value different attributes of 
a product. Utilities of different levels of an attribute can be calculated on the basis of listing the 
combinations of product attributes in order of decreasing preference (Lilien and Kotler 1983). 
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3.8 Econometric modelling approaches 
The decision to participate in an incentive program is a binary choice (yes/no or 1/0) 
and as such the dependent variable is a discrete outcome. In the logit and probit 
approaches the dependent variable is discrete. These models are collectively also 
known as qualitative response models (Green 2003). The goal of the models is to 
quantify the relationship between the independent variables (such as socio-economic 
and business characteristics) and the probability of joining a program. Logit models 
are most often used to analyse participation in incentive programs aimed at changing 
management that benefits environmental and conservation outcomes. 
A logit model was used by Wynn, Crabtree et a!. (200 1) to predict the probability of 
entry into a scheme aimed at changing land management practices. The dependent 
variables in their model were related to landowner and property characteristics. 
Drake, Bergstrom et al. (1999) used the logit model to explain participation in an agri-
environment scheme. They also used socio-economic variables as the independent 
variables. In Australia, a logit model was applied to investigate the adoption of soil 
conservation measures in New South Wales by Sinden and King (1990). The 
independent variables in their study included the adoption process, land factors, 
personal factors, economic factors, and institutional factors. 
Soderqvist (2003) applied a logit analysis to investigate the determinants of Swedish 
landowners' willingness to participate in a wetland creation program, including 
observable and non-observable landowner characteristics and attitudes. Stevens, 
White et al. (2002) applied a logit model including socio-economic and program 
characteristics (including funding amount), and attitude variables to predict 
participation in a forest management program. A logit model was applied by Force 
and Bills (1989) to examine participation rates in a conservation reserve program in 
New York. They included socio-economic as well as attitudinal variables in their 
model. 
A study by Klosowski, Stevens et a!. (200 1) applied a logit model to estimate the 
effects of the economic incentives offered by a hypothetical scheme on the likelihood 
of participation?8 This study particularly focussed on the probability of coordinated 
28 The results were compared to those obtained using OLS regression. 
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management between landowners and included attitudinal variables. Esseks and Kraft 
(1986) used a logit regression to determine whether changes to incentive scheme 
characteristics in southern Illinois would change likely participation. 
In addition, Soule, Tegene et a!. (2000) used a probit model to analyse the influence 
of land tenure on the adoption of conservation practices. Cooper and Keirn (1996) 
used a probit model to predict farmer adoption of environmentally sound practice as a 
function of the payment offer. The predictive powers of the logit and probit 
specifications are generally comparable, but the higher computational demands of the 
probit model and the generally weak theoretical justification for employing a probit 
specification limits practical use of this model. This means that the logit model is 
more widely used in empirical work (Greene 2003). 
The logit and pro bit models are used in the context of binary choice models. If these 
models are generalised to more than two alternatives they are referred to as 
multinomial logit models. Multinomial logit models are frequently used in studies 
that gather decision data using a choice modelling approach. A study by Horne 
(2004) in Finland applied a multinomial logit model to predict participation in a 
conservation incentive program. Horne's (2004) study incorporated independent 
variables related to landowner, property, and incentive program characteristics. 
An early study by Purvis Hoehn et a!. (1989) applied a tobit model to estimate the 
participation in a filter strip program. In tobit models the dependent variable is 
continuous instead of discrete, which allowed participation rates to be estimated. The 
independent variables included payment level, transaction cost, and future 
expectations and preferences as independent variables. Tobit models are a direct 
extension of the logitlprobit models. Tobit models relate to both quantity and 
probability, frequently referred to as joint decisions models (Green 2003). 
Another approach to analysing choice data that characterises heterogeneity in 
preferences for program attributes on the basis of attitude and socio-economic 
characteristics is the latent class approach. In this approach classes of individuals are 
assumed to be homogenous with respect to their preferences for alternatives as well as 
their sensitivity to changes in the levels of the attributes of the alternatives (Lee, 
Fujiwara eta/. 2003). 
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No previous study has used the latent class approach to incentive program choice as is 
applied in this dissertation. The development of latent class models and their 
application to date is reviewed below. The latent class model is specified in Section 
5.1. 
3.8.1 Latent class models 
The development of latent class models using empirical data is common in many 
disciplines including the health sciences (e.g. Bucholz et a/. 1996; Sullivan, Kessler et 
a/. 1998; Thatcher, Morey et a/. 2003), social sciences (e.g. McCutcheon 1987; 
Yamaguchi 2000), marketing (e.g. Swait 1994), and in travel behaviour research (e.g. 
Lee, Fujiwara eta/. 2003). The latent class approach has also been applied in a study 
by Bijmolt, Paas et a/. (2003) to analyse country and consumer segmentation in 
Europe with respect to financial product ownership. 
A limited number of studies has developed latent class models of environmental 
economic preferences (e.g. Boxall and Adamowicz 2002, Morey, Thatcher et a/. 
2006, Scarpa and Thiene 2004). The models in these studies are estimated with the 
intention of identifying and characterising heterogeneity in environmental preference 
data. Boxall and Adamowicz (2002) applied the latent class approach to wilderness 
park choice data. They developed a model of wilderness recreation demand for five 
wilderness parks in Canada incorporating attitudinal measures and stated preferences 
over wilderness park attributes. The results showed that four classes of recreationists 
exist. Morey, Thatcher et a/. (2006) developed a latent class model characterising 
angler heterogeneity with respect to fishing characteristics of Green Bay in 
Wisconsin, USA. The results of this study suggest that "Green Bay anglers separate 
into a small number of distinct classes with varying preferences and willingness to 
pay for a PCB-free Green Bay" (Morey, Thatcher et a!. 2006, p. 91). Scarpa and 
Thiene (2004) used the latent class approach to model the destination choice of rock 
climbers in the northeast Alps of Italy. Their study revealed four 'well defined 
classes' on the basis of climber preference for alpine climbing destination attributes. 
Unlike the previous two latent class studies, this study did not incorporate an attitude 
or motivation variable in the model. 
In the current research the latent class modelling approach is applied to landowners' 
choice of conservation incentive programs incorporating landowner attitude and socio 
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economic characteristics. The rationale for using the latent class approach is that it is 
expected that landowner heterogeneity is reflected in their preferences for incentive 
programs attributes. Understanding landowner heterogeneity is particularly important 
from a policy perspective. Understanding landowner heterogeneity would enable 
better targeting of incentive programs and can potentially help prepare managers for 
unintended consequences of some programs. It would also enable a better 
understanding of the distributional consequences of landuse policy and programs. 
Some economic models account for heterogeneity by including socio-economic 
variables in the utility function or by stratifying individuals into segments on the basis 
of socio-economic variables. While these models 'account' for preference 
heterogeneity they do not adequately 'explain' the source of it, where heterogeneity 
may reflect other characteristics of individuals such as the motivation, attitude, and 
past experiences (Boxall and Adamowicz 2002). 
To adequately explain heterogeneity in demand analysis " ... there must be a priori 
knowledge of the element of heterogeneity" (Boxall and Adamowicz 2002, p.422). 
The latent class approach has advantages in explaining heterogeneity by constructing 
classes on the basis of observed measures such as attitude scales. Latent class models 
enhance the explanation of heterogeneity by incorporating unobserved heterogeneity 
and by adding structure to the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. 
The latent class approach has not previously been applied in the type of study central 
to this research. The latent class choice modelling approach is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5. Prior to this, Chapter 4 presents the theoretical foundations of the 
economic and psychological models used in this research. The use of choice 
modelling in the context of the theoretical approach is also discussed. 
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4 Theoretical framework 
Chapter 2 described the ways in which the market for biodiversity on private land in 
Australia fails to provide a socially optimal outcome. One of the ways in which 
govenunent addresses this market failure is through the provision of incentive 
programs that make available funding for the protection of biodiversity. Convincing 
landowners to set areas aside for conservation is paramount if adequate protection is 
to be achieved through voluntary measures. Understanding the decision framework of 
landowners who own and manage land of conservation values is important to ensure 
adequate numbers enrol in the available schemes (Chapter 3). Moreover, it is 
important to understand landowner preferences in a scenario where entry is forced if 
voluntary measures do not adequately achieve conservation targets. 
In Section 4.1 the economic theory and behavioural foundation of land use decisions 
by landowners is explored. The data used to build an empirical model describing 
landowner preferences for incentive program attributes are gathered in this research 
using a Stated Preference (SP) method called choice modelling. In Section 4.1 .1, the 
behavioural foundation, based in the field of psychology, which underpins the use of 
the SP technique, is briefly explored. The SP choice modelling approach also has its 
roots in two distinct areas of economic theory: Random Utility Theory (RUT); and 
Lancaster consumer theory. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3 the latter two theories are 
discussed. Choice modelling is also founded in decision making theory developed in 
psychology discussed in Section 4.4. Chapter 5 presents the model estimation method 
and the statistical analysis used in this current research. 
4.1 Economic theory and behavioural foundation 
In economics the two most common approaches to studying landowner decision 
making are profit maximisation and utility maximisation (Chapter 3). Utility 
maximisation forms the basis of neoclassical theory of consumption. Standard 
consumer choice theory develops models that analyse a range of choice problems. In 
these models consumers are assumed to optimise their utility subject to budget 
constraints and other factors . Consumers are assumed to be rational decision makers 
who assign preferences to different bundles of goods and will choose the preferred 
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alternative. If a consumer has stable preferences then a consistent pattern of choice 
emerges. Utility can explain economic behaviour in terms of individuals aiming to 
increase, or maximise their utility. 
In this current research the landowner's decision to set aside a parcel of land for 
conservation is considered in the utility maximising framework. A landowner will 
conserve biodiversity values if the overall utility obtained from setting the land aside 
is greater than the utility of the status quo. From micro economic theory it follows 
that each individual chooses alternatives that maximise utility subject to budget 
constraints and other factors. 
In the literature reviewed in Chapter 3 the variables that contribute to the decision to 
protect land for conservation purposes were explored. Schematically this decision 
framework is described in Figure 3. 
Characteristics of the land 
(e.g. soil type/forest type) -
Income associated with land use f--
, . .... -:-- ----·-.-., 
i . Umdownei 
! -........ ' . ..·. ·- . 
' Land use 
---- choice* Non-observable landowner 
characteristics (e.g. attitude) 1-
Landowner characteristics 
(e.g. age, children, debt level) 1-
• e.g. Growms Potatoes, Tourist accommodation, Vineyard, and/or Conservation. 
Figure 3: Groups of variables included in a landholder's land use decision framework. 
As shown in Figure 3 above the landowners' land use decision framework is made up 
of four groups of variables which are income, property characteristics, socio economic 
characteristics of the landowner, and landowner attitudes?9 The variables that make 
up the groups are likely to have varying impact on the land use choice. Some 
interaction between variables may also be expected. For example, property 
29 Although there is no general agreement in the psychology literature upon what the term attitude 
denotes, most psychological definitions includes statements about an underlying state of mind or a 
feeling or disposition to behave in a certain way (e.g. Strauss 1945). 
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characteristics are expected to impact on income because soil types partly determine 
and limit production options. Landowner characteristics such as age or life stage may 
also impact on the land use choice, and thus on, for instance, conservation 
management activities. The land use choice for a parcel of land change to 
conservation only if the overall utility obtained from conserving the land is greater 
than the status quo, assuming the land is not already conserved. 
In the literature reviewed in Chapter 3 the attributes of an incentive program were 
reported to have an affect on landowner participation in conservation incentive 
programs and thus, ultimately, on the landowner's land use decision. Program 
attributes included not only the subsidies received (hereafter referred to as 
compensation funding) but also, for instance, the legal implications and land use 
restrictions imposed by the incentive program. 
The choice modelling approach is used in this current research to analyse choice 
behavior with respect to joining incentive programs. The data used to estimate 
landowner preferences for attributes of incentive programs are gathered using a 
Choice Survey. Choice modelling is one of a number of SP techniques used in the 
valuation of environmental goods. Others are, for instance, Contingent Valuation 
(CV), contingent rating, contingent ranking, and paired comparison (Morrison, 
Blarney et a/. 1996). The behavioural assumptions that underlie SP techniques have 
their origins in psychology. 
4.1 .1 Behavioural foundation of the Stated Preference technique 
Adamowicz, Louviere et al. (1998) note that SP techniques were developed as a 
natural analogue to the ". . . already well established Revealed Preference (RP) 
method" (p. 7). RP techniques, which includes the travel cost method, hedonic 
pricing, and the averting behaviour methods, are also commonly used to assess 
environmental use and non-use values (Morrison, Blarney et a/. 1996). The RP 
technique was not used in this research as this type of information was not available 
from previously defmed programs. 
The SP approach gathers data by asking subjects to make choices between 
hypothetical situations. The SP technique generates behavioural data from subject 
choices, but is in itself not a theory ofbehaviour (Adamowicz, Louviere eta/. 1998). 
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Consumer choice theory and econometric modelling techniques are applied to data 
gathered by means of SP techniques. 
As mentioned previously, choice modelling is a SP technique. In choice modelling, 
respondents choose the most appealing/best/most important of two or more goods or 
services described by a number of attributes (sometimes also referred to as 
characteristics in the literature). The choice modelling approach elicits choices 
between different combinations and varying levels of the attributes describing a good. 
The marginal rate of substitution between pairs of attributes can be found using choice 
modelling (Bennett 1999) and implicit prices or welfare measures can be estimated. 
The behavioral assumptions that underlie SP techniques, which are as such relevant to 
choice modelling, were developed by Thurstone (1927, 1959) and originate in 
psychology. The behavioral model that underlies the paired comparisons format 
posits that people are able to compare two states of being and determine what is, for 
example, 'best- worst', ' less preferred- more preferred', or 'most - least important' 
(Thurstone 1927). Later, Thurstone (1959) developed the behavioral assumption that 
supports the premise that people are able to make comparative judgments. 
Thurstone's models posit that people are able to choose between two extremes out of 
sets of three or more (Louviere 1994; Buckley, Devinney eta/. 2004). 
4.2 Random Utility Theory 
The behavioural theory at the foundation of SP is consistent with random utility 
theory (RUT). It is consistent with utility maximisation as a conceptual economic 
framework (Adamowicz, Louviere et a/. 1998). The behaviour of respondents can be 
forecast from an estimated utility function, which, in microeconomic theory is 
assumed to be coherent and invariant (Fujii and Garling 2003). 
RUT is used to estimate the probability of choice. To estimate these probabilities the 
utility (U) that individual (n) receives from choosing alternative (i) can be represented 
by equation 1. Variations in consumer choice can be explained by including a random 
element in the utility function (following the presentation of Adamowicz, Louviere et 
al. (1998), Boxall and Adamowicz (2002) and Walker and Ben-Akiva (2002)). 
(1) 
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Um =Unobserved utility of consumer n from alternative i 
Vm = Observable component of utility of consumer n from alternative i 
E, =Random unobserved component of utility of consumer n from alternative i 
The observable component of utility is a vector of factors that affect consumer n's 
utility, including choice-specific or individual-specific factors. The systematic 
component of utility that specifies the relationship between the explanatory variables 
(X} and choice behaviour can be written as follows: 
(2) 
Where fJ is a vector of utility coefficients and a is the Alternative Specific Constant 
(ASC). The systematic component of utility can be identified, and the parameters 
estimated, by determining how choice varies with different levels of attributes and 
differences in individual decision makers (Adamowicz, Louviere et a!. 1998). Due to 
the presence of a random component in the utility function, probabilistic statements 
about consumer behaviour can be made. 
In the decision to join a conservation incentive program a landowner (n) chooses from 
a finite set of incentive programs (C). Following Boxall and Adamowicz (2002) the 
probability (1t) that program i will be chosen (equation 4) is equal to the probability 
that the utility gained from program i is greater or equal to the utilities of choosing 
another program, kin C. 
(3) 
Different assumptions about the random tenn give rise to different probabilistic 
models. If errors are assumed to be distributed according to a bivariate nonnal 
distribution, a binary choice model can be specified (Thurstone 1927), which can be 
generalised to a multivariate case with a multivariate probit model. Type I extreme 
value (Gumbell) distributions 30 yield the conditional or multinomial logit model 
(McFadden 1974). A generalised extreme value distribution gives rise to the nested 
30 The 'three types theorem' by Fisher and Tippet asserts that there are only three types of distribution 
which can arise as limiting distributions of extreme values in random samples. In probability theory 
and statistics the Gumbel distribution is used to find the minimum tor the maximum) of a number of 
samples of various distributions. These distributions could be of the normal or exponential type 
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multinomial model (McFadden 1981 ). The standard assumption in RUT has been that 
the error terms are Independently and Identically Distributed (IID) following the type 
I extreme value distributions. 
Many economic models assume homogenous preferences. A conditional logit model, 
with a Gumbel distribution of the error term, can be used to estimate the probabilities 
where preferences are homogenous (McFadden 1981 ). When the attributes associated 
with each choice are substituted into V the choice probability is given by equation 4. 
(4) 
Where f3 is a vector of estimated parameters, not specific to n, and 11 is a scale 
parameter assumed equal to 1 when the model is not segment specific (Boxall and 
Adamowicz 2002). 
Lancaster consumer theory (discussed in the next section) gives rise to the idea that 
utility is obtained from the attributes of a good, in this case, the attributes of incentive 
programs. 
4.3 Lancaster consumer theory 
In the neoclassical tradition, utility models can be developed that analyse a range of 
choice problems. For each of these choice problems there are trade-offs between a 
range of alternatives. One branch of economic literature indicates that the attributes 
of a good determine the utility obtained from that good (Praag 1968). Lancaster's 
approach to consumer behavior gives rise to the idea that a good as such is not the 
ultimate object desired by consumers but rather that consumers demand the attributes 
which the good possesses (Lancaster 1971 ). Any good possesses an enormous 
number of these attributes, for instance, size, shape, colour, smell, and so on. 
Lancaster's consumer theory poses that the utility of a good or service can be 
decomposed into separate utilities for the attributes of that good. The overall utility 
contributes to the choice of that good or service (Lancaster 1971). 
Central to Lancaster's theory are the following observations (Lancaster 1991 , p.13): 
1. "The good per se, does not give utility to the consumer, it possesses 
characteristics, and those characteristics give rise to utility; 
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2. In general, a good will possess more than one characteristic, and many 
characteristics will be shared by more than one good; and 
3. Goods in combination may possess characteristics different from those 
pertaining to the goods separately". 
Lancaster theory helps understand how the utility of a conservation incentive program 
can in fact be broken down into separate utilities for attributes of the program. The 
attributes of an incentive program are expected to have an effect on landowner choice 
of program. One such attribute is, for instance, the size of the compensation payment. 
In the tradition of Lancaster in the current research, a landowner maximises utility by 
their choice of incentive program characterised by a bundle of program attributes. 
The actual theory that underpins the ability of an individual to make choices between 
bundles of attributes was based in psychology (Section 4.1.1 ). Theory on information 
processing and judgement in decision-making, which is also based in psychology, 
helps to understand how choices are made. Of particular interest in this context is the 
role of attitudes, which is the subject of the next section. 
4.4 Theory of planned behavior 
Both economic theory and psychology are concerned with behaviour and decision 
making. Findings that originate in psychology can help to understand how and why 
people make choices. One field of psychology which developed in parallel to 
economics focuses on the relationship between the environment and behaviour. 
Psychological theory states that the decision making process that underlies choice 
behaviour is "informed by perceptions31 and beliefs based on available information, 
and influenced by affect 32 , attitudes, motives 33 , and preferences 34 " (Ben-Akiva, 
McFadden eta/. 1999, p.l88). 
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen 2001) is the psychological model 
most often used by economists to link attitudes to the prediction of behaviour. The 
31 Perception is the cognition of sensation. 
32 Affect is the emotional state of the decision maker and its impact on cognition of the decision task. 
33 Motives are drives directed towards perceived goals. 
34 Preferences are comparative judgements between enti ties. 
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TPB "attempts to predict and understand behaviour by measuring the underlying 
determinants of that behaviour" (Beedell and Rehman 1999, p.l74). 
Attitude (Att) 
Social norm (SN) 
,-··' ....__ _____ ___, ,_. 
Perceived behavioural 
control (Pc) ,...--/ 
Behavioural 
intention (7) Behaviour 
Figure 4: The theory of planned behaviour (adapted from Beedell and Rehman 1999) 
An individual's attitude (Att) toward an issue and the perception of what others in 
society want, the Social Norm (SN), as well as other socio-economic characteristics 
will lead to behavioural intention. The behavioural intention is also affected by the 
landowner's perception of how easy or difficult it is to carry out the behaviour(Pc). 
More formally the relationship between behavioural intention, attitude and social 
norm can be specified as (adapted from Luzar and Diagne 1999): 
(5) 
Where (1) is the intention to perform a behaviour, which is related to the attitude 
toward performing the behaviour and the social norm for performing the behaviour. 
The weights (w) are empirically determined. The strength of the intention is closely 
associated with the cause of the behaviour. Attitudes are empirically measurable, in 
an indirect way. To say that an individual has a strong attitude towards an activity is 
another way of stating that they gain a large amount of utility from an action (Lynne, 
Shonkwiler et al. 1988). 
There is some debate regarding the relative strength of intention and attitude on 
behaviour. Garling, Gillholm et al. (1998) reported that the correlation between 
intention and behaviour was greater than between attitude and behaviour and 
56 
measuring relative intention improved the prediction of behaviour. Despite the lack 
of consensus on the relative importance of attitudes in the process of decision making, 
it is acknowledged they play a role in behaviour. 
The field of environmental psychology explores the relationship between 
environmental attitude and behaviour. Kaiser, Wolfing et a/. (1999) report that in 
1999, more than 1,400 publications in the field of psychology dealt with 
environmental problems. Of these, more than one third dealt with ecological 
behaviour of which more than one third (153 papers) related environmental attitude to 
ecological behaviour. 
Environmental attitudes are commonly divided into three mam groups: ego1st1c 
(egocentric), social-altruistic (or anthropocentric), and biocentric (or ecocentric 35 ) 
(Stem and Dietz 1994; Merchant 1992 quoted in Schultz and Zelezny 1999; Ruijgrok, 
Vellinga eta/. 1999). Studies have found that individuals who held more ecocentric 
attitudes tended to be more supportive of protection-oriented management. 
Anthropocentric individuals were more likely to support resource extraction strategies 
(McFarlane and Boxall 2003). 
There may be some interaction between environmental attitudes and socio-economic 
variables which impacts on behaviour. For instance, women are perceived to have 
more strongly held views towards environmental protection than males. 
Environmental attitudes are also positively related to higher income and the 
attainment of higher education levels (Stern and Dietz 1994; Steel 1996). The 
potential interaction between environmental attitudes and other variables leads both 
Kaiser, Wolfing et a/. (1999) and Steel (1996) to the conclusion that the direct 
relationship between environmental attitude and behaviour is tenuous. However, in a 
robust analysis these interactions would be identified. 
Some of the literature reviewed in Chapter 3 which looked at participation in 
incentive programs (e.g. Drake, Bergstrom et a!. 1999; Stevens, White et a!. 2002; 
Soderqvist 2003) and setting aside land for conservation (e.g. Force and Bills 1989; 
35 Dunlap and van Liere (1978) and Fransson and Garling (1999) argue that the New Environmental 
Paradigm (NEP) constitutes another environmental attitude in which humans perceive themselves as an 
integral part of nature. The NEP incorporates the relatively new the concepts of ' limits to growth' and 
'spaceship earth '. Although some may argue that these concepts are also inherent to the bio- or 
ecocentric attitude. 
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Klosowski, Stevens et a/. 2001 ), included environmental attitude variables in a utility 
maximisation framework. The role of environmental attitudes in predicting 
participation in incentive schemes was significant in all the above studies. 
In the current research attitudes were also evaluated and included as a variable in the 
decision model. The description of attitude used here is different to that defined in the 
above cited studies. In this current research it is assumed that a landowner's belief 
about the impact and outcome of establishing reserves on their land reflects their 
attitude. This approach was taken because extension programs tend to focus on 
changing 'attitudes' by providing information that affects people's evaluation of 
outcomes of reserve establishment. Thus, outcome evaluation of reserve 
establishment influences behaviour and reflects landowner attitudes. 
As discussed in the preceding sections, the RUT approach can be used to investigate a 
landowner's decision to set aside land for conservation. The utility maximisation 
framework allows the incorporation of socio-economic and attitude variables to 
explain the decision. The TPB underpins the inclusion of attitudes as a separate 
explanatory variable in the utility maximisation model. 
The next chapter presents the econometric approach (Section 5.1 and 5.1.1) used to 
model choice data gathered in this research and the statistical method (Section 5.1.2) 
used to analyse the data. The statistical methods used to analyse attitude data 
gathered as part of the same survey is presented in Section 5.2. The statistical method 
used to analyse the Best-Worst survey data, which was gathered prior to the Choice 
survey, is also presented (Section 5.3). 
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5 Estimation methods and statistical analysis 
As mentioned in Section 4.2, many economic models assume homogenous 
preferences. The probabilities for models with homogeneous preferences are 
estimated using, for instance, the conditional logit model (equation 4). However, the 
assumption of preference homogeneity is often not appropriate. For instance, 
landowner heterogeneity as reflected in preferences for incentive program attributes is 
to be expected. Some economic models have accounted for heterogeneity by 
including socio-economic variables in the utility function or by stratifying individuals 
into segments on the basis of socio-economic variables. Other studies have accounted 
for heterogeneity by following a two-step modelling procedure (e.g. Soderqvist 2003; 
Home 2004). In a two-step model cluster analysis is used to divide individuals into 
groups on the basis of their stated attitudes. The second step is then to apply a logit or 
multinomiallogit approach to each of the groups. 
These models 'account' for preference heterogeneity but do not adequately 'explain' 
its source, where heterogeneity may reflect other characteristics of individuals such as 
their motivations, attitudes, and past experiences (Boxall and Adamowicz 2002). The 
latent class approach (also referred to as the fmite mixture approach) discussed in the 
section below, can account for heterogeneity. 36 
5.1 Latent class model 
To account for heterogeneity in choice analysis " .. . there must be a priori knowledge 
of the element of heterogeneity'' (Boxall and Adamowicz 2002, p.422). The latent 
class approach accounts for heterogeneity by constructing classes on the basis of 
observed measures such as attitude scales. In constructing these classes socio-
economic characteristics can also be included as covariates. 
The inclusion of attitudes in the preference function has generated some discussion in 
the literature (e.g. Provencher & Moore 2006). The discussion centres around two 
criticisms. The first criticism relates to the value of including attitudes in terms of 
explaining a choice situation. Provencer & Moore (2006) argued that some 'common 
36 The latent class approach will be compared to the two-step method in section 8.4.4. 
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sense' interpretation of latent classes would make attitudinal scales redundant for 
purposes of resource management. However, it is acknowledged that latent class 
analysis does provide a relatively easy and cheap source of class identification 
(Provencher & Moore 2006). 
The second criticism relates to the likelihood of attitudes being endogenous variables 
in the explanation of choices. This would arise in this current research if a landowner 
choice of program were to influence his/her attitude. It is however argued that the 
attitude variable in this current research, that is, a landowner's attitude toward the role 
and impact of private conservation reserves, reveals a 'deeper' attitude that drives the 
utility derived from joining an incentive program. The attitude variable thus 
expresses a fundamental attitude that precedes joining an incentive program. The 
research therefore proceeds on the assumption that a landovroers' attitude toward the 
role and impact of private conservation reserves is not an expression of incentive 
program related preferences. 
In the latent class approach respondents make up several distinct segments (S) each 
with a different set of preferences (Provencher, Baerenklau et a!. 2002). Assuming 
that individual n belongs to segments (s=l, .... ,S) the utility function can be written 
as: 
(6) 
The latent class approach assigns individuals to " ... classes with identical preferences 
and estimates the probability of membership to each class along with their respective 
preference weights" (Scarpa and Thiene 2004, p.2). 
Equation 4 can now be written as: 
(7) 
where p and 11 are now utility and scale parameters specific to a segment (Boxall and 
Adamowicz 2002). Individuals can be allocated to one of the segments on the basis 
of their characteristics and their latent attitudes. To achieve this, a latent membership 
likelihood function is used. The membership likelihood function (M,;s) of individual 
n and segments is given by equation 8. 
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(8) 
P,; is a vector of latent attitudes held by individual n. Sn is a vector of observed socio-
demographic characteristics of individual n. Where T ps and Ts are parameter vectors. 
P,; can be defined by a vector of observed indicators of latent attitudes (Pn) 
(9) 
where til P are parameter vectors of the latent attitudes to be estimated. t;ns and t;np 
represent the error terms in equation 8 and 9 respectively. 
If equation 9 holds, M* can be expressed at an individual level by equation 10. 
(10) 
Zn is a vector of both the psychometric constructs (Pn) and the socio-economic 
characteristics (Sn) and A.s is a vector of parameters. In equation 11 the assumptions 
are incorporated into the probability of membership in segments. 
{11) 
If the joint probability of an individual belonging to segment s and choosing 
alternative i is given by equation 12, 
(12) 
then the probability that a randomly chosen individual n chooses alternative i is given 
by equation 13. 
s 
7rn(i) = L"ns" nls(i) (13) 
s~l 
The data used for estimating segment membership can be combined with preference 
data related to choice of product or service, thus allowing " ... joint estimation of the 
explanators of heterogeneity and the explanators associated with attributes of choice" 
(Boxall and Adamowicz 2002, p.422). 
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(14) 
Welfare can be estimated for latent class choice models to understand the 
distributional impact of change in the attributes. This topic is discussed in the next 
section. 
5.1.1 Welfare estimation 
The ultimate aim of many choice studies is to estimate the welfare implications of 
changes in one or more of the attributes of a product. The welfare impact associated 
with the increase or decrease of an attribute reflects the amount of compensation 
needed to maintain utility at a certain level. For instance a change in environmental 
quality, waiting time in a hospital que, or in this case, land use restrictions or legal 
implications of an incentive program, is associated with a welfare estimate reflecting a 
change in utility. 
Estimation of the welfare impact in latent choice models is based on Hanemarm's 
(1982) theory of welfare estimation in conditionallogit models (quoted in Boxall and 
Adamowicz 2002). Boxall and Adamowicz (2002) estimate the compensation 
variation on a segment by segment basis for latent choice models. As this current 
research involves estimating a WT A, the equivalent variation (EV) rather than the 
compensation variation is estimated. Following Boxall and Adamowicz (2002) the 
segment specific equivalent variation for individual n is given by: 
(15) 
Where Ys is the segment specific marginal utility of income, PsXk is the segment 
specific indirect utility over k choice, 0 is the initial state and 1 is the new state 
following a change in an attribute level in X in at least one of the choices in k. 
Accounting for segment membership in generating the welfare measure can be done 
by multiplying equation 15 by the probability of membership of segment s, namely 
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5.1.2 Statistical indicators for latent class analysis 
In this dissertation the latent class approach was used to model landowner preferences 
for incentive program attributes. The data used to estimate the model was obtained by 
means of a Choice survey. Landowner characteristics and attitudes, as well as 
property characteristics, collected in the same survey, were used as variables in the 
latent class analysis. The computer program used for estimating the latent class 
model was LatentGOLD Choice 4.0. 
As discussed in Section 5.1.1. latent class models classify individuals into classes. In 
addition to the standard goodness of fit, classification and prediction statistics, 
practitioners of the latent class approach use infonnation criteria to determine the 
number of classes. 
The chi-squared (X2) statistic with the corresponding degrees of freedom yields the 
asymptotic p -values, which can be used to determine whether the specified model fits 
the data. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC), based on the L2, are used to "weigh and fit the parsimony of a model" 
(Vermunt and Magidson 2005, p.46). 
The number of classes in a latent class model cannot be predefined and the optimal 
number of classes must be selected on the basis of statistical criteria. Moreover, 
Boxall and Adamowicz (2002, p.433) suggest that " ... conventional rules for this 
purpose do not exist and judgement and simplicity play a role in the final selection of 
the size of S'. 
The BIC, the AIC, the explanatory power of the model (R2), and the inherent intuitive 
correctness of the model, e.g. the signs of estimated parameters, serve as the main 
guides to determining the number of classes (see also Boxall and Adamowicz 2002; 
Scarpa and Thiene 2004; Morey, Thatcher et al. 2006). 
The BIC (sometime referred to as the Schwarz criterion) is a statistical information 
criterion. Following Morey, Thatcher et al. (2006), the BIC is given in equation 16, 
where (d) is the number of free parameters to be estimated, (n) is the number of 
observations and (B) is the maximised value of the likelihood function of the 
estimated model. 
BIC = -21nB+dln(n) (16) 
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Equation 16 becomes equation 1 7 under the assumption that the model error is 
normally distributed. 
(RSS) BIC =nln -,-1 +dln(n) (17) 
The BIC is a decreasing function of the Residual Sum of Squares (RSS) from the 
estimated model and an increasing function of the number of free parameters to be 
estimated. Lower values of the BIC for multiple class regression models, in 
comparison to a single class regression model, suggest heterogeneity in the data. 
Lower values of the BIC indicate a better model in terms accounting for 
heterogeneity. 
The AIC is a measure of the goodness of fit of an estimated statistical model (equation 
18). The AIC trades off the complexity of an estimated model against how well the 
model fits, assuming that the model errors are normally distributed. Similar to the 
BIC, smaller values of the AIC indicate better solutions. 
AIC = -2ln(B)+ 2d (18) 
The AIC sometimes over estimates the number of classes (Scarpa and Thiene 2004). 
It is therefore important that the number of chosen classes also account for the 
significance and the meaningfulness of the parameter estimates according to the " .... 
analyst's own judgement" (Scarpa and Thiene 2004, p.9). 
Another statistic is the Dissimilarity Index (DI), a descriptive measure which indicates 
how much " . . . observed and estimated cell frequencies differ from each other" 
(V ermunt and Magid son 2005, p.46). The DI is defined as follows: 
I' "' I' "' 
DI = {(L,•=t Cl n,. - q,.[) + (N- L,•=t q,.)} 
2N 
(19) 
where q is a particular alternative and is distributed as z2 • The classification statistic 
provides information on how well observed values predict latent classes, or how well 
the classes are separated. Classification is based on class membership probabilities. 
Observed and predicted values can be presented in a classification table where each 
cell reports the number of observations correctly or incorrectly classified. 
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In the preceding section the statistical methods used to analyse data obtained from the 
Choice survey was presented. The latent class approach used in this research to 
estimate the decision model allows the inclusion of several variables, including 
attitudes. Attitude data was obtained from a question included in the survey which 
asked landowners to rate how much they agreed with a number of statements 
regarding the role and outcome of establishing conservation reserves on private land. 
The section that follows shows how the attitude variable included in the latent class 
analysis was derived. The statistical method used in the analysis of the attitude data is 
also discussed. 
5.2 Statistical analysis of attitude data 
Attitude data were collected as part of both the BW and the Choice survey. In the 
survey respondents were asked to indicate their level of (dis)agreement with 
statements related to the role and outcome of conservation reserves on private land on 
a Likert scale. For instance the first 3 statements in this part of the survey were as 
follows: 
Conservation reserves on private land: 
Please tick 0 only 1 of the 5 options 
++ + +/-
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree 
Are an effective way to ensure wildlife 0 0 0 0 0 survival 
Are expensive to manage 0 0 0 0 0 
Create a good image for landowners 0 0 0 0 0 
The attitude data were analysed using a Principal Component Analysis (PCA). PCA 
is a multivariate technique that reduces a large body of data so that a maximum of the 
variance is extracted (Harman 1967). PCA involves a mathematical procedure that 
transforms a number of (possibly) correlated variables into a (smaller) number of 
uncorrelated variables called principal components. The first principal component 
accounts for as much of the variability in the data as possible, and each succeeding 
component accounts for as much of the remaining variability as possible. 
More formally, the object of component analysis is to represent a variable in terms of 
several underlying factors, or hypothetical constructs. The model for component 
analysis is: 
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(j = 1,2, . .. ,n) (20) 
Each of n observed variables is described linearly in terms of n new uncorrelated 
components, F1, F1, ... , F.. An important property of this method, insofar as the 
summarisation of data is concerned, is that each component in tum makes a maximum 
contribution to the sum of the variances of the n variables. The sum of the variances 
of all n principal components is equal to the sum of the variances of the original 
variances when n ~ oo (Harman 1967). 
A component analysis can be conducted with any method of factor extraction as long 
as the matrix to be operated on by these methods is initially the unreduced correlation 
matrix with ones in its principal diagonal. 
A brief mathematical summary ofPCA (adapted from Mulaik 1972) is as follows: 
Z = FX (21) 
where Z is the 11 x 1 random vector whose coordinates arc n variables and X is a n x 1 
random vector whose coordinates are the n principal components for the 11 variables. 
F is the 11 x n square matrix of principal-axes factor loadings of the n variables on the 
11 principal components. The matrix F is given as: 
F=AD"' (22) 
where A is the n x n eigenvector matrix and D is the n x n diagonal eigenvalue matrix 
for the matrix R. R contains the correlations between the n variables such that: 
R = E(ZZ') andA'RA =D (23 and 24) 
The coordinates of X, representing the principal components, are mutually orthogonal 
so that: 
E(XX')=I (25) 
PCA yields a matrix of correlations between variables and factors. The advantage of 
PCA is the mathematical convenience of working with the eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors to determine the number of factors that are to be retained and to compute 
factor scores (Mulaik 1972). 
66 
5.3 Statistical analysis of Best-Worst data 
In Sections 5.1 and 5.2 the statistical methods for analysis of the choice and attitude 
data were reported. Prior to carrying out the Choice survey, a Best Worst survey was 
administered. In the BW survey respondents were asked to to indicate the most and 
least important incentive program attribute, out of a different combination of five of 
10 attributes. They were asked to repeat this a total of 18 times.37 
The main aim of the BW survey was to the rank the program attributes in order of 
importance and thus limit the number of attributes used in the subsequent Choice 
survey to only the most important ones. Limiting the number of attributes was 
thought to minimise Choice survey complexity. An additional aim of administering 
the BW survey was to test for any differences between landowners and professionals 
who administer and manage incentive schemes in the ranking of the relative 
importance of the incentive program attributes. The degree of importance of incentive 
program attributes was measured on an underlying continuum of importance. 
In the BW survey, the respondent was asked to choose the most and least important 
program attributes from a different set of five attributes several times. For example, 
the first and second question of the survey were as follows : 
Which program attribute do you think is most important and which do you think is 
least important to a landowner who is thinking about joining an incentive program to 
protect native vegetation? 
Part 1 
Part 2 
Most important 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Most important 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Tick only one Program attribute 
Funding amount 
Funding agency 
Program duration 
Application procedure 
Technical support availability 
Tick only one Program attribute 
Payment method 
Application procedure 
Monitoring & survey requirements 
Funding allocation process 
Funding agency 
Least important 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Least important 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
37 The data BW were collated in Excel and statistical analysis was carried out in SPSS 13.0.0 and 
StataSE 8. 
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The joint probability of choosing the most important attribute (i) and the least 
important attribute (j) across all blocks of 5 attributes can be estimated independently 
of the marginal probabilities using the appropriate block design and its complement 
(Appendix I) (Auger, Devinney eta/. 2004; Buckley, Devinney eta/. 2004). 
Following the presentation of Louviere (1994) and Buckley, Devinney eta/. (2004) 
the choice process associated with each attribute pair i and j can be represented as 
follows: 
(26) 
Du is the unobservable true difference between attributes i andj on the underlying 
continuum of importance; ou is the observable (mean) difference revealed by the 
choices that a respondent makes; and &v is a random error component of choice. The 
probability that a respondent chooses the ij pair of attributes in each subset is given 
by: 
all other K -l(o,k + &,k) pairs (27) 
Bn is the block (subset) of attributes faced by respondent n; and K is the nwnber of 
attributes per block. Assuming that &u is distributed according to a Gwnbell 
distribution leads to a Multinomial Logit Model (MNL) for analysis (Louviere 1994; 
Boxall, Adamowicz eta!. 1996, Blarney; Bennett eta/. 2000; Louviere, Hensher et al. 
2000). If 8u can be expressed as two scale values h. - h, then the choice probability 
can be expressed as: 
for all K(h,, h,) pairs in ic (28) 
The formal measurement assumptions that apply to BW scaling are summarized by 
the following (following Marley and Louviere 2005): 
• The latent dimension ( o lj ) can be decomposed into the desired scale values (h., 
h,) and the unexplained portion of the difference (&u ). 
• The respondent is able to identify the most important and least important item 
in choice sets that have more than 3 items. 
• There is stochastic transitivity in the choice: if A is more important than B and 
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B is more important than D than A is more important than D. 
• There is symmetry of choice: the probability that A is most important and B 
least important is the same as the probability that B is least important and A is 
most important. 
The parameters in the model are the differences between one particular attribute and 
all others on the conunon underlying scale of importance. Using the Balanced 
Independent Block Design (BIBD), the scale value for each attribute is the number of 
times it is chosen most important against the number of times that it is chosen least 
important. The estimated scale values can be approximated by the simple score 
o(m,l,) which is the total most important (m) i minus the total least important (l) i 
counts for each attribute. This approximates the unknown difference s. - s, for each 
individual. For example, in this study each attribute appeared 9 times, so the 
individual level scale ranges from +9 to -9. "This implies that [the scores] are linearly 
related to the true scale values and interval scale measures . . . on the underlying 
continuum of [importance]" (Finn and Louviere 1992, p.l4). For example, a score of 
+ 1 is obtained if a respondent rated an attribute most important 5 times and least 
important 4 times (Auger, Devinney eta/. 2004). 
The individual aggregate difference scores provide a crude measure for the level of 
importance. In this study an additional procedure is carried out (Section 7.2). The 
individual BW scores were used in Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS) analysis. 
Cohen and Neira (2003) compared the aggregate difference scores to MDS results 
concluding they both yield the same scale information. But MDS provides additional 
information on how similar or how different two attributes are. 
MDS is a teclmique that uses proximities as input which indicates the perceived 
similarity or difference between attributes (Kruskal and Wish 1978). A conunon 
procedure for obtaining proximity data is to ask survey respondents to directly judge 
the "psychological distance" (or closeness) between stimulus objects. MDS is used to 
visualize these proximities in a low dimensional space. It uncovers relationships 
between attributes by restricting the solution to a linear combination of independent 
variables. The dissimilarity measures for data analysed using MDS is the Euclidian 
distance which is the square root of the sum of the squared differences between values 
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for the variables. MDS measures how well the configuration approximates the 
distances between the attributes by the "stress", where 
(29) 
and du is the constructed distance between attribute i and j in the given number of 
dimensions, oiJ is the observable distance, or difference between i and j, and f is a 
transformation that preserves the rank order of the input distance (Kruskal and Wish 
1978). Lower stress figures indicate a better representation of the input distances in 
the configura.tion. 
In the preceding sections the statistical methods used to analyse data gathered by 
means of the BW and Choice surveys was discussed. In the next chapter details of the 
survey design are reported. 
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6 Survey design and administration 
This research explores the decision framework of private landowners surrounding 
participation in conservation incentive programs. The data used to develop and 
estimate the decision model was gathered by means of a Choice survey of Tasmanian 
landowners. The Choice survey instrument was also used to gather attitude data. 
Prior to administering the Choice survey, a BW survey was carried out. The primary 
aim of the BW survey was to rank conservation incentive program attributes in order 
of importance and use the results to assist in developing the choice set for the Choice 
survey. Ordering the attributes in order of importance minimised the complexity of 
the Choice survey and ensured that the choice question presented an accurate 
reflection of the "real" decision framework. A second aim was to establish any 
differences in the relative importance of program attributes between landowners and 
professionals who administer and manage conservation schemes. 
In this chapter a brief review of the BW survey method is presented, followed by a 
discussion of the BW survey design.38 A detailed discussion of the Choice survey 
design concludes this chapter. 
6.1 Best-Worst survey 
BW scaling is a direct, scale-free method of measuring the weight or importance of 
the attributes or features of a choice (Finn and Louviere 1992; Cohen and Neira 2003; 
Louviere and Towhidul 2004). Developed by Louviere (1991), the BW scaling 
technique presents respondents with a profile, or a set of attributes, of a good or 
service. The respondent is asked to choose the attribute combination that is most 
important and least important (or best and worst). 
Several advantages and strengths are associated with using the BW scaling technique 
(Cohen and Neira 2003). Most importantly BW scaling has been found to be very 
easy to use (Cohen and SHC & Associates 2003). Much research suggests that binary 
responses (responses with two outcomes) are simple and reliable (e.g. Buckley, 
Devinney eta/. 2004). Further, when Cohen and Neira (2003) compared BW scaling 
38 The statistical tools used to analyse the BW survey results were previously discussed in Section 5.3. 
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to alternatives, such as the five-point scale rating method, they found that BW is 
preferred as it avoids context biases and is rating scale free. They concluded that 
overall, BW scaling was easier to understand and resulted in "better" results. 
In the first application of BW scaling, Finn and Louviere (1992) examined the 
importance of various food safety issues of public concern. They combined BW 
scaling with a choice experiment. They first asked respondents to indicate their first 
choice and then choose their last choice from the remainder. The BW survey 
detennined the consumers' true level of concern about food safety issues. The choice 
experiment then assessed " ... how preference for actions [was] likely to change with 
characteristics of the food safety incident or problem" (Finn and Louviere 1992, p.l4 ). 
The study found that BW scaling provided an appropriate research method for " ... 
policy makers who need conswner input to help determine how to allocate their 
managerial and marketing resources" (Film and Louviere 1992, p.23). 
The BW method has subsequently been applied in many different areas of research. 
For example Auger, Devirmey et a!. (2004) used BW scaling to investigate 16 
different issues of conswner social belief. In this study cross-cultural comparison was 
facilitated due to the scalar inequivalence of BW scaHng. Cohen and Neira (2003) 
used BW in an international study into the benefits of drinking coffee. BW was used 
in a study that measured preferences for benefits of computer servers (Cohen and 
SHC & Associates 2003). With respect to foreign direct investment options Buckley, 
Devinney eta!. (2004) investigated managerial preferences using BW. 
In a theoretical context BW is frequently compared to other SP survey teclmiques 
(e.g. Cohen and SHC & Associates 2003; Cohen and Neira 2003). In an empirical 
context BW is mostly used alone or in combination with a choice question (e.g. Finn 
and Louviere 1992). There are few empirical examples where BW is used prior to 
carrying out a Choice survey to inform attribute selection for a Choice survey, the 
approach used in this research. Only one study was found that used the BW approach, 
along with several other rating teclmiques, to explore the issue of identifying 
attributes for inclusion in a subsequent choice study (Sawtooth Software 2002). 
Buckley, Devinney et al. (2004) and Flynn, Louviere eta!. (unpublished) used BW in 
combination with a Choice survey to check that the results generated by the BW 
survey were consistent with a choice experiment. Flynn, Louviere et al. 
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(unpublished) point out that combining the "easy" BW task with a Choice survey may 
be appropriate for the pwpose of comparisons of marginal changes in attributes used 
in the Choice survey. In this approach a respondent is asked to choose the best and 
worst of a number of options and then indicate their preference for the remainder of 
options (see also Louviere, Burgess et al. 2004). The BW task aspect is, therefore, an 
integral part of the question in the Choice survey, as opposed to being a separate 
survey as in this research. 
Population segments can be identified to understand patterns in the BW data using a 
simple cluster analysis on the basis of additional information gathered as part of the 
BW survey (e.g Auger, Devinney et a!. 2004; Buckley, Devinney et a/. 2004). In this 
current research the attitude data was also gathered with the aim of determining 
segments in the population (Section 8.2).39 
6.1.1 The Tasmanian Best-Worst survey 
The BW survey was administered to two groups of respondents, landowners, and 
professionals who administer and manage incentive programs (referred to as program 
designers and administrators- PDAs). Both groups were given the same BW rating 
task. Slightly different questions were asked regarding personal characteristics of the 
two groups. 
6.1. 1.1 Survey design 
Incentive program attributes included in the BW survey were determined by expert 
opinion, that is, a focus group composed of incentive program field staff, program 
managers, and landowners.40 This group of 12 persons met in September 2004. The 
choice of incentive program attributes was further informed by review of existing 
conservation incentive schemes and the literature. The resulting 10 program attributes 
that were included in the fmal BW survey were: 
( 1) funding amount; 
39 Small response numbers, however, did not allow a significant analysis of the BW attitude data to be 
undertaken. 
40 Program attribute levels for the Choice survey (discussed in Section 5.2.3) and a series of statements 
about the perceived role and impact of creating conservation reserves on private land were also 
developed in these focus groups. 
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(2) monitoring and survey requirements; 
(3) funding agency; 
(4) program duration; 
(5) technical support availability; 
(6) funding allocation process; 
(7) land use restriction; 
(8) legal mechanism; 
(9) application procedure; and 
(10) payment method. 
In the BW survey respondents were asked to indicate the most and least important 
incentive program attribute, out of a combination of five attributes. As there were a 
total of 10 attributes, respondents were asked to repeat this question a number of 
times, each time with a different block of five of the 10 attributes. 
BW uses experimental designs to place program attributes in the different blocks. All 
possible sets of program attributes (t) can be given by the complete factorial (2~ but 
this would require a prohibitive number of blocks (k) to be presented in a survey. A 
Balanced Incomplete Block Design (BIBD) was used to construct the sets and 
determine the number of sets (as in Auger, Devinney eta!. 2004). BIBD has been 
used for many years in experiments where individuals are presented with different 
objects and are asked to make a comparative rating (Cochran and Cox 1957). 
Two variables used to construct the BIBD were predetermined in this BW survey: the 
10 attributes, and the size of the block, which was five. The decision to limit the 
number of attributes in a choice set to five was the result of feedback received from 
subjects who provided comments in the pre-testing phase. Other BW surveys also 
seemed to favor smaller rather than larger sets. For example, Cohen SHC & 
associates (2003) and Finn and Louviere (1992) both use four attributes per set. 
The result was a design with a total number of 18 blocks (b). Each attribute appeared 
nine times within those 18 blocks (r) and appeared four times in combination with 
each other attribute (A.). The design (and its complement) used in the survey41 is 
shown in Appendix 1. Using the BIBD design ensures that each respondent makes 
41 The design was obtained from home.hccnet.nl/kees.duineveld/xbibdlbibl0.18.9.5.4.view.txt viewed 
on 24 April 2005. 
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" .... a sufficient number of choices to measure his or her values for each [attribute]" 
(Finn and Louviere 1992, p. 14). 
6.1.1.2 Survey layout 
The BW survey, for both landowners and PDAs, consisted of three parts42 (the full 
survey for PDAs is shown in Appendix 2). The main aim of the first part of the 
survey was to gain an understanding of the respondent's experience with conservation 
issues. Landowners were asked about their involvement with conservation and 
incentive schemes, general property characteristics, past management activities, and a 
number of personal questions. The first part of the PDA survey asked a series of 
multiple-choice questions which established their working situation and frequency of 
interaction with landowners. 
The actual BW task was presented in the second part of the survey. Both landowners 
and PDAs were asked to indicate the most and least important incentive program 
attribute, out of a combination of five attributes. The introduction to the BW task was 
worded differently between the landowner and PDA surveys. The introduction to the 
BW task in the landowner's survey stated: 
Which program attribute do you think is most important and which do 
you think is least important when you are considering whether to join an 
incentive program to protect native vegetation? 
The introduction to the BW task in the PDA survey stated: 
Which program attribute do you think is most important and which do 
you think is least important to landowners when they are considering 
whether to join an incentive program to protect native vegetation? 
The third part of the survey explored the respondent's attitude to the role and impact 
of establishing conservation reserves on private land. Survey respondents were asked 
to express their level of agreement or disagreement with a total of 26 statements. 
These statements indicated behavioral beliefs and were developed on the basis of a 
literature review, informal interviews with landowners, and expert opinion. The 
statements are roughly centered around six general foci (the numbers in brackets 
indicate the statement number in Table 1 ): 
42 A glossary defining each of the attributes was provided with the survey. 
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1. Impact on productive capacity of the property ( 13, 16, 23); 
2. Impact on current income or future potential income (12, 17, 20, 21, 22, 24); 
3. Personal impact on the landowner (6, 7, 8, 18, 25); 
4. Environmental impact on property (3, 9, 15); 
5. General environmental impact (2, 4, 5, 1143); and 
6. Trans-boundary impact and management options (1, 10, 14). 
In the rating question respondents were asked to express their level of agreement or 
disagreement with the statements in Table 1. A uni-dimensional five point Likert 
scale (Likert 1932) was used to measure attitude. The middle label on the response 
scale was labelled "neutral" thereby offering the option of neither agreeing or 
disagreeing. The other four labels included strongly disagree, disagree, agree, and 
strongly agree. 
43 Statement 11 explored the landowner's perception of intergenerational equity. 
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Table 1: Rating questions aimed at establishing landowner atti tudes to the role and impact of 
establishing reserves on rivate land. 
I Will benefit others as much as the landowner 
2 Provide a good way to protect species from extinction 
3 Will reduce the potential for soil erosion and salinity EROSION 
4 Add to the beauty of the landscape BEAUTY 
5 Are an effective way to ensure wildlife survival WILDL 
6 Create a good image for landowners IMAGE 
7 Give the landowner a sense of fulfilment FULFIL 
8 Will increase the landowner's understanding of the environment LEARNING 
9 Are of value for stock shelter and control STOCK 
10 Are best established where neighbours work together to protect areas NEIGHS 
I 1 Will mainly benefit the future generation FUTGEN 
12 Increase the opportunities to earn income from recreation/tourism IN COP 
13 Create a harbour for animals that are a pest to farming PESTS 
14 Should be left alone with minimal management LEFT ALONE 
15 Increase the fire threat to the landowners' property FIRE 
16 Create a harbour for weeds WEEDS 
17 Are expensive to manage EXPMAN 
18 Take up a lot ofume to manage TIME 
19 Reduce the property value PROPVALU 
20 Reduce the landowners' opportunity to diversify DIVERSE 
21 Reduce the security of future income INCSEC 
22 Reduce the potential to earn income from the rest of the property INC RED 
23 Will make the management of the remainder of the property more complicated COMPLEX 
24 Can be expensive as they lead to reduced productivity due to shading RED PROD 
25 Threaten the landowners' livelihood LIVELY 
26 Are only desirable if there is no other valuable usc for the land OTHERUSE 
The last statement (26) was included as it was frequently mentioned in infonnal 
interviews with landowners. The statement establishes a relative priority of private 
reserves over other uses for the land. However, it does not fit neatly into the 
framework surrounding landowner attitudes. 
6.1.1.3 Pre-testing, sampling and survey administration 
The landowner survey was pre-tested by eight landowners randomly selected from the 
databases of the Private Forest Reserve Program (PFRP), Private Area Protected 
Program (P APL), and Greening Australia (GA). Landowners were contacted by 
phone and, after having the survey's aims briefly explained to them, were asked if 
they were willing to participate in pre-testing the survey. Upon the landowner's 
agreement, a survey was sent in the mail with a stamped return envelope. The main 
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comments received from the pre-testing concerned the length and repetitive nature of 
the survey. As a result, minor alterations were made to the final version. 
The PDA survey was pre-tested by officials who filled in the survey while the 
researcher was present and thus provided direct feedback. A mail-out version was 
developed for landowners and an online version of the BW survey was developed for 
PDAs. The surveys were administered in June 2004 and no follow-up procedures 
were implemented. 
The fmal landowner survey was mailed to I 00 landowners randomly selected from 
the Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association (TFGA) database. Tllis database 
contains the addresses of all primary producers in Tasmania. The sample was 
stratified on the basis of commodity group: wool (30), meat (30), dairy (30), and 
vegetables (1 0), representing the approximate proportion of landowners in each of 
these groups. The landowner survey was administered by mail as administration of 
the survey via email was thought to be inefficient. 44 Discussions with PDAs 
confirmed this, based on their experience in dealing with landowners. 
An estimated 60 professionals work for the 6 different organisations that implement 
or develop conservation incentive programs in Tasmania. These organisations are 
GA, PFRP, PAPL, Private Forests Tasmania (PFT), the Forest Practice Board (FPB), 
and the Department of Primary Industries, Water and Environment (DPIWE). The 
stated focus of these organisations activities ranges from "mainly forestry'' to "private 
land conservation". However, all the abovementioned organisations employ 
"conservation officers". All organisations were approached to participate and 
agreement was obtained from the most senior person in the organisation.45 
The survey for PDAs was administered via the internet. The website details were 
emailed to a central contact person in each participating organisation. The contact 
person was then asked to forward the email to colleagues using their internal email 
system. The email contained a "live link" to a website where respondents were 
44 The main reason for not administering the survey via email or the internet was that, even though in 
Tasmania more than 65 percent of rural landholders use computers 
(www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/ebus/maffrole/usage.htm viewed on 4 August 2005), members of the 
focus group believed that low responses would result. 
45 As there is currently little guidance for defining sample sizes for BW surveys where heterogeneity in 
respondent preferences is expected (Flynn, Louviere et a/. unpublished), approaching all organisations 
was considered best. 
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presented with the survey. After completion of the survey respondents were asked to 
"submit" the survey. The survey results were saved to a predetermined location on 
the University of Tasmania server. 
The response rate for landowners was 31 percent. A total of 32 useable PDA surveys 
was returned. This corresponds to a 53 percent response rate based on the estimated 
60 persons working in the incentive program sector in Tasmania. 
6.2 Choice survey 
The main aim of the Choice survey (Appendix 3) in this research was to understand 
the decision framework of landowners surrounding incentive program participation 
and, in particular, to understand the trade-offs between incentive program attributes. 
It is important to gain an understanding of the decision problem most akin to the 
decisions that individuals make in real life when developing a Choice survey 
(Adamowicz, Louviere et a/. 1998). Two steps were taken in this research to ensure 
an accurate interpretation of the decision problem: a focus group meeting with 
incentive program field staff, program managers, and landowners was held; and a BW 
survey was carried out to identify the most important attributes to be included in the 
Choice survey. Both the focus group meetings and the BW survey have been 
discussed previously in Section 6.1. 
After development of the Choice survey, a draft version was pre-tested by 10 
landowners randomly selected from the databases of the PFRP, PAPL, and GA. 
These landowners were contacted by phone and those who agreed to participate were 
sent a survey in the mail with a stamped return envelope. Some minor wording 
changes were incorporated on the basis of feedback received. 
Two covering letters were included with the Choice survey. The first letter was from 
the TFGA encouraging landowners to participate (Appendix 3). The purpose of this 
letter was to emphasize the importance of landowner participation and the relevance 
of the survey to them. The letter was also aimed at increasing the credibility of the 
researchers. In the letter it was explained that the researchers had previously worked 
successfully with the TFGA, the stakeholder group representing landowners in 
Tasmania. The letter further emphasized the fact that participation was anonymous. 
At no stage did the landowner have to provide a name or contact details. Anonymity 
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in surveys minimises respondents reporting what they think is socially desirable. This 
is recognised as a common problem with gathering survey data and has been 
extensively researched (e.g. Krosnick 1999; Nancarrow and Brace 2000). 
The second letter included with the survey was printed on University of Tasmania 
letterhead. This letter outlined how the survey would enable landowners to influence 
policy with regard to private land conservation incentive programs. Clear information 
was provided about the aim of the survey and the benefit to the participant of filling 
out the survey. A so-called "hypothetical bias" may otherwise be generated if the 
survey is not perceived to be realistic (Frykblom and Shogren 2000). 
The covering letter from the University contained contact information for the 
researchers. It also provided information on where and how the results of the survey 
could be obtained (Dillman 1978). The latest return date for the survey, 30 September 
2004, was stated on the covering letter. The fmal survey was mailed to 500 
Tasmanian landowners in early September 2004. No follow-up procedures attempting 
to influence the response rate were initiated46• 
6.2.1 Survey layout 
The fmal Choice survey was divided into four parts. The first part contained 16 
questions: property and business characteristics; the landowner's past conservation 
management activities; and past involvement in conservation incentive programs. 
The second part of the survey contained eight choice questions. Each choice question 
presented two conservation incentive programs described by five program attributes. 
The five program attributes (land use restrictions; funding amount; legal implications; 
technical advice availability; and payment method) were set at a different level for 
each of the two programs (discussed in Section 6.2.3). Survey respondents were 
asked which of the two programs they would voluntarily join, or to indicate they 
would not join either of the programs. In the next part of the question respondents 
were asked which program was most preferred if they had to choose and did not have 
the option of not joining either program (Section 6.2.3.1). Descriptions of the 
46 Even though a follow-up process is a standard procedure (Dillman 1978), the process was not 
undertaken in this current research due to financial limitations. 
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attributes used in the choice section were defmed in a glossary. An example of how 
to fill out the choice question was printed on the back of the glossary (Appendix 3). 
In the third part of the Choice survey respondent were asked to rate 24 statements 
about the role, impact and environmental outcome of establishing conservation 
reserves on private land. Tllis question contained the same statements as those used in 
the BW survey. 47 The last part of the Choice survey contained 11 questions which 
established the socio-economic characteristics of the landowner. 
6.2.1.1 Sample size and response rate 
The fmal version of the Choice survey was mailed out to 500 randomly selected 
Tasmanian landowners48 from the TFGA database. The sample was stratified into 
four different commodity groups representing the approximate proportion of 
landowners in each of these groups in Tasmania: wool (30 percent); meat (30 
percent); dairy (30 percent); and vegetables (1 0 percent).49 
The usual considerations of accuracy and collection cost guided the survey sample 
size (Adamowicz, Louviere et al. 1998). The sample comprised approximately 12.5 
percent of the estimated 4,000 rural landowners in Tasmania. 50 This lies between the 
minimum sample (n) of between 384 and 576 for a choice probability ofbetween 0.4 
and 0.5 as recommended by Louviere, Hensher eta/. (2000, p. 264). 
A total of 10 surveys was undeliverable and returned to sender, giving an effective 
mail-out of 490 surveys. Over the month following the mail-out, 145 surveys were 
returned, comprising a 30 percent response rate. Of these, 13 surveys were 
incomplete and deemed unuseable. The fmal response rate was therefore 27 percent 
47 Two of the statements were removed from the original26 that were included in the BW survey. After 
analysis of the BW survey results, it was clear that these two statements were not statements about the 
outcome of reserve establishment. 
48 The landowners who had been sent a BW survey were included in the population sample for the 
Choice survey. Due to the random selection of the landowners and confidential nature of the survey, it 
is unknown if any landowners received both a BW and Choice survey. If this was the case, the 
numbers are likely to be small as there were a total of 4,000 landowners from which the sample was 
drawn. 
49 It was unknown if the individuals contained in the sample had any native forest on their land or not. 
so The ABS Natural Resource Management Survey of Tasmanian farmers samples 728 individuals in 
this sector which represents a 100 percent response rate due to tl)e compulsory nature underpinned in 
legislation of ABS surveys (David Rankin Pers. Comm., 2006). 
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(132 surveys). This response rate is adequate according to Louviere, Hensher eta!. 
(2000, p. 264) who recommend a minimum number of respondents of between 48 and 
72 for simple models. The incorporation of preference heterogeneity generally 
requires larger sample sizes. It may therefore be argued that the sample in this current 
research is somewhat low. 
Non-response bias, caused by over-complex survey instruments, is increasingly 
recognised as a challenge in valuation surveys. It is possible that a certain 'type' of 
person is more likely to be a non-respondent to a complex survey than another (e.g. 
Stewart, Anderson et a!. 1993) therefore biasing estimates. As the issue of non-
response bias was not specifically addressed in this current research, it must be 
considered a caveat on any discussion of the results (Section 9). 
6.2.1.2 Contextual statement for forest and non-forest owners 
The Choice survey sample contained both landowners who currently owned forest and 
landowners who owned no forest at all. The choice section of the survey required that 
these groups be directed to a different section of the survey containing a contextual 
introduction relevant to their particular choice situation. As choice decisions are 
made on the basis of stimuli presented (Adamowicz, Louviere et a/. 1998), 
respondents need to able to relate to the choice situation. If respondents cannot relate 
to the situation, or are not motivated by the information presented, they are unlikely to 
be able to choose between the options provided (Ajzen, Brown eta!. 1996). 
Landowners who owned native forest were asked to think about one particular area of 
native forest on their property and describe it in terms of its physical characteristics. 
They were also asked whetl1er they thought the particular tract had conservation 
values. Landowners were subsequently asked what the "market value" of this area of 
forest was and on what basis the market value was estimated. The contextual 
paragraph was as follows: 
To set the scene for the next section of the survey we ask you to 
think about a particular area of native forest on your property that has 
some conservation value (it doesn't matter what the type of forest is 
or where it is on your property). If you don't own an area of forest 
with conservation values please think of any other tract of native 
forest on your land. Please answer these brief questions about that 
area of native forest. 
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Landowners who did not own native forest were asked to imagine that 1 0 percent of 
their farm was covered in native forest and that this area had an estimated market 
value of $5,000 per hectare. This represents an average per hectare value for 
Tasmania. 51 
The contextual paragraph for landowners with no native forest was as follows: 
Even though you currently don't own any land with native forest, we 
are interested in your opinion about the sort of incentive program that 
would appeal to you if you did own forested land. 
To set the scene for the next two sections please place yourself in the 
position of someone who owns an area of native forest. Please 
imagine that 10% of your property is covered with one single 
contiguous block of native forest. 
Say that similar forested land in your region has sold for around 
$5,000 per hectare in the past year. On this basis a fair market value 
for the area of native forest would be $5,000 per hectare times the 
size of the area you indicated above. 
Imagine that tllis forest has conservation value and is eligible to be 
enrolled in a conservation incentive scheme. Enrolling the land may 
mean you will have to change the use of that land but you would 
retain ownersllip of the land. 
Both types of landowners were then asked to answer the same choice question with 
respect to the parcel of land they previously described.52 
A well documented issue that can arise with stated preference surveys is so-called 
hypothetical bias. Hypothetical bias is the difference between stated and revealed 
values caused by the "hypothetical nature of [stated preference] surveys which [ ... ] 
can result in responses that are significantly greater than actual payments" (Murphy, 
Allen et a!. 2005, p. 313). Research by Murphy, Stevens et al. (2005) indicates that 
one way in which hypothetical bias can be avoided in some instances is by using 
51 This estimate was based on discussion with landowners and PDAs as well as the real estate industry 
particularly focused on agricultural land. Land values are higher in the North West and lower in the 
Midlands of Tasmania by several thousands of dollars per hectare but the overall average was agreed to 
be around $5,000 per hectare. 
52 No follow up test was implemented to investigate differences in landowner cognisance of the level of 
the monetary attribute in a situation where landowners are explic-itly shown the dollar amount in the 
choice question and where the dollar amount is not explicitly stated, as in this current research. 
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'cheap talk'. Cheap talk "... entails reading a script that explicitly highlights the 
hypothetical bias problem before participants make any decisions, as a means of 
generating Wlbiased responses" (Murphy, Stevens et a!. 2005, p. 327). Other methods 
include debriefing or certainty statements (e.g. Blumenschein, Blomquist et a!. 2007). 
No specific strategy was implemented in this current research to address the 
possibility of hypothetical bias. The potential implications of this type of bias can 
therefore not be directly assessed in this current research. 
6.2.2 Specific Choice survey design issues 
Many papers and textbooks have been written that deal with simple survey design 
issues aimed at maximising response rates (e.g. Dillman 1978; Jenkins and Dillman 
1995; Greer, Chuchiniprakam et a!. 2000). For instance, in order to maximise 
response rates, the relevance of the issue to the respondent has to be ensured and the 
cost minimised (e.g. Greer, Chuchiniprakam et a!. 2000). Other issues which will 
maximise response rates are, for instance, the inclusion of a stamped return envelope 
{e.g. Veiga 1984), anonymity (e.g. Tyagi 1989), offering survey results (e.g. Kalifatix 
and Tsogas 1994), and inclusion of a covering letter (e.g. Jobber, Birro eta!. 1988). 
The design details presented in the sections that follow is not exhaustive and will only 
discuss selected issues such as for example the number of profiles, choice sets, 
attributes, and the attribute levels. 
6.2.2.1 Number of profiles 
Landowners were asked to choose between participation in two conservation 
incentive programs. In the literature, the choice options, hereafter referred to as 
programs, are called "profiles": "A profile is a single attribute level combination in a 
complete factorial combination of attribute levels" (Adamowicz, Louviere et al. 1998, 
p.13). 
In the Choice survey, respondents were asked to indicate in which conservation 
incentive program they would enroll their land: program 1 or program 2. They were 
also able to choose not to enroll their land in either program 1 or 2 (hereafter, where it 
relates to this research, referred to as the 'voluntary' option). Respondents were 
subsequently asked to indicate in which program they would chose to enroll their land 
if they had to choose and did not have the option of not enrolling their land in either 
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(hereafter, where it relates to this research, referred to as the 'forced choice' option). 
The choice in this case was limited to program 1 or program 2. 
Descriptive labels were not used for the 2 profiles, which were simply called 
"program 1" and "program 2". The inclusion of policy labels or headers, such as 
"environmental option" - "financial option" - "social option", in environmental 
Choice surveys appears to reduce the attention respondents pay to the attributes of the 
choice set (Blarney, Bennett et a/. 2000). Simply labelling the choice options 
program 1 and program 2 avoided potential anchoring53 to what respondents perceive 
to be the most preferable policy label. 
Anchoring may also occur where an example survey question is given to explain the 
survey approach to the participant. The respondent is likely to anchor their estimate 
to values the survey designer has given in the example (Tversky and Kahneman 
1974). The chance of this occurring was reduced in this research by ensuring that the 
example question included with the survey was not used in the choice sets 
subsequently presented to respondents. 
6.2.2.2 Number of choice sets 
Choice survey respondents are generally presented with six to 10 choice sets. A 
single set contains two or three alternatives and one base option (often the status quo). 
The literature is unclear what effect the number of choice sets presented has on 
responses. On the one hand it is reasonable to expect that fatigue may affect the 
reliability of the results. For example, Mazzotta and Opaluch (1995) and DeShazo 
and Fermo (2002) find that choices among alternatives become complex if there are 
many alternatives, or if the alternatives differ in terms of a large number of attributes. 
They fmd that this may impact on choice consistency which will in tum impact on 
welfare estimates. 
Hensher, Stopher et a!. (200 1) also tested the effect of administering various numbers 
of choice sets ( 4, 8, 16, 24, and 32) on the ability of respondents to comprehend and 
respond. They found that the number of treatments placed before people did not 
generate a problem, even for the 32-treatment design, and thus did not support the 
SJ Anchoring is the effect of the respondent being pulled toward an anchor and is often referred to as 
"starting point bias" (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). 
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principle of fatigue effects. They did find, however, some evidence that four 
treabnents were inadequate to allow sufficient variability in responses. 
To explore the effects of fatigue in this study 12 randomly selected landowners were 
asked to pre-test the survey with 16 choice sets containing 10 attributes. Subjects 
were asked to provide the researcher with feedback about the survey. 
Most landowners voiced concerns about the number of repeat questions and the 
number of attributes. As most subjects were unfamiliar with this type of survey, 
suspicions were aroused. Comments received regarding the number of repeated 
questions were for example: 
"I got completely disinterested by the 101h time and didn't 
care what I answered"; 
"I gave up after number 8". 
On the basis of the comments received and following further discussion with the 
subjects, the number of choice sets was limited to eight. Guidance on the number of 
choice sets was also taken from other studies (e.g. Whitten and Bennett 2001; Boxall 
and Adamowicz 2002; Rolfe and Windle 2003; Home 2004). Comments were also 
received in relation to the repetitive nature of the questions. For instance: 
"Are you trying to catch us out?" 
"Why don't you just ask what we think a program should look 
like instead of all this complicated stuff?" 
''Are you trying to find inconsistencies in our answers?" 
To avoid arousing suspicion and consequently reducing the survey response rate, the 
nature of the questioning was explained in the covering letter and in the survey itself. 
As such, it was explicitly stated that the survey was not aimed at finding responses 
inconsistencies. Due to the "informal nature" of pre-testing the survey, no further 
statistical analysis of the pre-test results was carried out. 
6.2.2.3 Number of attributes 
Users of Choice surveys have used different numbers of attributes in the profiles. 
Home (2004) uses five attributes to describe alternative policy options aimed at 
increasing areas of land protected for conservation. Kerr and Sharp (2004) use six 
attributes to evaluate offsite mitigation of adverse environmental effects resulting 
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from development on streams in New Zealand. Rolfe and Windle (2003) use five 
attributes to value the protection of aboriginal cultural heritage sites. Boxall and 
Adamowicz (2002) use five attributes to evaluate wilderness park choice. 
In the pre-testing phase of the current survey, subjects were presented with 10 
attributes in each choice set. The comments received regarding the number of 
attributes presented in the program profile suggested that 10 attributes increased 
survey complexity. For example: 
"I only ended up looking at the first two things - too much to 
remember" 
"By the time I'd read the last one, I'd forgotten what the first 
one was". 
On the basis of comments received, and the literature reviewed, the number of 
program attributes was set at five. The five most important attributes out of the initial 
set of 10 were determined using the BW survey (Chapter 7). 
6.2.2.4 Orthogonal design 
The design of a Choice survey involves selecting a sample of proflles which have 
particular statistical properties allowing the estimation of the coefficients of a utility 
function. Linear model design theory underpins the published catalogue and 
specialized software that is used to develop designs. However, Adamowicz, Louviere 
et a/. (1998) point out that care should be taken when simply applying "canned" 
designs as many choice problems have built in constraints. 
The assistance of Dr. Leonie Burgess and Prof. Deborah Street, Department of 
Mathematical Sciences, University of Teclmology Sydney, was sought to develop the 
most efficient design for the choice experiment within the constraints of the 
application. The method, which is outlined in Burgess and Street (1999, 2005, 
forthcoming), starts with a Fractional Factorial Design (FFD) and adds generator(s) to 
create the other options in the choice sets. In this case, a FFD was constructed to 
allow for the estimation of all the main effects plus the two-factor interactions 
between the first attribute and each of the other attributes. This FFD was used as the 
frrst options in 16 choice sets, and a generator was added to the FFD to obtain the 
second options in the choice sets. 
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The design for the Choice survey allowed for five attributes, four of which have two 
levels and one with four levels (Appendix 4). All main effects and the interaction 
between the first two level attribute (land use restrictions) and the four level attribute 
(funding amount) can be estimated independently of each other (i.e. they are 
uncorrelated). The 16 sets and their complements were randomly allocated to two 
separate eight-set surveys. 54 
6.2.2.5 Willingness to accept 
Choice experiments generally contain at least one attribute that is expressed in dollar 
value. Such as the cost of travel mode (Hensher and Sullivan 2003), or additional tax 
paid for conservation pmposes (Whitten and Bennett 200 1 ). This is essential if 
marginal utilities and implicit prices are to be estimated. 
The attribute expressed in dollar value in this research was the market value of an area 
of land. Survey respondents were asked to estimate a fair market value for their land. 
The level of the estimated market value was then varied in the program profile in the 
choice experiment to a proportion of the original base amount. In other words, the 
landowner was offered either. less, the same as, or more than the market value in 
compensation funding for joining a conservation incentive program. 
This approach to determining a base level for the monetary attribute in a choice 
experiment has previously been applied in the transport literature. For instance 
Hensher and Greene (2003a) set the base amount in a stated choice experiment for 
urban commuting by asking respondents to identify their current trip details (including 
running cost and toll charges). 
In the current research the landowner was asked to accept money for setting aside 
land. The landowner is asked to reveal their Willingness To Accept (WTA) a 
monetary reimbursement for a "loss" of potential future income. 55 The loss is the use 
of that land for productive purposes (agriculture or forestry). Landowners are 
assumed to hold rights and in a voluntary setting accept compensation to give up these 
54 Alternative designs were investigated and deemed too complicated. 
55 The psychological foundation of loss aversion is relevant to Choice surveys of non-use value. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) first established that people dislike losses more than they value gains, 
which is the central theme of prospect tlze01y. Even though this issue is important to Choice surveys it 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation to investigate this any further. 
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rights. Therefore, Wf A estimation adopted in this dissertation is the only acceptable 
framework. Most other choice experiments, particularly where they focus on 
environmental issues, ask respondents their Willingness to Pay (WTP) for a 
combination of environmental characteristics. The level of their "payment" will result 
in a specified set of environmental "gains". 
6.2.2.6 Inclusion of status quo 
The introduction to the choice section of the survey established that thC? landowner 
could enroll the land they have in mind regardless of the current status. The 
landowner was able to choose not to enroll their land if neither program 1 nor 2 
appealed. This part of the choice question formed the basis of a voluntary choice 
scenario. An absolute measure of value of changes in individual attributes can be 
detennined if a "choose no or neither'' option is included in the choice set (Morrison, 
Blarney et al. 1996). 
Other studies (eg. Home 2004) have found that a large proportion of respondents 
choose the "status quo" option. This results in significant differences in per hectare 
welfare estimates between the analysis that includes and excludes the status quo (e.g. 
Home 2004). It was expected that a large number of survey respondents in this 
current Choice survey would also choose not to join a program. 
In this research a model was estimated for a voluntary choice scenario, but also one 
where the landowner is forced to choose one of two programs (the 'forced choice' 
model). The second scenario was included to simulate a choice situation where, for 
instance, forest owners were forced to conserve their land by government regulation. 
Chapter 5 presented the statistical method used to interpret the choice, BW, and 
attitude data. Chapter 6 presented a review of the BW and Choice survey methods. 
In Chapter 7 these statistical methods are applied to the BW data and the results are 
presented. Similarly, in Chapter 8 the results of the Choice survey are presented. 
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7 Best-worst survey results 
This section presents the result~ of the Best-Worst (BW) survey. Firstly, the general 
results, such as experience and work focus are described. Secondly, the BW and 
attitude data are analysed, using the statistical methods previously discussed in 
Section 5.2. 
7.1 Descriptive Best-Worst data 
Two BW surveys were sent out: one to Program Designers and Administrators 
(PDAs); the other to landowners (abbreviated in the tables below as LOs). The BW 
survey was emailed to an estimated 60 PDAs, professionals working for six different 
organisations that implement or develop incentive schemes in Tasmania. A total of 
32 responses was received, resulting in an estimated 53 percent response rate. 
PDAs had worked in jobs related to resource conservation for an average of 12 years 
(the longest was 30 years and the shortest was one year). The largest proportions of 
PDAs described their positions as scientific (29 percent) and extension officers (23 
percent). A total of 23 percent were policy officers or in management positions. The 
PDAs that did not fit into any of the categories listed in the survey described 
themselves as bureaucrats, a project officer, and an ecologist. Around one third of 
PDAs worked in the field and had face-to-face contact with landowners once or twice 
per week. For about half of the PDAs this contact occurred less than once per month. 
Only a small proportion of PDAs never visited landowners and properties (less than 
10 percent). 
For landowners the BW survey was mailed out. A total of 100 landowners received a 
survey, and 31 responses were returned giving a 31 percent response rate for the 
landowner survey. 
Landowners had been engaged in conservation related activities for an average of 11 
years and had owned their property for an average of 17 years. Male landowners 
comprised 61 percent of respondents. Overall, 83 percent of landowners identified 
themselves as the owner and manager of the property. The average age of landowners 
was 47 years old. Slightly more than 50 percent had completed TAFE or had tertiary 
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qualifications. An average of 64 percent of landowners earned the majority of their 
income from farming. At the same time, 75 percent earned some off-farm income. 
7.2 Best-Worst data 
In the second part of the survey respondents were asked to identify the most and least 
important attributes of incentive programs out of five attributes. They were asked to 
repeat this 18 times, each time for a different combination of the 10 attributes. 
Every respondent's assessment of the relative importance of the 10 incentive program 
attributes was determined by subtracting the number of times it was rated least 
important from the number of times it was rated most important. The potential score 
ranged from +9 to -9. · The mean individual BW scores provide a measure of the level 
of importance for each of the incentive program attributes (Finn and Louviere 1992). 
The mean scores for all respondents are shown in column one of Table 2. 
Land use restrictions 
Fundin~ amount 
0.45 -2.024 0.048 
0.59 -1.976 0.053 
-0.53 0.62 -0.560 0.578 
-1.66 -0.03 0.966 0.338 
-1.44 -0.28 -2.231 0.029 
-1.52 -2.09 -0.90 3.520 0.001 
-2.61 ·-2.22 -3.03 -I. 758 0.084 
-4.61 -5.34 -3.79 -1.778 0.081 
Table 2 shows that for all respondents (column 1) the five most important attributes in 
the decision framework were land use restrictions, funding amount, legal implications, 
technical support availability, and payment method. These same attributes were also 
ranked as the five most important for landowners and PDAs when considered 
separately (columns 2 and 3). The only difference between the two groups lies in the 
relative ranking of the legal implications, rated fifth for landowners and third for 
PDAs. 
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A Student's t-test for the equality of mean scores for PDAs and landowners indicates 
a significant difference at the 5 percent level in the rating of incentive scheme 
attributes for LEGAL, TECHSUPP, APPLICATION, and ALLOCPROC (shown in 
bold). 
Table 3 shows the nwnber of times each attribute was more important than funding 
amount and the second column the number of times it was less important than funding 
amount. The Z-score is for the Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank test where the 
null hypothesis is that the attribute and the funding amount are equally important. 
The null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 percent level of significance for all attributes. 
Land use restrictions (RESTRICT) 1.926 39 17 3.050 
Funding amount (FUND AMOUNT) 3.057 
Legal implications (LEGAL) 4.910 14 41 3.625 
Technical support availability (TECHSUPP) 5.303 12 46 3.968 
Payment method (PAYMETH) 5.385 10 46 4.487 
Program duration (DURATION) 5.959 9 49 4.876 
Application procedure (APPLICATION) 6.107 8 46 5.133 
Funding allocation process (ALLOCPROC) 6.623 6 52 6.122 
Monitoring & survey requirem.( MONITOR) 7.238 4 54 6.412 
Funding agency (AGENCY) 8.492 5 54 6.428 
The ranking score for the attributes and for each respondent was scaled using lvlDS 
analysis (Table 4). The proximities were scaled at an ordinal level as the normalized 
raw stress increased when proximities were scaled at a ratio level (Section 5.3). This 
procedure was carried out for all respondents and each respondent group separately. 
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Land use restrictions (RESTRICT) 1.451 0.0025 1.454 1.355 
Funding amount (FUND AMOUNT) 0.827 0.0054 0.886 0.567 
Le~al imElications (LEGAL) 0.142 0.0128 0.244 0.041 
Technical supeort availability (TECHSUPP) 0.043 0.0157 -0.137 0.161 
Payment method (PAYMETH) -0.068 0.0090 -0.076 0.290 
Program duration (DURATION) -0.206 0.0047 -0.248 -0.014 
Aeelication erocedure ~APPLICATION) -0.271 0.0049 -0.352 -0.161 
Fundin~ allocation erocess (ALLOCPROC) -0.314 0.0034 -0.366 -0.278 
Monitoring & survey requirem.(MONITOR) -0.533 0.0095 -0.399 -1.090 
Funding agency (AGENCY) -1.072 0.0077 -1.006 -0.872 
ResE Norm. Raw Stress 0.0076 0.0058 0.0401 
Diseersion Accounted For 0.9924 0 .9942 0.9600 
Tucker's Coef. of Congruence 0.9962 0.9971 0.9798 
The stress and fit measures indicate that the distances in the solution approximate the 
original distances well for all respondents. A higher stress figure was obtained for 
landowners. Although lower stress measures and higher fit measures (Tucker's 
coefficient of congruence) indicate better solutions, the figures obtained for 
landowners are considered acceptable. 
The quantitative scale represents the psychological response of the respondent to the 
perceived importance of the incentive program attributes. The column of normalised 
stress identify TECHSUPP (0.0157) and LEGAL (0.0128) as the attributes that 
contribute most to the overall stress of the solution for all respondents. 
FUND AMOUNT contributes most to the overall stress of the solution for landowners 
(not shown in the table). 
Even though the ranking order of legal implications and the payment method differs 
between PDAs and landowners, both groups included the same attributes in their list 
of five most important. The five most important attributes that are included in the 
Choice survey (Chapter 8) are: FUNDAMOUNT (funding amount); LEGAL (legal 
implications); RESTRICT (land use restrictions), TECHSUPP (technical support 
availability); and FUNDMETHOD (funding method). 
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7.3 Best-Worst attitude data and analysis 
The last section of the BW survey asked respondents to rate 26 statements on the role 
and impact of establishing conservation reserves on private land. Mean ratings and 
standard deviations for both PDAs and landowners are shown in Table 5. A score of 
1 indicated "strongly agree", 2 indicated "agree", 4 indicated "disagree", and 5 
indicated "strongly disagree". A score of three indicated that the respondent felt 
"neutral" about the statement. The attitude question asked in the survey and the 
definition of the codes in Table 5 were previously given in Table 1 of Section 5.1. 1.2. 
Table 5: Respondent rating of the role and impact of establishing conservation reserves on private 
land (BW survey data). 
BENOTH 1.848 0.881 1.688 2.000 -1.452 0.151 
PROTECT 1.848 0.685 1.906 1.794 0.662 0.510 
EROSION 1.848 0.769 1.813 1.882 -0.366 0.715 
BEAUTY 1.864 0.875 1.813 1.912 -0.458 0.649 
WILDL 1.894 0.844 1.906 1.882 0.114 0.909 
IMAGE 1.955 0.919 1.750 2.147 -1.784 0.079 
FULFIL 2.030 0.822 1.906 2.147 -1.193 0.237 
LEARNING 2.091 0.836 1.906 2.265 -1 .769 0.082 
STOCK 2.185 0.748 2.250 2.121 0.691 0.492 
NEIGHB 2.197 0.789 2.094 2.294 -1.032 0.306 
FUTGEN 2.545 1.112 2.906 2.206 2.676 0.009 
IN COP 2.561 0.994 2.344 2.765 -1.746 0.086 
PESTS 2.818 1.176 3.063 2.588 1.660 0.102 
LEFT ALONE 2.939 1.036 3.063 2.824 0.936 0.353 
FIRE 2.970 1.037 3.219 2.735 1.932 0.058 
WEEDS 3.045 1.169 3.219 2.882 1.171 0.246 
EXPMAN 3.061 1.051 3.281 2.853 1.678 0.098 
TIME 3.123 0.857 3.188 3.061 0.594 0.555 
PROPVALUE 3.227 1.064 3.563 2.912 2.590 0.012 
DIVERSE 3.364 1.002 3.500 3.235 1.074 0.287 
INCSEC 3.394 0.909 3.563 3.235 1.474 0.145 
INCRED 3.409 1.202 3.656 3.176 1.641 0.106 
COMPLEX 3.485 0.864 3.656 3.324 1.582 0.119 
REDPROD 3.667 1.043 3.938 3.412 2.100 0.040 
LIVELY 3.697 1.052 3.938 3.471 1.834 0.071 
OTHERUSE 3.815 1.130 4.375 3.273 4.477 0.000 
A test of the equality of mean scores for PDAs and landowners indicates a significant 
difference, at the 5 percent level, in the rating of the following attitudes (shown in 
bold in Table 5): OTHER USE (0.000); FUTGEN (0.009); PROPV ALUE (0.0 12); 
REDPROD (0.040). PDAs more strongly disagreed that reserving areas of forest was 
only useful if there was no other use for the land. Landowners more strongly agreed 
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that reserve establishment mainly benefited the future generation and that it reduced 
property values. Landowners less strongly disagreed that reserve establishment could 
be expensive as it leads to reduced productivity due to shading. 
A PCA and V ARIMAX rotation method (SPSS version 11.0.0) was used to condense 
the original 26 attitude variables to form a reduced number of interpretable variables 
(Mulaik 1972). Firstly, the communalities for all attitude variables were examined. 
Variables with extraction communality values smaller than 0.2 were dropped from the 
PCA, as this indicated that they did not fit well with the factor solution. The next step 
in the PCA involved determining the number of factors {Table 6). There are several 
methods by which this can be done, including Cattell's scree test, identifying 
eigenvalues greater than 1, and interpretability of the resultant factors. Using a 
combination of these methods, i.e. an eigenvalue greater than 1 and the component 
must add around 10 percent to the factor solution, resulted in two factors being 
extracted. 56 
Total 
variance % Total variance % Total variance 0/o 
7.907 35.940 35.940 7.907 35.940 35.940 4.134 18.789 18.789 
2 2.724 12.383 48.323 2.724 12.383 48.323 3.847 17.486 36.275 
3 1.617 7.349 55.673 1.617 7.349 55.673 2.862 13.010 49.285 
4 1.114 5.062 60.735 1.114 5.062 60.735 2.145 9.750 59.035 
5 1.037 4.713 65.448 1.037 4.713 65.448 1.411 6.413 65.448 
* Components with eigenvalues smaller than 1 are not shown. 
Table 6 shows that the first two components explain around 48 percent of the total 
variation in the original variables. Variables with loadings greater than 0.400 in the 
rotated component matrix for two principal components were assumed to fit well 
within the factor solution (shown in Table 7). The PCA was also carried out 
separately for PDAs and landowners. No significant difference resulted in the factor 
solution between the two groups. 
56 Even though the third component explains 7 percent of the variance, this component was difficult to 
categorise into a specific impact focus. The third component was therefore not retained in the analysis 
(Table 7). 
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Table 7: Rotated component matrix (BW survey 
data). 
0.664 
DIVERSE 0.662 
FULFIL 0.779 
IMAGE 0.628 
IN COP 0.503 
INCRED 0.807 
INCSEC 0.739 
LIVELY 0.826 
OTHER USE 
-0.519 
PROPVALUE 0.620 
PROTECT 0.796 
REDPROD 0.510 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization (Kaiser 1958). 
Rotation converged in 7 iterations. 
Kaiser-Meyer-Oikin Measure of Sampling Adequacy is 0.75957 
Bartlett's Test ofSphericity58: Approx. Chi-Square = 914.167, df= 231, Sig =<0.0001 
Standard tests of the adequacy of the PCA indicate that a factor analysis is useful for 
this reduced variable set. A 0.759 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy indicates a high proportion of variance in the data can be explained by the 
underlying factors. Further the significance level of <0.0001 for Bartlett's test of 
sphericity, with approximate Chi-square of 914.167 and 231 degrees of freedom, 
indicates significant relationships among the variables. 
Table 7 shows that the first factor (PCl) includes attitudes that focus on the impact of 
reserves on the production capacity of an agricultural enterprise. The second factor 
(PC2) relates to attitudes that focus on the impact of reserves on environmental values 
and on the personal value to the landowner. The two factors can consequently be 
labelled production impact and environmental impact. 
The PCA attitude data was not further analysed and a cluster analysis was not applied 
due to the small number of observations. In general, however, the PCA results for the 
BW attitude data presented above compare well to tl1e Choice survey attitude results 
57 The Kaiser-Meyer-Oikin Measure of Sampling Adequacy is a statistic which indicates the proportion 
of variance in the variables which is common variance, i.e. which might be caused by underlying 
factors. High values (close to 1.0) generally indicate that a factor analysis may be useful with the data. 
58 Bartlett's test of sphericity indicates whether the correlation matrix is an identity matrix, which would 
indicate that the variables are unrelated. A significance level of kss than 5 percent indicates that there 
are probably significant relationships among the variables. 
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discussed in the next chapter. The factors are similar in that they comprise a factor 
focused on environmental outcomes, and one with a focus on the production impact of 
establishing reserves. 
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8 Choice survey results and analysis 
In this chapter the results of the Choice survey are presented. First, a descriptive 
analysis of the socio-economic characteristics of survey respondents and their 
property is outlined. This is followed by the statistical analysis of the attitude data 
gathered as part of the Choice survey. Lastly, a model of landowner preferences for 
incentive program attributes is estimated. A discussion of the results in this Chapter 
and Chapter 7, as they relate to the objectives stated in Chapter 1, is reserved for the 
concluding Chapter 9. 
As described in Chapter 6, the Choice survey was mailed out to 500 Tasmanian 
landowners, stratified into three different commodity groups. A total of 132 useable 
surveys was returned resulting in a 27 percent response rate. The response rate is 
consistent with that of other landowner surveys in Tasmania (Jennings and van Putten 
2001, 2003) and also compares well with mail-out Choice surveys carried out 
elsewhere (e.g. Whitten and Bennett 2001). 
8.1 Descriptive choice data 
In the next section, survey respondent characteristics are outlined followed by 
property and business characteristics, and their native forest holding and conservation 
management activities. The characteristics of respondents in the sample are compared 
to Tasmanian landowners as described by the Australian Bureau of Statistics census 
data, previous landowner surveys, and the BW survey data. Where significant, 
differences between male and female respondents and between regions are identified. 
General respondent statistics (the mean and standard deviation) are shown in Table 8 
below. 
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Table 8: Mean and standard deviation of socio-economic characteristics, property characteristics, and 
land management activities of survey respondents (Choice survey data). 
The number of years the property has been owned Years 125 
Number of years involved in conservation activities Years 132 
The age of the respondent Years 128 
The size of the property Hectares 132 
The size of native forest on the property Hectares 132 
The number of dependent children on the property Number 129 
Annual Gross Farm Turnover $/year 108 
The landowner owns and manages the property 
Property is owned as a partnership or by the family 
The landowner resides on the property 
The property is situated in the southern region of 
Tasmania 
The property is situated in the central region of 
Tasmania 
The property is situated in the northwest region of 
Tasmania 
The landowner has received assistance for fencing 
The landowner owns an area ofNF 
The landowner does not use the area ofNF for 
anything 
The landowner intends to use the area ofNF for 
commercial harvesting purposes in the future 
There is a conservation reserve on the property 
The survey respondent is male 
The landowner has achieved up to tertiary education 
level 
The landowner intends to pass the property on to a 
family member 
Off-farm income is earned by the landowner or a 
famil y member who lives on the property 
The majority of income is earned from fanning 
activities 
The landowner does not have a mortgage on the 
property 
%oftotaiN 132 
%oftotaiN 132 
%oftotaiN 132 
%oftotaiN 132 
%oftotalN 132 
%oftotalN 132 
%oftotalN 132 
%oftotalN 132 
%oftotal N 97 
%oftotalN 97 
%oftotaiN 97 
%oftotaiN 132 
%oftotalN 132 
%oftota1N 130 
%oftota1N 130 
%oftotalN 130 
%oftota1N 129 
34.498 
17.124 
10.766 
2,942.83 11056 
885.41 4561.910 
1.44 1.391 
599,011 684303 
92% 0.277 
49% 0.502 
92% 0.266 
23% 0.426 
42% 0.495 
36% 0.481 
53% 0.501 
73% 0.443 
40% 0.493 
26% 0.440 
22% 0.416 
76% 0.430 
34% 0.476 
58% 0.496 
66% 0.475 
77% 0.423 
40% 0.492 
Note:* Where the number of observations (N) does not equal 132 this indicates missing data except for 
questions related to native forest where N=97. 
Overall, the mean values for characteristics for both the Choice survey sample and 
BW survey sample are similar. Some minor differences are that BW survey 
respondents were slightly younger, fewer earned the majority of their income from 
farming, and they had owned their properties for a shorter period of time. 
8.1.1 Landowner demographic data 
Respondents were asked to identify the gender of the person ftlling out the survey; 76 
percent indicated they were male. The gender distribution of survey respondents is 
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similar to that found in previous surveys of farmers in Tasmania where 83 percent of 
respondents were male (Jennings and van Putten 2003). Of the 5,654 persons who 
identified themselves as farmers or farm managers in the 2001 Census of Population 
and Housing, 72 percent were male. 
The average age of survey respondents was 49 years. Forty-six percent of survey 
respondents were less than 50 years of age. The oldest respondent was 80 and the 
youngest was 23 (Table 9). Female respondents were on average somewhat younger 
than males. 
Table 9: Survey respondent age statistics for males and females (Choice 
survey data). 
99 29 128 
42% 59% 46% 
52.1 45.7 49.1 
Maximum age 80 65 80 
Minimum age 29 23 23 
The average age of respondents and the percentage under 50 compare well to the 2001 
Census of Population and Housing, where 53 percent of farmers or farm managers 
were less than 50 years old. 59 While all respondents identified their gender, four 
respondents (three of whom were female) did not report their age. 
Survey respondents were asked how many children were living on the property. 
Three survey respondents did not indicate whether they had any children living on the 
property while 40 percent of respondents indicated they had no children. This is 
roughly comparable to the 2001 Census of Population and Housing for farmers and 
farm rnanagers60 where 48 percent of respondents did not have dependent children. 
Overall, respondents had an average 2.38 children living on the property. The highest 
number of children living on the property was five. 
Respondents were asked to indicate the highest level of education they had achieved. 
Forty-three percent of respondents reached secondary level, 32 percent technical or 
T AFE level, and the remaining 34 percent had reached university level. The number 
59 Occupation (ASC02) and SEXP Sex by AGEP Age. 
60 Occupation (AS C02) by FMTF Family Type. 
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of fanners who had reached secondary level was higher than that found by the 2001 
Census of Population and Housing where 23 percent of farmers and farm managers 
completed level 12.61 The number of landowners who had achieved tertiary level 
education in this survey was also higher than that found in a previous Tasmanian 
survey by Jennings a no van Putten (2003) were it was 24 percent. 
There are some observable demographic differences in the current survey between 
male and female respondents (Table 10). Female respondents were somewhat 
younger and had achieved a higher level of education than male respondents. This 
result is consistent with Jennings and van Putten (2003). 
Table 10: Demographic differences between male and female survey respondent 
(Choice survey data). 
Age 29 99 45.690 52.091 0.005 
Tertiary education 32 100 0.500 0.290 0.042 
No mortgage 30 99 0.600 0.343 0.016 
Reside 32 100 1.000 0.900 0.001 
NW region 32 100 0.250 0.470 0.021 
* Only variables significant at 5% are shown. 
There were significantly fewer female respondents in the Northwest of the State. 
Females also more frequently had no mortgage and were resident on the property . 
. 8.1.2 Information level 
To ascertain how well-informed landowners were in relation to conservation issues, 
survey respondents were asked if they regularly received information from any of a 
list of organisations. Around 40 percent of respondents indicated that they regularly 
received information from either Greening Australia or Landcare/Coastcare. A 
further 35 percent indicated they received information from PFT. More than 45 
percent of respondents received information from two or more sources. 
These results are similar to those found in a previous survey of Tasmanian landowners 
by Jennings and van Putten (2003) who found that 57 percent of respondents were 
members of, or received information from, Landcare and/or Greening Australia, and 
40 percent of landowners were members of, or received information from, PFT. 
61 Occupation (ASC02) by SEXP Sex and HSCP Highest Level of Schooling Completed for Persons. 
101 
8.1.3 Business and property demographics 
With the aim of gathering information about the business and property characteristics, 
survey respondents were asked if they earned any off-farm income. Sixty-six percent 
of landowners indicated that they earned off-farm income. Seventy-seven percent of 
respondents indicated the majority of their income was derived from fanning 
activities. Of those whose primary income source was farming, 60 percent also 
earned off-farm income. In a previous landowner survey by Jennings and van Putten 
(2003) the percentage of respondents earning off-farm income was 64 percent. 
The same survey by Jennings and van Putten (2003) found that slightly over 60 
percent of landowners owed no debt on their farm. This was higher than found in this 
research, where 40 percent of respondents did not owe any debt on their property. 
Thirty-three percent of respondents had a mortgage of up to 25 percent of the value of 
the property and 22 percent had a mortgage between 25 and 50 percent of the value 
the property. 62 
A total of 82 percent of landowners reported their average Gross Farm Turnover 
(GFT). The highest reported OFT was $3 million per annum. The average annual 
OFT was $599,000, or around $1,700 per hectare. Thirty percent of respondents 
reported an annual OFT greater than "$500,000. Only 8 percent of respondents 
reported a OFT of less than $50,000 per annum. These figures vary somewhat from 
the national estimates of the Agricultural Finance Survey last carried out in 1999-
2000 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2000). In this survey 12 percent of farm 
businesses reported a turnover of $500,000 and more than 18 percent of farm 
businesses reported a turnover of less than $50,000. 
Forty-two percent of respondents were from the Central region ofTasmania, whilst 23 
percent were from the South and 36 percent from the North. Reported annual OFf 
was highest for the Central region at $714,115, followed by the Northern region at 
$569,634 and lowest in the Southern region at $441,045. The average property size 
for all respondents was around 3,000 hectares. The smallest reported size was 12 
hectares and the largest was 111,000 hectares. The average farm size was largest for 
61 A total of three respondents did not indicate their mortgage debt level. Over 85 percent of 
landowners who indicated their primary source of income was farming also indicated they owed a debt 
on the property. 
102 
the Central region at a reported 5,340 hectares, followed by 2,397 in the South and 
456 in the North. 
Property sizes are consistent with the pattern of economic activity in the three regions 
in Tasmania. In the Northern region of Tasmania the main agricultural activities are 
cropping and dairy. These are more intensive agricultural activities that are generally 
carried out on the fertile soils of the north-west region. The large extensive grazing 
properties are mainly located in the Central region. More recently, grazing activities 
are combined with cropping, with the introduction of pi~ot irrigation systems. This is 
evident in the survey data, as over 50 percent of landowners in the Central region 
reported undertaking three agricultural activities, growing wool, producing meat, and 
cropping. This is higher than the central region where 33 percent reported 
undertaking three activities. 
Landowners were asked if they owned, managed, or owned and managed their 
property. Ninety-two percent of respondents owned and managed the property. 
Landowners indicated they had owned their property for an average of 32 years (the 
minimum was one year and the maximum was 181 years). The long period of 
ownership indicates that some landowners interpreted the question: "How long have 
you owned the property?" as "How long has your family owned the property?". 
Seven respondents did not indicate how long they had owned the property. 
Ninety-two percent of respondents resided on the property. Thirty-eight percent of 
properties were privately owned, 33 percent were owned as a partnership, 18 percent 
as a family trust, and 16 percent as a private or public company. This pattern is 
consistent with the results of the previous landowner survey by Jennings and van 
Putten (2003). 
There are some observable regional demographic differences particularly between the 
South and the two other regions (Table 11 ). 
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Number of years involve in 
conservation 
The landowner does not have 
a mortgage on the property 
The landowner owns and 
manages the property 
There is a conservation 
reserve on the property 
30 
31 
31 
31 
25 
*Only variables significant at 5% are shown. 
95 
101 
98 
101 
72 
22.242 35.258 
8.9352 15.525 
0.677 0.316 
0.7742 0.960 
0.56 0.208 
** The average was not corrected for the landowners who interpreted the question as: 
"How long has your family owned the property?" 
0.034 
0.020 
0.001 
0.024 
0.003 
Table 11 shows that landowners in the southern region had owned their property for a 
shorter length of time and had also been involved in conservation for a shorter period 
of time than the two other regions. However, a higher nwnber of landowners in the 
South had conserVation reserves on their property. 
8.1.4 Native forest and conservation management 
Seventy-three percent of respondents indicated they had an area of native forest on 
their property. The average size of the native forest area was 1,200 hectares. The 
largest reported area was 50,000 hectares and the smallest was 12 hectares. 
Fifty-nine percent of respondents who owned native forest used it for grazing, while 
40 percent indicated they did not use it for anything. Twenty-one percent of 
respondents indicated using their native forest for commercial timber harvesting and 
20 percent for hunting. Twenty-six percent of respondents indicated they had 
commercial native forest harvesting intentions for the future. Of those respondents 
who had future harvesting intentions, 85 percent had also harvested in the past. 
Eleven percent of respondents were unsure whether they were going to undertake any 
commercial harvesting in the future. These findings are consistent with those of 
Jennings and van Putten (2006). 
Table 12 shows that 73 percent of respondents indicated they had been involved in 
conservation management. Almost half of respondents indicated that they managed a 
part of their property for specific conservation purposes. Although 27 percent of 
respondents indicated they had not been involved in conservation management, 69 
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percent of these respondents indicated they had established shelter belts or protected 
native vegetation. This inconsistency might indicate that the definition of what 
constitutes conservation management was interpreted differently by survey 
respondents. 
Respondents who managed part of their property for conservation 
Respondents who received funding for fencing native vegetation 
Respondents with fonnal conservation reserves on their property 
Respondents who received funding to establish fonnal conservation 
reserves on their property 
64 0.48 
70 0.53 
29 0.22 
24 0.18 
Respondents were asked whether they had established a formal conservation reserve 
on their property. As shown in Table 12, 22 percent of respondents had established 
such a reserve on their property, and 18 percent of all respondents had received 
funding to do this. Two percent of respondents were unsure about whether they had a 
formal conservation reserve on their property or not. 
A high proportion of respondents had undertaken some form of environmental 
management on their property (Table 13). Two~thirds of respondents had established 
shelter belts on their property and almost 60 percent had protected vegetation. 
The proportion of landowners who had undertaken at least one of the listed activities 
was higher than in a previous study by Jennings and van Putten (unpublished). In the 
latter study, only 40 percent of respondents had undertaken at least one management 
activity from a list of activities (most frequently 'planting trees for shelter'). Only 20 
percent of respondents indicated they undertook recreational activities on their 
property. 
Table 14 shows that 53 percent of respondents had received funding to fence native 
vegetation. Almost one third of respondents had received trees for revegetation. 
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Overall, more than two-thirds of landowners had received at least one form of 
assistance listed in Table 14 to achieve environmental outcomes on their properties. 
Table 14: Proportion of landowners who received some form of assistance to achieve 
environmental outcomes on their pro erty (Choice survey data). 
Money for revegetation 
Trees for revegetation 
Labour assistance for revegetation 
Money for improving soil management 
Scientific advice (e.g. identification of animals) 
Technical advice (e.g. management of animals) 
Administrative assistance (e.g. filling out form) 
Legal advice (e.g. implication of covenants) 
NHmber,of ·,· ... Prop_9rtiqn ofa\1 
respondents . :.··' . :• .• re· ' em dentS • . : 
30 0.23 
40 0.30 
25 0.19 
4 0.03 
16 0.12 
17 0.13 
15 0.11 
11 0.08 
Survey respondents indicated they had undertaken environmental and conservation 
management activities for an average of 19 years. Many respondents reported the 
time period to be the same as the number of years the property had ·been owned by 
them or their family. The longest time was reported as .120 years. It seems that this 
question was interpreted in a similar vein to the question asking the respondent how 
long they had owned the property.63 
There are some demographic differences between survey respondents who owned 
native forest and those who did not (Table 15). 
97 35 3864.158 389.423 0.009 
97 35 0.289 0.543 0.01 1 
* Only variables significant at 5% are shown. 
The average size of the farm was significantly smaller for respondents who did not 
own native forest. Significantly more survey respondents who did not own native 
forest resided in the North West region of Tasmania. This may be a reflection of the 
63 These outliers were retained in the dataset used for the analysis. 
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economic activities carried out in tlris region. The North West farms are generally 
smaller and carry out intensive agricultural activities such as cropping and dairying. 
Due to the fertility of the soils in this region of Tasmania, much of the native forest 
has been cleared for agriculture and hence fewer and generally smaller remnants of 
native forest remain (Scanlan, Prinsley et a/. 1992). 
8.1.5 Joining an incentive program 
In Section 2 of the survey, respondents were presented with incentive program choice 
questions. The orthogonal design of the survey (Section 6.2.2.4) resulted in four 
different versions of the survey. Of the 132 respondents, 63 answered surveys with 
design 1 or its complement. Sixty-nine respondents answered surveys with design 2 
or its complement. 
Eighty-four of the 132 survey respondents indicated at least once that they would 
choose to voluntarily join a program if offered the market value or more than the 
market value. The remaining respondents indicated they would not join an incentive 
program under any circumstance. The proportion of respondents who always chose 
the status quo of not joining under any circumstance is lower than tl1at found in the 
Finnish study by Horne (2004), 64 where two-thirds of respondents expressed a 
preference for no additional conservation. 
8.1.6 Estimated market value 
Before respondents were asked to answer the choice question, they were asked to 
identify the size of the area of native forest to which the choice question applied. 
Obviously, tlris question only applied to the 97 respondents who owned an area of 
native forest. The average size of the native forest owned by these respondents was 
421 hectares. 
After identifying the size of the native forest area, respondents were asked to estimate 
a fair market value per hectare of their native forest. The average market value that 
was estimated by respondents was $6,175 per hectare. The median market value was 
estimated at $4,000 per hectare. The highest market value was estimated at $200,000 
64 Although this Finnish study method was different to the approach in this research, it could potentially 
indicate some difference between Australian and Finnish landowners in the willingness to participate in 
a program that adds conservation areas to the reserve system. 
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per hectare, based on its coastal location. The lowest estimated market value was 
$250 per hectare. Twelve respondents did not answer this question and an average 
value of $5,000 was assumed for these respondents in the model presented in Section 
8.4.1.65 
Respondents were asked to indicate the basis for their estimate of fair market value. 
The majority of respondents based their estimation on the value of similar land in the 
region (Table 16). 
Table 16: Landowner approach to valuing the native forest on their property (Choice 
survey data) . 
. Bas'is for e...:;tirriating afair market · ·'".'Number of · _r,·. Average value 'ofthe land 
Y_aJue·l?Ohe iand wi~ .. n~ti,v~ .,.:: . >;,:resp6n~~n.ts• · ·:·. ,; ... ~yitb native .f.~~es~ . · 1 forest ... ·:·· o' '.1, •• ' • •.•• number) ; . . .;: ($) .;,. ' ... · l 
What the LO paid for the land 14 3,299 
Value of similar land in the region 49 10,697 
Government valuation 12 3,793 
Value of the timber on the land 18 4,264 
Other: 11 
Aesthetic/ biodiversity value 2 /,500. 4,942 
Income foregone 3,000 
Personall'a!tte 5.000 
Subdivision value•• 2 16.000.30.000 
POSIIIOIII/oca/1011•• 3 17,297. 50.000. 200.000 
* The total number does not add up to 85 as some respondents chose more than 
one option. 
** Landowners who said their land valuation was due to either subdivision or 
position/location generally also based this value on the value of similar land in 
the region, explaining the high average land value for that item. 
Respondents who owned native forest were asked whether they believed the area of 
forest had any conservation value. A total of 69 respondents believed their native 
forest had conservation value. Sixteen respondents did not know whether the forest 
had conservation value or not and 12 respondents did not answer this question. 
Respondents who did not own native forest were asked to imagine that 10 percent of 
their property was covered in native forest and that this forest could be protected for 
conservation by means of joining an incentive program.66 The average reported size 
of this imaginary forest was 36 hectares, which was smaller than the average area for 
forest owners. 
65 The 12 landowners who had not estimated a market value for their land were not significantly 
different to other survey respondents in tenns of their socio-economic characteristics. 
66 The assumed average value of$5,000 per hectare applied to these respondents. 
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8.2 Attitude data and analysis 
In section 3 of the survey respondents were asked to rate 24 statements about the role 
and impact of consetvation reserves on private land. The purpose of this part of the 
survey was to identify any attitudes the respondents might hold in relation to the role 
and outcome of reserve establishment, in particular the effect on the productive 
capacity of the land and the environmental outcome. These attitudes were translated 
into landowner types using a Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The Likert-rating 
scores 
67 
were used in the PCA to determine whether there were any significant 
relationships among the variables. The use of Likert-rating scores in a PCA is a 
commonly used approach (e.g. Boxall and Adamowicz 2002). Analysis of the attitude 
question data draws on the methodology previously described in Section 5.3 and 
previously applied to the BW survey data in Section 7.3. The PCA analysis presented 
below is carried out for the 97 respondents who owned an area of native forest. These 
97 respondents form the basis for the 'forced choice' latent class model (Section 
8.4.1). 
The PCA is also carried out separately for all survey respondents (n=132) which 
forms the basis for the 'voluntary' model (Section 8.4.2). The PCA for this model is 
presented in Appendix 5 to avoid excessive duplication of presented results. A 
comparison of variables that make up the factors between the two PCAs was also 
included in Appendix 5. 
The average rating and standard deviation of the 24 statements concerning the role 
and impact of consetvation resetves on private land is shown in Table 17.68 An 
explanation of the codes was previously given in Table 1. 
67 A score of 1 is strongly agree, 2 is agree, 4 is disagree, and 5 is strongly disagree. A score of 3 
indicates the respondent feels "neutral" about the statement. 
68 The attitude statements in Section 3 of the survey are the same as those presented to respondents of 
the BW survey (Section 7.3). The BW sur\tey contained two more statements that were dropped in the 
Choice survey as feedback indicated they were considered confusmg and not easily classified. 
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Table 17: Respondent rating of the role and outcome of conservation reserves on private land (Choice 
survey data). 
'· . Number 
"' .. Number of Number Number Number 
... .. Std. re.-pol'll:l~rs of of · of of 1 COdes ·: ... · .· . · Mean·· . re;pc>ndent.> . I 
'· Dev. strongly ll!SpC\nk>nts l"eSpl~liS respondents 
strongly 
agree agree neutral disagree disa et 
BEAUTY 1.896 0.810 33 44 15 4 0 
BENOTH 2.417 0.954 15 39 33 5 4 
COMPLEX 3.021 1.164 11 22 26 28 9 
DIVERSE 2.969 1.195 14 20 25 29 8 
EROSION 2.260 0.857 15 51 21 8 1 
EXPMAN 2.542 1.020 16 31 33 13 3 
FIRE 2.323 1.132 27 30 25 9 5 
FULFIL 2.375 0.881 14 43 29 9 1 
FUTGEN 2.740 1.130 9 40 24 13 10 
IMAGE 2.021 0.707 22 51 22 1 0 
IN COP 2.979 0.979 7 21 40 23 5 
INCRED 3.219 1.092 7 20 22 39 8 
INCSEC 3.042 1.172 13 16 30 28 9 
LEARNING 2.354 0.878 11 52 24 6 3 
LIVELY 3.281 1.161 10 13 25 36 12 
OTHER USE 2.906 1.324 16 26 20 19 15 
PESTS 1.917 1.028 39 39 8 7 3 
PROPVALUE 2.833 1.106 13 22 36 18 7 
PROTECT 2.156 0.950 24 44 19 7 2 
SHADE 3.083 1.106 10 18 29 32 7 
STOCK 2.115 0.789 17 58 15 5 1 
TIME 2.927 0.992 10 18 40 25 3 
WEEDS 2.281 1.028 22 42 17 13 2 
WILDL 2.156 1.034 26 43 18 4 5 
Table 17 shows that none of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement 
that establishing reserves creates a good image for landowners (IMAGE). Reserves 
were also perceived to be a good way to add to the beauty of the landscape 
(BEAUTY) as 80 percent of landowners agreed with this statement. Even though 
more than three quarters of respondents believed that reserve establishment created a 
haven for animals that are a pest to farming (PESTS), more than three quarters also 
believed that reserves were of value to stock for grazing purposes (STOCK). 
As part of the PCA, the communalities for all attitude variables were examined 
(Appendix 6). Communalities are estimates of the variance of each variable 
accounted for by the factor solution. All variables with communality scores greater 
than 0.2 were assumed to fit well with the factor solution. The next step in the PCA 
was determination of the number of factors. There are several methods by which tllis 
is usually done, including Cattell's scree test, eigenvalues greater than 1, and 
interpretability of the resultant factors. Using a combination of these methods, two 
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I 
I 
factors were extracted. The total variance explained by the attitude variables is shown 
in Table 18. 
8.775 41.783 8.775 41.783 5.715 27.214 
2 2.481 53.598 2.481 53.598 5.541 53.598 
* Components with eigenvalues smaller than 1 and/or that contribute less than 5% of the variance are 
not shown. 
Table 18 shows that the first two components explain around 54 percent of the total 
variation of the original variables. Standard tests of the adequacy of the PCA indicate 
that a factor analysis is useful for this reduced variable set. A 0.866 Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy indicates that a high proportion of variance in 
the data is explained by the underlying factors . Further, the significance level of 
<0.0001 for Bartlett's test of sphericity, with approximate Chi-square of 22073.885 
and 210 degrees of freedom, indicates relationships among the variables are 
significant. 
The figures in Table 19 represent the partial correlation between the item and the 
Varimax rotated factor. The variables that have loadings greater than 0.400 (+ or-) 
for a particular component, called production focus (PCl) and environmental focus 
(PC2), are shown. 
Ill 
Tnblc 19: Rotated component matrix {Choice survey 
data). 
BEAUTY 
BENOTH 
COMPLEX 
DIVERSE 
EXPMAN 
FIRE 
FULFIL 
IMAGE 
IN COP 
INCRED 
INCSEC 
LEARNING 
LIVELY 
OTHERUSE 
PESTS 
PROPVALU 
PROTECT 
SHADE 
TIME 
WEEDS 
WILDL 
EnviroMJent 
f.x:us 
PC! 
0.720 
0.625 
-0.455 
0.779 
0.668 
0.517 
-0.442 
0.772 
-0.509 
-0.628 
-0.579 
0.781 
0.747 
Proouction '· 
1 
·roclls , . 
' PC2 ' 
0.718 
0.650 
0.693 
0.654 
0.598 
0.700 
0.612 
0.608 
0.451 
0.677 
0.679 
0.748 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
The envirorunent focus, component PCl, has high loadings for variables related to the 
positive impact of reserve establislunent on the envirorunental values of the property, 
such as increased beauty, wildlife protection, as well as personal fulfilment. The 
factor loadings are negative for the impact of reserves on property values, the effect 
on livelihood and on income security, suggesting that reserve establislunent does not 
have a negative impact on these factors. 
The production focus, component PC2, has high positive loadings for all variables 
related to the negative impact of reserve establislunent on the production capacity of 
an agricultural enterprise. These attitudes reflect the effect of reserve establislunent 
on both current income and property values, and future asset values. 
These factors are similar to those developed for the attitude data69 collected as part of 
the BW survey, although fewer variables are included in both the production focus 
69 Even though there were 24 questions in the BW survey and 26 in the Choice survey, overall the 
attitude questions were very similar. This allowed a degree of cross checking of the results. A two-
tailed test of the independence of the samples {BW and Choicl!) showed there was no significance 
difference between the two groups in the rating of the attitude statements. 
112 
and environmental focus components in the BW survey.70 Scores for the two factors 
were calculated for each survey respondent in the sample and these were included as 
variables (attitude_prod and attitude_env) in the latent class analysis (Section 8.4.1). 
8.3 Latent class results 
In the next sections the results of the choice model of Tasmanian landowner 
preferences for incentive program attributes are presented. Two latent class models 
are estimated. The first model simulates a situation where landowner enrolment in the 
program is compulsory (Section 8.4.1 ). The second model simulates a situation where 
entry into a program is on a voluntary basis (Section 8.4.2). 
The models incorporate incentive program variables, socio-economic variables, and 
proxies for attitude. LatentGOLD choice (4.0) was used for the latent class analyses. 
Some basic statistics and the definitions for the variables used in the models are 
discussed in Section 8.3.1. 
8.3.1 Definition of latent class variables 
The continuous socio-economic variables included in the model are shown in Table 
20. 
70 Both the production focus and environmental focus in the BW analysis contained seven variables that 
were the same as those in the choice analysis. The choice analysis contained an additional five 
variables for the production focus and three variables for the environmental focus. 
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Table 20: Statistics for the continuous socio-economic variables (Choice survey data). 
number_ 
child 
years_own* 
farm size 
years_inv_ 
cons 
gft 
res_size 
age 
Number of children 
living on the property 
( cars) 
Number of years the 
property has been 
owned by the LO 
( cars) 
The size of the 
EroEertl (ha) 
Number of years 
involved m cons. 
Achvities (~ears} 
Gross farm turnover 
($/annum) 
The size of any area 
ofNF(ha) 
The ageofthe LO 
(years) 
1.44 
32.13 
2,943 
13.977 
599,011 
885 
50.64 
1.39 0 5 .3825 
34.37 181 * 2.332 
11 ,017 12 111,195 7.891 
17.062 0 120* 2.636 
681,259 1000 $3M 1.860 
4,545 49,420 9.443 
10.73 23 80 .312 
1.860 129 
8.828 125 
73.301 132 
14.123 97 
5.923 107 
99.032 97 
2.914 128 
Note: * As discussed in Section 8.1.3, 31 percent of landowners indicated they had owned the property 
for more than 30 years. Some landowners may have interpreted this question in relation to the length 
of family ownership or involvement rather than personal ownership. 
Logarithmic transformations of variables are appropriate to achieve symmetry in the 
central distribution (Cohen 1969). Where either the skewness and kurtosis values 
were outside the -3 and 3 range, the log of the variable was taken. This 
transformation applied to years_inv_cons, years_own,farmsize, gft, and res_size. The 
basic statistics for the discrete socio-economic variables are shown in Table 21. 
Much of this information was previously discussed in Section 8.1. 
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Table 21: Discrete socio-economic and attitude variable names and statistics (Choice survey data). 
Vanahle name Description of variable #of Mean St Dev. Obs. 
own and manage LO owns and manages the property 132 0.92 0.277 
partn_fam_own Property IS owned os a partnership or by the fam1ly 132 0.49 0.502 
reside The LO res1des on the property 132 0.92 0.266 
woot_meat_crop The LO uses the property to !,'TOW wool, meat, lind 132 0.33 0.473 cro s 
region62 The property IS Situated in the southern region of 132 0.23 0.426 Tasmania 
off_farm_inc Off. farm income IS earned by the LO or a fam1ly 130 0.66 0.475 member who hvcs on the property 
maLinc_farm The maJonty of mcome is earned from farm1ng 130 0.77 0.423 ac11vit1es 
no_mortgage The LO does not hove a mortgage on the property 129 0.40 0.492 
veg_protect LO hos protected vegetation for conservation 132 0.58 0.495 
trees_or_labour LO has recc1ved trees or labour/oss1stance to plant 132 0.39 0.489 trees for conscrvatton on the propcrt.):: 
own_NF The LO owns an area ofNF 132 0.73 0.443 
no_use_NF The LO does not use the area ofNF for anythmg 97 0.40 0.493 
fut_harv_NF The LO mtends to use the area ofNF for commercml 97 0.26 0.440 harvesting purposes m the future 
reserve on_prop There IS a conservallon reserve on the property 97 0.22 0.416 
fund_ 4_reserve The LO hos rece1 ved fundtng to establish th1s reserve 97 0.1 8 0.387 m the OSt 
manage_ 4_cons The LO manages an area of the property for 97 0.66 0.502 
conservahon purposes 
gender The survey respondent IS male 132 0.76 0.430 
tert edu The LO has ach1eved up to tert1ary educauon level 132 0.34 0.476 
GA_member The LO rece1ves mfonnanon from, or IS a member of 132 0.38 0.487 Greemn11 Australia 
caregr_member The LO rece1ves mfonnauon from, or IS a member of 132 0.39 0.490 
a land or coast care 11roup 
pass_farm_on The LO mtends to pass the property on to a fam1ly 130 0.58 0.496 
member 
The conservation incentive program attributes that have two levels entered the utility 
function as binary variables (Table 22). The two levels indicate the relative 
'restrictiveness' of the attribute.71 For example in the c~ntext of the legal attribute, a 
covenant is more restrictive than a management agreement. 
71 
'Restrictiveness' in this context also relates to the apparent ' flexibility' of the program, i.e. upfront 
payments are perceived as more flexible than tax relief. Not having to pay for technical assistance is 
perceived as a more flexible arrangement than offering assistance on a fee for service basis. 
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legal 
landuse 
paymethod 
tech assist 
The legal implication is that a pennanent 
covenant is placed on the title of the land 
(covenant) 
No use of the land is pennitted after 
reserve establishment 
(nousepennit) 
The compensation is paid via tax relief 
(taxrelief) 
The technical assistance available after 
reserve establishment is on a fee-for-
service basis 
(fee4service) 
The legal implication is a temporary 
management agreement for the land 
(managreement) 
Limited usc of the land is pennitted 
after reserve establishment 
(limiteduse) 
The compensation is paid via an 
upfront payment 
(upfrontpay) 
The technical assistance available after 
reserve establishment is free of charge 
(freetechadv) 
The variable compfund is the amount of compensation funding the landowner is 
offered for setting aside land for conservation. This variable used in the latent class 
analysis has two forms: the first is based on average land values in the 'voluntary' 
model (e.g. $5,000/ha, $6,250/ha, $2,500/ha, and $3,500/ha); the second is based on 
the estimated land value as reported by survey respondents in the 'forced choice' 
model (e.g. $6,175/ha, $7,719/ha, $3,088/ha, and $4,632/ha). These latter values are 
relative to the self-reported market value (e.g. market value, one-quarter more than the 
market value, half the market value, three-quarters of the market value). 
As multi-collinearity is commonly found in non-experimental data, the correlation 
coefficients between all program attributes, socio-economic and attitude variables 
were determined (Appendix 7). Highly collinear variables cause regression 
parameters to be inefficient and can cause the signs of the regression coefficient to be 
counter-intuitive (Gujarati 1988). In this analysis a value of 0.5 or higher was used as 
the cut-off value for inclusion in the analysis. 
The variable size_nf was excluded from the analysis as the correlation coefficient with 
farmsize was greater than 0.7 and withyears_inv_cons was greater than 0.5. Further 
farmsize was also excluded from the analysis as the correlation coefficient with 
years_inv_cons was greater than 0.5. Res-size was retained as a farmsize related 
variable. 
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8.4 Steps followed in estimation of latent class models 
Landowners are heterogeneous in terms of observable characteristics such as gender 
and age, and unobservable characteristics such as attitude. Landowner heterogeneity 
is reflected in their preferences for the attributes of conservation programs. In order 
to better understand landowner behaviour, landowner choice of conservation incentive 
program is combined with landowner attitude data, individual property and business 
characteristics, as well as landowner characteristics, using a latent class approach 
(McFadden 1986). 
Two econometric models are developed. The first model, referred to as the 'forced 
choice' model, applies the latent class regression approach to a choice model in which 
survey respondents choose between two conservation incentive programs. The survey 
respondent is forced to choose between two conservation incentive programs as the 
option of not joining either is not included.72 This model is estimated using choice 
data only for those survey respondents who currently own native forest (97 of the 132 
survey respondents).73 
In the second model, referred to as the 'voluntary' choice model, survey respondents 
choose between one of three options: two conservation incentive programs and a third 
option of not joining any program. Overall, a relatively high number of observed 
choices (67 percent of observations) were for the option of not joining (or status quo). 
Status quo observations are sometimes removed from the analysis of choice data (e.g. 
Horne 2004). However, when status quo observations are removed, some bias may be 
introduced, as only respondents who choose an alternative other than the status quo 
are retained. The 'voluntary' model is estimated using choice data for all survey 
respondents, including the 27 percent of survey respondents who did not own any 
native forest. 
For both models different combinations of attributes were used to describe the two 
programs presented to the respondent in the choice question. The five incentive 
72 Although a very different experiment, Crouch, Devinney eta/. (2006) also applied a choice scenario 
where choice was restricted and no "no choice option" was provided. 
73 There were no significant demographic or socio-economic differences between non-forest owners 
and forest owners. 
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program attributes, and the levels used in the choice question were reported in Table 
22. 
Estimation of both the 'forced choice' and 'voluntary' models involves the following 
steps (based on Magidson and Vermunt (n.d.)): 
1 Estimate a series of latent class models using only incentive program 
attributes for different numbers of classes and examine the statistical 
information criteria for the models; 
2 Re-estimate the latent class models incorporating socio-economic and 
attitudinal covariates and compare the statistical information criteria for 
these models to those in step 1 above; 
3 Select the optimal number of latent classes on the basis of the fit statistics; 
4 Estimate a final latent class regression model imposing parameter 
restrictions across latent classes for program attributes that are not 
significantly different between classes; 
5 Present and interpret the coefficients for the program attributes and 
covariates for the frnal model. 
Sections 8.4.1 and 8.4.2 present and interpret the results of the estimated 'forced 
choice' and 'voluntary' models respectively. 
8.4.1 'Forced choice' model 
Following the procedure described in Section 8.4, the first step in developing the 
' forced choice' model was to estimate latent class models using the five program 
attributes for different numbers of classes.74 Table 23 shows the fit statistics for 1 to 4 
latent class regression models.75 
74 The way in which the classes are selected is explained on the pages that follow. 
15 LatentGOLD choice ( 4.0) was used to estimate all latent class models. 
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Table 23: Fit statistics of 1, 2, 3 and 4 latent class 'forced choice' regression model (Choice survey 
data). 
~ .... 
.... 
"': ,t :' ; : ; ~ • 0 t:! o E <'0 .. 
·· BIC .,· 'AIC ... .. (.) 0 Mod~! . '',:: ·LL ~"ll . u l~ p-value t;:: t:: . R:(O> Rl / ' (~9 · ·r;;w (LL) 61 ' ' i ~~ - ~ § u 
981.07 968.20 5 818.51 92 <0.001 0.000 0.146 0.145 
2-Class -423.42 897.17 868.85 11 707.1 6 86 <0.001 0.009 0.355 0.354 
3-Class -368.25 814.27 770.50 17 596.81 80 <0.001 0.031 0.533 0.528 
4-Ciass -339.63 784.47 725.25 23 539.57 74 <0.001 0.050 0.699 0.696 
The statistical indicators show that all models are significant at the 5 percent level and 
that the 4-class model fits best, as the BIC and AIC are lowest for the 4-class 'forced 
choice' model. The log likelihood values (LL) show improvement of the model fit 
with increasing number of classes. Almost 70 percent of the variance is explained by 
the 4-class model.76 
Latent class 'forced choice' models 1 to 4 were then re-estimated, including two 
attitude variables77 (attitude_env and attitude JJrod): Individual factor scores were 
included for these attitude variables in the latent class regression. The model also 
included dummies for a socio-economic variable (gender) and an 'experience' 
variable (treesJund). A continuous property characteristic variable (res_size) was 
also included. All covariates are significant at the 5 percent level. The model was 
initially run with all variables listed in Tables 20 and 21 and subsequently reduced to 
include only those variables significant at the 5 percent level. The results for the fit 
statistics are shown in Table 24. 
76 The last two columns of Tables 23 and 24 show 2 different R2 measures. The baseline for the R2(0) 
is the null model containing no predictors at all, where each alternative is equally likely to be selected. 
For the R2 null model each alternative is predicted to be selected with a probability equal to the overall 
observed marginal distribution. 
77 The attitude variables were developed in Section 8.2 where a PCA of 24 attitudinal statements was 
undertaken. This exercise identified two factors which were lat-elled prod_attitllde and env_attitude. 
Individual factor scores were included as variables in the latent class regression model. 
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Table 24: Fit statistics for 1, 2, 3 and 4 latent class 'forced choice' model including significant 
covariates (Choice survey data). 
.... 
. . , 
.. ,:.j <C ... 0 ' 0 
. to= . t:: R~(O) Rl . 
i'. • j 
' 
a . ,. '.· G 
::,,,.- .. .. 
' 
~· "j 
970.85 5 948.03 91 <0.001 0.000 0.146 0.145 
2-Class -411.09 895.22 854. 19 16 822.19 80 <0.001 0.016 0.343 0.342 
3-Ciass -345.59 814.43 745.19 27 691.19 69 <0.001 0.049 0.518 0.513 
4-Ciass -310.26 793.97 696.53 38 620.53 58 <0.001 0.037 0.677 0.675 
All 'forced choice' models that include covariates in Table 24 are significant at the 5 
percent level. The lower BIC indicates that the 4-class model is a better fit than the 1-
class model. The BIC falls from 970.85 for the !-class model which does not 
recognise landowner heterogeneity, to 793.97 for the 4-class model.78 The AIC for 
the 4-class model is also lower than for the 3-class model. However, as discussed in 
Section 4.5. 1.2, the AIC can become less reliable with increased numbers of classes. 
The R2 statistic, assessing the percentage variance explained by the dependent 
variables, increases from 14.5 percent for the 1-class model to 51.3 percent for the 3-
class model with covariates and 67.5 percent for the 4-class model. 
The BIC and the R2 statistics indicate that the 4-class model performs best. To assess 
if the R2 statistic obtained for the 4-class model represents a significant improvement 
over the 3-class model, a p-value was estimated using the conditional bootstrap 
method. The bootstrap p-value can be used to confmn whether the power of the 
design is sufficient and the number of segments in the final model is adequate 
(Magidson, Eagle et al. n.d.). Results conclude that the gain from moving from a 3 to 
a 4-class model was not statistically significant for the 'forced choice' model.79 
The third step was to select the optimal number oflatent classes on the basis of the fit 
statistics. Comparing the fit statistics reported in Table 23 to those in Table 24, it is 
evident that, on the basis of the BIC and the R2 statistic alone, the 4-class model 
without covariates performed best. However, the decrease in the value of the BIC 
78 A 5-class model was also estimated with no reduction in the BIC compared to the 4-class model. 
79 If the difference in model fit between the two models is not significant, the more restricted model 
may also be accepted as true and therefore preferred on grounds of being more parsimonious. On the 
other hand, if the difference is significant, the more restricted model can be rejected in favour of the 
less restricted model (LatentGOLD version 4 help menu). 
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behveen the low of 784.47 for the 4-class model without covariates and the 3-class 
model with covariates was only 39.28. Since there are no clear rules in relation to 
selecting the number of classes on the basis of the statistical criteria alone (Morey, 
Thatcher et al. 2006), interpretation of the coefficient estimates suggested that 
inclusion of the covariates added significantly to describing and understanding class 
membership. Therefore, step 4 was undertaken using the 3-class model with 
co variates. 
The five covariate model was re-estimated allowing for independence for program 
attributes across classes that were not significantly different beween groups. The 
formal test of equality of parameters across classes for paymethod, given by the p-
value and the Wald(=) statistic, was greater than 0.05. As there was no significant 
difference beween the 3 classes for this attribute, the parameter restriction was 
applied. 
The final 3-class 'forced choice' model is significant at the 5 percent level and 
contains three latent classes. The final model includes six covariates and parameter 
restrictions for one program attribute. There is little difference in the R2 statistic for 
the 3-class model shown in Table 24 and the final 3-class 'forced choice' model with 
both explaining around 51 percent of the variance.80 The reported R2 value for the 
final 3-class model is high in comparison to other studies where an adjusted R2 value 
beween 22.4 and 13.7 percent was reported by Scarpa and Thiene (2004) and 
beween 39 and 41 percent by Popper, Kroll eta!. (2004). The LL for the fmal 3-class 
model is 619.25. 
On the basis of the BIC alone the final 3-class'forced choice' model is superior to the 
model without the equality of parameters for paymetltod (Table 24). The BIC is 
805.64 for the final model as opposed to 814.43 for the 3-class model without 
independence for program attributes. 
Overall, t11e final 3-class 'forced choice' model does well at separating individuals 
into groups having a dissimilarity index of 0.91. By comparison, Morey, Thatcher et 
a!. (2006) reported an entropy measure (similar to the dissimilarity index) of 84 
percent. The predictive power of the fmal 3-class 'forced choice' model is also 
80 The model is significant at the 5 percent level; there are 25 parameters and 71 degrees of freedom. 
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illustrated by the high number of observations (82 percent) that are correctly classified 
(Table 25). 
Table 25: Classification of 'forced choice' model observations 
(percentage of observed program choice) (Choice survey 
data). 
OBSERVED PREDICTED 
Program 1 277(81%) 67 (19 %) 344 
Program 2 68 (16 %) 356 (84 %) 424 
Total 345 423 768 
Table 25 above shows similar patterns of classification for program 1 and 2, with 81 
percent of observed choices for program 1 and 84 percent of observed choices for 
program 2 correctly classified. 
Covariate classification statistics indicate how well class membership can be 
predicted on the basis of an individual's covariate values. The final 'forced choice' 
model has a covariate classification error of 27 percent. The R2 statistic for the 
covariates indicates that 37 percent of the variance in the dependent variable can be 
explained by covariates. · 
On the basis of the above statistical indicators, in particular the low BIC for the final 
3-class 'forced choice' model and the low model prediction error, the presence of 
heterogeneous preferences and the need for separate utility function estimates is 
suggested. The utility functions for each landowner class are developed in the next 
section. 
8.4. 1.1 Utility parameters for 'forced choice' model 
Each of the three latent choice classes is characterised on the basis of the covariates 
included in the fmal 3-class 'forced choice' model. These coefficients are referred to 
as segment membership parameters in Boxall and Adamowicz (2002). The estimated 
1\ 
segment membership parameters (As) and the estimated utility function parameters 
1\ ( p s) for the 3-class 'forced choice' model are jointly estimated and shown in Tables 
26 and 27. 
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The first two rows ofTable 26 show that each of the three classes in the final 'forced 
choice' model can be described in tenns of the member's attitude to the role and 
outcome of establishing resetves on private land.81 
Estimated coefficients for both attitudinal variables are significantly different to zero 
at the 5 percent level for landowners in class 3. The reported signs on the attitude 
variables indicate that members of this class believe that establishing consetvation 
resetves negatively affects production. Members of this class also believe that resetve 
establishment does not have a positive environmental outcome. Members of this class 
have been labelled production owners. This is the smallest of three classes and 
respondents had a 16 percent chance of being in this class. The relative size of the 
groups closely resembles that of Karppinen (1998) who also found that investors, who 
are similar to production owners in this study, were the smallest class. Respondents 
had a 13 percent chance of being in this class. 
Results suggest that in contrast to production owners, members of class 1, labelled 
multi-objective owners, do not believe that establishing consetvation resetves 
negatively affects production. Respondents had a 55 percent chance of being in this 
class. The coefficient on attitude_env is not significant for this class. Kline, Alig et 
al. (2000) also found that multi-objective owners accounted for the largest group in 
their sample. 
The attitude_env variable is significant at the 5 percent level for members of class 2. 
Landowners in this class have been labelled environment owners, as they believe that 
a positive environmental outcome is achieved by establishing consetvation resetves. 
Respondents had a 29 percent chance of being in the environment owner class. The 
coefficient on attitude_prod is not significant for this class. 
The three landowner classes closely resemble those found in previous research in 
Tasmania. Jennings and van Putten (2006) determined that Tasmanian landowners 
could be separated into four groups on the basis of their stated objectives of forest 
ownership: the groups were labelled income and investment owners, non-timber 
8 1 The assignment of individuals to the three landowner classes " ... is probabilistic and every 
respondent has a positive probability of being a member of e<!Ch of the [ ] groups" (Boxall and 
Adamowicz 2002, p.437). 
124 
output owners, and multi-objective owners82 essentially being the same groups as in 
the current study. 
Table 26 shows that forest owners can also be described in terms of several socio-
economic and property characteristics. Multi-objective owners have a higher 
probability of being male (0.530) while environment owners are more likely to be 
female (-0.856).83 Gender was also found to influence decision patterns in joining 
conservation programs in other studies (e.g. Stem and Dietz 1994). Females had 
more strongly held views towards environmental protection than males, and females 
also had more positive environmental attitudes (e.g. Jennings and van Putten 2003). 
Owens and Cooney (1998) explain this more positive environmental attitude by 
asserting that perhaps women make decisions based on 'feelings' which would 
increase environmental concern. Other authors found that gender does not affect 
attitudinal outcomes (e.g. Henderson 1998). 
Multi-objective owners own smaller reserves (-0.445), and environment owners own 
larger reserves (0.303). Studies undertaken in Europe and elsewhere have found that 
larger farms increased the likelihood of participating in incentive schemes (e.g. 
Skeratt 1994; Drake, Bergstrom et a/. 1999; Dupraz, Vanslembrouck et a!. 2003). 
None of these studies has related the size of the parcel of land to specific landowner 
classes. 
Multi-objective owners are more likely to have received funding to plant trees in the 
past (0.505). Production owners are less likely to have received funding to plant trees 
in the past (-0.548). Previous experience may mean that the landowner is more aware 
of the potential benefits of conservation which may affect the choice decision. The 
effect of past participation in incentive schemes on the increased likelihood of entry 
into another scheme has been well researched (e.g. Drake, Bergstrom et a/. 1999; 
Wynn, Crabtree eta!. 2001; and Dupraz, Vanslembrouck eta!. 2003). However, one 
study by Lynch, Hardie et a/. (2002) found no differences in the likelihood of joining 
an incentive program between landowners who had pre-existing experience with a 
particular conservation management activity and those who did not. 
82 The fourth group were agricultural owners who were not identified in this current research. 
83 Clearly reference can only be made here to the stated sex of the survey respondent which may not be 
consistent with a high level of decision-making power or influence within the household. 
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No relationship was found in tlris current research between age and the likelihood of 
joining an incentive program, as also found by Wilson (1997). Age has been found to 
b.e significant in other studies. For instance, increasing age had a negative effect on 
joining agri-environmental programs in a European study (Dupraz, Vanslembrouck et 
a/. 2002). Similarly, in the United States increasing age negatively affected a 
landowner's willingness to join a program to protect riparian zones (Lynch, Hardie et 
a/. 2002). 
The utility function parameters for the program attributes for the 3-class 'forced 
choice' model are shown in Table 27.84 As discussed earlier in this section, the effect 
of one attribute (paymethod) was restricted to be the same between classes. 
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84 The coefficients are symmetrical as the respondent was forced to choose between two options only. 
The coefficients for the levels of each attribute add up to zero. 
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Table 27 shows that a higher level of compensation funding has a positive impact on 
utility for environment owners and is not significant for the other two landowner 
classes.85 The effect of maintaining limited land use after reserve establishment on 
utility was broadly similar for environment owners and multi-objective owners. 
Restricting all land use options for reserved areas decreases the probability of 
choosing a program with this characteristic for these two landowner classes. The size 
of the coefficient suggests that the effect was slightly greater for environment owners. 
For production owners the sign of the coefficient for land use is significant and the 
opposite to the other two landowner classes. 
The pattern for environment owners and multi-objective owners is also similar for 
entering into a temporary management agreement. These two landowner classes 
receive positive utility from entering into a management agreement, while production 
owners receive positive utility from placing a permanent covenant on title.86 
There is no difference between the landowner classes in their preference for upfront 
payments of compensation funding as opposed to tax relief. Access to free technical 
advice after reserve establishment has a positive utility only for environment owners. 
The ASC, the constant that captures the impact of unobserved factors not captured by 
the attributes (see Adamowizc eta!. 1998), is significant and negative for production 
owners and positive and significant for multi-objective owners. 
8.4.2 'Voluntary' choice model 
In this section the results of estimating the 'voluntary' choice model are presented and 
interpreted. This model is based on the choice question where respondents were 
presented with three choice options: two conservation incentive programs; and a third 
option of not joining any program. A latent class regression is applied to choice data 
for all132 survey respondents, including those who did not own any native forest.87 
ss A small number of landowners did not provide an estimate of the average market value for their land 
(Section 8. 1.6). For those landowners a market value for their land of $5,000 per hectare was assumed. 
The model results do not change significantly if the average value of $6,175 per hectare had been 
assumed (based on the average land value reported by other landowners). 
86 A discussion of the results is presented in Chapter 9. 
87 The 'voluntary' model was also carried out for forest ownus only (respondents comprising the 
sample for the ' forced choice' model). Even though the covariates for the socio-economic variables 
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The steps presented in Section 8.4 are again used to estimate the fmal model. In the 
first step the latent class regression models for 1 to 4 classes were estimated using all 
five program attributes. The various fit statistics for each of the four models are 
reported in Table 28. 
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123 <0.001 0.000 0.311 0.074 
2-Class 1502.29 1447.52 19 113 <0.001 0.032 0.508 0.339 
3-Class 1418.81 1335.21 29 549.08 103 <0.001 0.029 0.590 0.449 
4-Ciass -603.12 1396.67 1284.24 39 478.11 93 <0.001 0.037 0.656 0.538 
All four 'voluntary' models are significant at the 5 percent level. As expected, the log 
likelihood values (LL) show improvement of the model fit with increasing number of 
classes. The 4-class model explains 54 percent of the variance and the BIC for the 4-
class choice model is lowest. 
As outlined in step two (Section 8.4) the 1 to 4-class 'voluntary' models were re-
estimated including three attitude variables. The model also included dummies for 
three socio-economic variables: tertiary education (tert_edu), gender (gender), and 
region (region62). All covariates are significant at the 5 percent level.88 Fit statistics 
for the re-estimated models are reported in Table 29. 
3-Ciass -605.39 1292.77 41 1210.77 <0.001 0.037 0.581 0.440 
4-Class -563.26 1404.41 1240.52 57 1126.52 74 <0.001 0.034 0.622 0.495 
differed between the models, the sign of the covariates for the attitude variables and the program 
attributes were the same for both models. 
88 The model was initially run with all variables listed in Tables 20 and 21 and subsequently reduced to 
include only those variables significant at the 5 percent level. 
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All four 'voluntary' models shown in Table 29 are significant at the 5 percent level. 
The BIC is lowest for the 4-class 'voluntary' model which includes all six covariates. 
The BIC falls from 1722.73 for the 1-class model that does not account for 
heterogeneity to 1404.41 for the 4-class 'voluntary' model. The lower BIC indicates 
that 4-class model has a better fit than the 1-class model. 89 As in the 'forced choice' 
model, the AIC for the 4-class 'voluntary' model is lower than for the 3-class model. 
However, as previously discussed, the AIC can become less reliable with increased 
numbers of classes. 
The R2 increases from 7.4 percent for the 1-class model, which does not allow for 
preference heterogeneity, to 44 percent for the 3-class model with covariates, and 50 
percent for the 4-class model. To assess whether the R2 statistic obtained for the 4-
class model would be a significant improvement over the 3-class model, the p-value 
can be estimated using the conditional bootstrap method. The conditional bootstrap 
analysis indicated that the improvement of moving to a 4-class model was not 
statistically significant. 
Step 3 described in Section 8.4 was to select the optimal number of latent classes on 
the basis of the fit statistics. Comparing the fit statistics reported in Table 28 to those 
in Table 29 it is evident that, on the basis of the BIC and the R2 statistic alone, the 4-
class model without covariates performs best. This result was also found for the 
'forced choice' model. Again, the decrease in the value of the BIC between the 4-
class model without covariates and the 3-class model with covariates is small. 
Interpretation of the coefficient estimates suggests that inclusion of the covariates 
adds significantly to describing and understanding cla~s membership. For these 
reasons, the next step, where the effect of three program attributes across latent 
classes (step 4 in Section 8.4) are constrained, uses the 3-class model with covariates. 
The final 3-class, six covariate 'voluntary' model was re-estimated while imposing 
parameter restrictions across latent classes for program attributes for which no 
significant difference was identified (the Wald(=) statistic was greater than 0.05). As 
there was no significant difference between the 3 classes for landuse, paymethod, and 
techassist, the parameter restriction was applied. 
89 Again, as applied in the ' forced choice' model, no further decrease in the BIC is observed going from 
a 4-class to a 5-class model. 
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The fmal 3-class 'voluntary' model contains three latent classes, includes six 
covariates and parameter restriction for three of the program attributes was applied. 
The final3-class model is significant at the 5 percent level.90 A BIC value of 1379.88 
is determined for the final 3-class model. This value is lower than any of the BIC 
values reported in Tables 28 and 29 above. 
Overall, the R2 statistic is 43 percent for the final 3-class model. The final model 
performs well at separating individuals into classes with a dissimilarity index of 82 
percent. The predictive power of the final model can also be assessed using the 
number of correctly classified respondent choices {Table 30). Overall, the final 3-
class 'voluntary' model correctly predicts 79 percent of the 1048 observed choices. 
Table 30: Classification of the final 3-class 'voluntary' model observations 
(percentage of observed program choice) (Choice survey data). 
r:!;. ~. ~ ~~~ '!( ~ • '~· J!rof:ta!DJt ~ti.~rogr~;z_r" .. .p; l-'NI}JiJoiif ,:{(rita! :1~u 
OBSERVED PREDICTED 
Program 1 91 (54%) 23 (14%) 55 (33%) 169 
Program 2 19 (11%) 103 (58%) 57 (32%) 179 
Not join 41 (6%) 26 (4%) 633 (90%) 700 
Total 151 152 745 1048 
As Table 30 shows, the model correctly predicts 54 percent of observed choices for 
program 1. Of the 169 observed program 1 choices, 14 percent were misclassified 
into program 2 choice and 33 percent were misclassified into 'not joining'. A similar 
pattern of misclassification can be observed for observed program 2 choices. For 
program 2, a total of 58 percent of observed choices was correctly classified and 32 
percent were misclassified into 'not joining'. A significantly higher percentage of 
observed choices were correctly classified for the option of not joining, which is 90 
percent. The fmal 3-class model therefore has a high level of accuracy in predicting 
instances where the respondent chooses not to join (comprising 67 percent of the total 
number of observed choice options), as only 6 percent of observed choices of not 
joining were misclassified into choosing program 1, and 4 percent into choosing 
program2. 
Covariate classification statistics indicate how well class membership can be 
predicted on the basis of an individual 's covariate values. The 'voluntary' model has 
90 The final 3-class model includes 29 parameters and 102 degrees of freedom. 
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a classification error based on covariates of 31 percent. The R~ statistic for the 
covariates indicates that 29 percent of the variance of the program choice can be 
explained by covariates. 
On the basis of the above statistical indicators, in particular the low BIC for the final 
3-class 'voluntary' model and the low model prediction error, the presence of 
heterogeneous preferences and the need for separate utility function estimates is 
suggested. The utility functions for the tmee landowner classes are reported in the 
section below. 
8.4.2.1 Utility parameters for 'voluntary' model 
Each of the three latent choice classes is characterised on the basis of the covariates 
" included in the final 3-class 'voluntary' model. Estimated segment membership (As) 
" parameters are shown in Table 31 . The estimated utility function parameters ( P s) for 
the program attributes for the final 3-class 'voluntary' model are subsequently shown 
in Table 32. 
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Table 31: Parameters, standard error, z statistics, Wald and p-value for attitude and socio-economic variables for the 3 class 'voluntary' model 
The first three rows of Table 31 show that each of the three classes in the final 
'voluntary' model can be described in terms of member's attitude to the role and 
outcome of establishing conservation reserves on private land91 • The coefficients on 
all three attitude variables92 for members of class 2 (labelled environment owners) are 
significant at the 5 percent level. The reported signs on the three attitude variables 
suggest that members of this class agreed strongly that environmental advantages are 
associated with establishing conservation reserves. Members of this class strongly 
disagreed that reserves negatively impact on production or on future opportunities. 
The estimated coefficients for two of the attitude variables for members of class 3 
(labelled production owners) are the opposite to those of environment owners. The 
members of this class did not identify positive environmental outcomes of 
establishing reserves but strongly agreed that establishing reserves has a negative 
production impact. The coefficient on oppor_attitude is insignificant for this class. 
Members of class 1 did not believe that establishing conservation reserves negatively 
affects production. This was also found in the 'forced choice' model. Even though 
members also indicated a concern that reserve establishment would reduce future 
opportunities (which they did not in the 'forced choice' model), this class has been 
labelled multi-objective owners. 93 Overall landowners had a 45 percent chance of 
being in the class labelled multi-objective owners, a 43 percent chance of being in the 
class labelled environment landowners, and a 12 percent chance of being in the class 
labelled production owners. 
Table 31 also shows that multi-objective landowners can be described in terms of 
gender (they are more likely to be male) and region (they are more likely to own 
property in the south of the State). Environment landowners are more likely to be 
female, live in areas other than the south of the State, and to have achieved tertiary 
education. Production landowners are more likely to be male and to have lower 
education levels. 
91 The construction of the attitudinal variables for inclusion in the voluntary model based on PCA was 
shown in Appendix 5. The three variables reflect environment focus, production focus, and focus on 
long term opportunity. 
92 As outlined in Section 8.2, the 'voluntary' model has three variables that resulted from the PCA, 
where as the 'forced choice' model had two variables (Appendix 5). 
93 Although it may be argued that this class of landowner is a "weak" multi-objective owner. 
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The estimated utility function parameters for the program attributes for the final 3-
class 'voluntary' model are shown in Table 32. As discussed previously, all three 
attributes (landuse, paymethod, and tech assist) were restricted to be the same between 
classes. 
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nousepermit -0.566 0.878 -0.645 -0.566 0.878 -0.645 -0.566 0.878 -0.645 -0.566 0.000 
UNlimiteduse 0.349 0.367 0.951 0.349 0.367 0.951 0.349 0.367 0.951 0.349 0.000 
Paymethod upfrontpay 0.032 0.045 0.711 0.032 0.045 0.711 0.032 0.045 0.711 0.023 0.990 0.000 0.032 0.000 
taxrelief 0.020 0.132 0.152 0.020 0.132 0.1 52 0.020 0.132 0.152 0.020 0.000 
NOpayment -0.052 0.101 -0.515 -0.052 0.101 -0.515 -0.052 0. 101 -0.5 15 -0.052 0.000 
Techassist fee4service -0.123 0.131 -0.939 -0.123 0.13 1 -0.939 -0.123 0.131 -0.939 0.882 0.640 0.000 -0.123 0.000 
freetechadv 0.247 0.534 0.463 0.247 0.534 0.463 0.247 0.534 0.463 0.247 0.000 
NOadvice 
-0.123 0.179 -0.687 -0. 123 0. 179 -0.687 -0.123 0.179 -0.687 -0.123 0.000 
Note: Cells containing coefficients significant at 10 percent have been shaded. 
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Table 32 shows that for all three landowner classes none of the payment methods or 
teclutical assistance was significant at the 5 percent level. The table also shows that 
maintaining limited land use after joining a program had a positive effect on utility for 
all three landowner classes, as the variable was restricted for all groups. 
Compensation funding and the legal implications of programs were broadly similar 
for environment and multi-objective landowners. Compensation funding is significant 
and positive for both classes indicating that higher levels of compensation funding 
had a positive impact on utility. All three levels of the legal attribute are significant 
for both environment and multi-objective landowners at the 5 percent level. Both 
placing a permanent covenant on title and entering into a temporary management 
agreement had a negative impact on utility. A positive utility is associated with not 
having any legal implications. 
Similar to the 'forced choice' model, the estimated coefficient for compensation 
funding is not significant at the 5 percent level for production landowners. A positive 
impact on utility is associated with entering into a covenant and a negative impact on 
utility with entering into a legal agreement for this class. 
The ASC is significant and negative for production owners and significant and 
positive for multi-objective owners in the ' voluntary choice' model. The negative 
ASC for production owners indicates that a status quo bias or so-called 'endowment 
effect' may apply (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992 quoted in Adamowicz eta!. 1998). 
Program attribute coefficients presented in the preceding sections can be used to 
determine the welfare impact of joining incentive programs with different levels of 
restrictiveness. The next section focuses on deriving welfare impact estimates. 
8.4.3 Welfare impact of program restrictions 
Traditionally, choice models are used to estimate the welfare impact as a consequence 
of changing attribute levels. An estimate of an attributes' dollar value contribution to 
utility can be made by taking the ratio between the attribute coefficient and the 
coefficient for the attribute that is expressed in dollars (Adamowicz, Louviere et a/. 
1998). 94 In this current study the attribute expressed in dollars is compensation 
94 The covariates are at their mean values. 
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funding. It is possible to estimate the utility of a particular scenario based on different 
combinations of attributes and levels (e.g. Rolfe and Bennett 1996). 
In this current study the welfare impact for both the 'forced choice' and the 'voluntary 
choice' models is estimated for incentive programs with different levels of 
'restrictiveness'. The welfare impact for both models is estimated using methods as 
traditionally presented in other studies (Chapter 3). 
Interpretation of welfare impacts in this current study is somewhat limited for both 
models because the estimated coefficient for compensation funding was not 
significantly different to zero for all landowner groups. For instance, for the 'forced 
choice' model (Section 8.4.1 ), the estimated coefficient for compensation funding 
P compfund was not significantly different to zero for production owners or multi-
objective owners. Consequently, Equivalent Variation (EV), calculated using 
equation 15 in Section 5.1.1, was not significantly different to zero for these owner 
groups. The above implies that the estimated utility of a particular scenario, based on 
different combinations of attributes and levels, can only be interpreted with any 
confidence for environment owners. Similarly, for the ' voluntary choice' model 
(Section 8.4.2), the results can be interpreted with confidence only for multi-objective 
owners and environment owners. The figures presented in Tables 33 and 34 that 
follow, have to be interpreted with care. 95 
The interpretation of the welfare impact for the 'voluntary choice' model follows that 
traditionally presented in choice studies (e.g. Rolfe and Bennett 1996; Home, Boxall 
et a!. 2005). The estimated welfare impact for an attribute in the 'voluntary' model 
(Table 34) is relative to the status quo of not joining an incentive program. 
For the 'forced choice' model the estimation of the welfare impact is more limited and 
not equally meaningful as that estimated for the 'voluntary choice' model. For the 
'forced choice' model the choice was restricted to two programs and did not include 
the option of not joining any program. The estimated welfare impact for an attribute 
is therefore the difference between the restrictive level of the attribute and the less 
restrictive level. A comparison of the welfare impact between the two models 
95 The limited number of observations for both models is als0 potentially cause for concern in the 
interpretation of the welfare impact. 
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(Chapter 9) is therefore limited due to the different interpretation of the welfare 
estimates. 
The interpretation of the ASC for the 'forced choice' model also differs from the more 
traditional choice model, the 'voluntary choice' model. In the 'voluntary choice' 
model the ASC is a dummy variable that equals one when the status quo option is 
chosen. If the ASC is negative it indicates that the utility associated with selecting 
either program, therefore moving away from the current situation, is negative. If the 
ASC is negative in the 'forced choice' model it indicates a negative utility associated 
with greater restrictiveness of the program.96 
With the above in mind, in Table 33 below the welfare impact of two different 
incentive programs with different levels of 'restrictiveness' are estimated for the 
' forced choice' model and compared to the most restrictive scenario. The description 
of the level of restrictiveness for each of the four binary program attributes was 
previously described in Table 22.97 
96 The Jess restrictive attributes are coded zero and the more restrictive attributes coded one in the 
datasheet that underlies the calculations for the ' forced choice' model. 
97 A covenant was more restrictive than a management agreement (legal), no use of the land was more 
restrictive than limited use (landuse), tax relief was more restrictive/less flexible than upfront payment 
(paymethod) , and fee for service was more restrictive than free of charge technical assistance 
(techassist). 
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Table 33: Welfare impacts for changes in incentive program restrictiveness for the 'forced choice' 
model, ·and the lower and upper 95% confidence interval (Choice survey data). 
-$1,247 
Lower95% 
-'>20'1, ' I ~ -$1,653 
Uppcr95% ~II.MI -$840 
Restrictive legal & land use ($/Ita) -Sl{ l ,% l 
-$315 
Lowcr 95% -~ ! 'i\ J lS 
-$721 
Upper95% ,~:~.~ J 5 $92 
! WELFARE GAIN -scenario 1 $932 
2 Only restrictive legal ($/Ita) -:\2.'!05 $957 
Lowcr95% ·'1 1 4.·1~1 ssso 
Upper95% ) i l)~.:!'2 $1,363 
; WELFARE GAIN -scenario 2 
.$2,203 
3 Unrestrictive program ($/Ita) :)93}3() $1,247 
Lower95% 
-) 17.11·1: $840 
Uppcr95% ~::1...: .~1~ $1,653 
I WELFARE GAIN- scenario 3 · $2,494 
Baseline = Covenant, no use permitted, tax relief, fee for service technical advice 
Scenario l = Covenant, no use permitted, upfront funding, free technical advice 
Scenario 2 =Covenant, limited use permitted, upfront funding, free technical advice 
·'>5.00 11, 
-~ul - m 
<, I,.!IJ(• !ll 
-ss . .:w m 
.·;1.~1- m 
·, 1,3<)(, Ill 
-S.1. 1 ~< m 
-~ I . i 13 n· 
\ 1.3(1~~ I' I 
•:;5.00 m 
-) i. ~ t,,.) fli 
':-1.31~.111 
Scenario 3 = Management agreement, limited use permitted, upfront funding, free technical advice 
* For the figures shown in grey the variable for funding amount (Table 27) was not significant at the 5 
percent level. 
Table 33 shows the welfare change (gain) in moving from the baseline, which is the 
most restrictive incentive program, to a less restrictive scenario. As expected, more 
restrictive incentive programs are less attractive to all forest owner groups. The 
welfare gain for·environment owners from moving from the restrictive program to one 
where the funding method and technical advice availability attributes are less 
restrictive is $932 per hectare. The gain in welfare would be $2,494 for environment 
owners moving from the restrictive to the unrestrictive program. 
The welfare impact of incentive programs with different levels of restrictiveness are 
also estimated for the 'voluntary choice' model in Table 34. 
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-$3,399 -$5,020 
Lowcr95% 
-$4,941 -$6,595 
Uppcr95% 
-$1,856 -$3,445 
2 Restrictive legal & land use ($/ha) 
-$2,951 -$4,527 
LOwer95% 
-$5,105 -$6,186 
Upper95% 
-$797 -$2,868 
3 Only restrictive legal ($/ha) 
-$1,972 -$3,448 
Lower95% 
-$3,194 -$5,109 
Uppcr95% 
-$751 -$1 ,787 
4 Unrestrictive program ($/ha) 
-$500 -$2,166 
Lowcr95% 
-$1,702 -$2,680 
Lowcr95% S702 -$1,651 
Scenario 1 = Covenant, no use permitted, tax relief, and fee for service technical advice 
Scenario 2 = Covenant, no use permitted, upfront funding, free technical advice 
Scenario 3 = Covenant, limited use permitted, upfront funding, free technical advice 
-$] ,850 
-'22.1h:l 
\1 •1.-16!1 
-$(,.:102 
-$2.l512 
s 111.529 
-512.268 
.<;2!;.99-
'i·l .411{1 
-S4, 1:'6 
"\ I:'.}'IQ 
~ ~.mu. 
Scenario 4 = Management agreement, limited use permitted, upfront funding, free technical advice 
* For the figures shown in grey the variable for funding amount (Table 32) was not significant at the 5 
percent level. 
Table 34 shows the WTA compensation estimates for joining a program with different 
levels of restrictiveness. Even though not joining an incentive program is the most 
attractive option to all landowner classes in the 'voluntary choice' model, the EV for 
joining a restrictive program is less than the average agricultural land value in 
Tasmania (Section 8.1.6). As ·expected, welfare gains are smaller with more 
restrictive programs for multi-objective owners. The EV for joining a restrictive 
program is greater for environment owners than for multi-objective owners. 
Although the majority of landowners prefer not to join an incentive program the ASC 
was significant and positive for multi-objective owners (Table 32) indicating there 
was no status quo bias or so-called endowment effect (Kahneman and K.netsch 1992 
quoted in Adamowicz et al. 1998). 
The range for the EV estimates as shown in Tables 33 and 34 were calculated with an 
approximation formula (equation 34) as " ... there are no simple exact formulas for 
the mean and variance of the quotient of two random variables in terms of moments of 
the two random variables" (Mood, Graybill et al. 1974, p.180): 
var[X] ~ (J.Jx ) 2(var[
2
X ] + var~Y] _ 2cov[X,Y] ) 
f j.Jy j.J X j.Jy j.J X j.Jy 
(34) 
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The standard errors for each of the ratios between an attribute coefficient and the 
coefficient for the compenSation funding attribute (expressed in dollars) are shown in 
Appendix 9. 
8.4.4 A two-step estimation procedure of landowner preferences 
In this research a PCA was used to describe forest owner groups on the basis of their 
attitude toward the role and outcome of establishing reserves on private land. As 
outlined in Section 8.2 the measurement of attitude was undertaken using Likert scale 
rating scores. Two factors were estimated for the 'forced choice' model. In Sections 
8.4.1 and 8.4.2 preferences for program attributes were estimated for respondents, 
characterised by their attitude using a latent class analysis. 
In this section the latent class approach is compared to a two-step estimation process, 
consisting of cluster analysis and logit regression.98 Both the latent class and the two-
step approaches group together similar cases and explain the association among a set 
of observed variables. Individuals in the same class cannot be distinguished from 
each other on the basis of their observed responses. 
In the two-step approach, firstly the factor scores obtained in the PCA (Section 8.2) 
were used as the grouping variables in a K-means cluster analysis. Cluster analysis is 
commonly used to classify individuals into groups on the basis of their attitude (e.g. 
Kuuluvainen, Karppinen et al. 1996; Kline, Alig et al. 2000; Jennings and van Putten 
2006). A brief outline of cluster analysis is presented in Appendix 10. 
For each cluster of landowners (as opposed to class of landowner) the preferences for 
incentive program attributes are subsequently estimated using a straightforward logit 
approach. An outline of binary choice models is presented in Appendix 11. A logit 
or multinomial logit approach has previously been used in other studies for this type 
of analysis by for instance Stevens, White et al. (2002), Soderqvist (2003), and Home 
(2004). The results of latent class analysis have been contrasted to mixed logit by 
Hensher and Greene (2003b) for the choice of road types in New Zealand, and to 
conditionallogit by Sc~rpa, Drucker et a!. (2003) for the choice of piglet breeds. The 
study by Hensher and Greene (2003b) found that no ". .. unambiguous 
98 The 'voluntary' model will not be compared to the two-step estimation method, but results of the 
cluster analysis for all 132 respondents indicated similar results to those for the 97 forest owners. 
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recommendations could be made as to the superiority of any of the two approaches" 
(Scarpa and Thiene 2004, p.3). 
The results presented in Section 8.4.5 after a discussion of some difference between 
latent classes and clusters. 
8.4.4. 1 Some differences between clusters and latent classes 
As mentioned above, in cluster analysis (specifically k-means cluster analysis) an ad-
hoc distance measure is used for classification. The probabilities in latent class 
analysis are used to define "closeness" to each "class" or "cluster'' centre and thus 
formalise the K-means clustering approach in terms of a statistical model. In the 
latent class analysis individuals in the same class share a common probability 
distribution among the observed variables, estimated by maximum likelihood 
methods. 
An important. difference between latent class and K-means clustering is that latent 
class provides various diagnostic tools to determine the optimal number of classes 
(e.g. BIC as shown in Section 5.1.2). In K-means cluster analysis the number of 
clusters into which the data are to be grouped is determined prior to the analysis. 
Another difference between the methods is that the latent class model can include 
exogenous variables referred to as covariates (see, for instance, Section 8.4.1) thus 
allowing classification and description to be carried out simultaneously using a single 
uniform maximum likelihood estimation algorithm. For K-means cluster analysis, 
discriminant analysis has to be used to determine differences between clusters. 
8.4.5 Two step estimation results 
As discussed in Section 5.3 a unique factor score was computed for each survey 
respondent for two principal components. These scores are now used as the grouping 
variables in a K·means cluster analysis. The aim of tlus is to identify groups of 
landowners on the basis of their systematic attitude to the role and outcome of 
establishing reserves on private land. The results suggest that landowners in 
Tasmania can be classified into three clusters, as shown in Table 35. Cluster labels 
generally reflect the attitude associated with the principal components with the highest 
positive score. The cluster results are significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 35: Final cluster centres and number of cases in cluster (Choice survey data). 
: . . Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
··PCA factQI' . < ·-. · CLmulti-objective Cleoviromnent C'Lproduc.:tion 
~ ... - . . : . . . 
...... owners owners owners 
attitude env 0 -1 
attitude_.prod -1 0 
Total respondents in cluster 39 (41%) 34 (35%) 23 (24%) 
Table 35 shows that the largest cluster (C 1) represents 41 percent of the sample. 
Members of this cluster have a negative score on the production factor. This suggests 
that members of this group do not believe that the establishment of reserves on private 
land has a negative impact on production. Members of tltis cluster are labelled 
CLmulti-objective owners. 
The second largest cluster (C2) represents 35 percent of the sample. It appears that 
members of this cluster viewed conservation on private land exclusively as having a 
positive envirorunental effect. Members of this cluster are referred to as 
CLenvironment owners. 
The members of the smallest cluster (C3), making up 24 percent of the forest owners, 
viewed conservation on private land as having a negative effect on income and future 
wealth and security. Negative mean scores on all other factors suggest that these 
individuals may not have viewed fmancial outcome as being complementary to the 
restrictions put on the land. As in the latent class approach the members of C3 are 
referred to as CLproduction owners. 
The scores show the same attitude _pattern as the groups that were formed on the basis 
of the latent class analysis (Table 26). However, some differences in class sizes can 
be observed between the two approaches. For instance, production owners make up 
only 15 percent of respondents in the latent class analysis as opposed to CLproduction 
owners who make up 24 percent in the cluster approach. The largest groups in the 
analyses are the multi-objective owners and CLmulti-objective owners, but in the 
latent class approach they make up 55 percent of the total whereas in the cluster 
analysis they make up 41 percent. Overall, the size of the classes is more evenly 
distributed in the cluster analysis compared to the latent class. 
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Even though the same attitude groups were developed using the cluster and the latent 
class analysis, only 37 percent of observations were classified into the same group 
using both methods99 (Table 36). 
Table 36: Cross classification of respondents into landowner classes and clusters by the 
latent class and cluster methods (Choice survey data). 
Pred icted by latent class Predicted by cluster method 
method 
Multi-objective owners 26 (49%) 17 (32%) 10 (19%) 
Environment owners 4 (14%) 11 (39%) 13 (46%) 
Production owners 9 (60%) 6 (40%) 0 (0%) 
Total 39 34 23 
53 
28 
15 
96 
Table 36 shows that none of the respondents who were classified as production 
owners in the latent class approach were similarly classified in the cluster method. In 
contrast, almost half of the multi-objective owners were classified into the same group 
in both methods. 
For each of the forest owner clusters a logit model was estimated. The number of 
correctly classified observations and the statistical indicators of the logit model fit for 
each of Ule forest owner clusters are shown in Table 3 7. 
Table 37: Program choice classification and model statistics for forest owner clusters 
(Choice survey data). 
Correct classification of program 1 181 (65%) 168 (64%) 133 (69%) 
Correct classification of program 2 213 (62%) 179 (63%) 125(71%) 
Total correct classification 394 (63%) 347 (64%) 258 (70%) 
LR chi2(5) 56.67 68.45 96.62 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood 404.188 -342.844 -206.770 
Pseudo R2 0.066 0.091 0.189 
99 Note that the respondents were classified on the basis of probabilities using the latent class method. 
The following is an example of the probabilities for four landowners into the classes and the 
subsequent modal classification. 
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As shown in Table 37, the logit regression models for the three forest owner clusters 
are significant at the 5 percent level. Around 65 percent of observations are correctly 
classified for the three forest owner clusters. This is lower than the number of 
correctly predicted observation in the latent class model, which was 81 percent for 
program 1 and 84 percent for program 2 with overall 82 percent correctly predicted 
observations. The R2 statistic for each of the forest owner clusters is low at 7 percent, 
9 percent, and 19 percent, for ~lusters I, 2, and 3 respectively. 100 
The logit regression coefficient estimates for each of the three forest owner clusters 
are shown in Table 38. None of the socio-economic and property characteristics was 
significant in the logit models. 
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Land use 
Paymethod 
Tech assist 
Constant 
Note: Cells containing coefficients significant at 5 percent have been shaded. 
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The results of Table 38 show that there is little difference between the three 
landowner clusters in the coefficients and the signs of the coefficients. Overall, the 
coefficients indicate that all landowner clusters prefer less restrictive programs. 
Cluster differences lie mainly in the size of the coefficients. 
There are a number of similarities between Table 38 and Table 27 for the latent class 
results. For instance, in the modelling approaches the coefficient for the legal 
arrangement has the greatest effect for multi-objective owners and CLmulti-objective 
owners and the land use restrictions has the greatest effect for environment owners 
and CLenvironment owners. Getting free technical advice has a positive utility for 
only one forest owner group in the models namely environment owners and 
CLenvironment owners. Compensation funding does not significantly contribute to 
multi-objective owner or CLmulti-objective owner preferences for program attributes 
in the two modelling approaches. 
Nevertheless, there are some important differences in the results produced using the 
two approaches. The most important is CLproduction owners are more similar in 
terms of their preferences for program attributes to the other two groups in the two-
stage logit regression. In the two-stage approach this landowner group received 
positive utility from being forced to enter less restrictive incentive programs (the same 
as the other two groups). In the latent class analysis, however, unlike otl1er 
landowners, production owners had higher utility associated with increasing levels of 
program ' restrictiveness' (i.e. the land use and legal implications). The coefficient for 
compensation funding is not significant in the latent class model for production 
owners, but, although only small, the coefficient is positive and significant in the logit 
model. 
Several socio~economic landowner characteristics, such as gender, were significant in 
the latent class approach. Latent class can include these exogenous variables as it 
allows classification and description of the landowners to be carried out 
simultaneously using a maximum likelihood estimation algorithm. Even though the 
logit approach allows the inclusion of socio-economic variables as independent 
variables in model estimation, none were significant. 
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The utility coefficients for the program attributes presented in analysis above can be 
used to determine the welfare impact of joining more restrictive incentive programs, 
as in Section 8.4.3 for the latent class model. 
8.4.5.1 Welfare impact for Jogit model 
The welfare impact for the cluster analysis in combination with a logistic regression 
was calculated using the coefficients shown in Table 38. Table 39 below shows the 
welfare impact for the same restrictiveness scenarios that were previously presented 
for the 'forced choice' latent class model in Table 33. 
. Clproducti.o~1 
.owners · 
1 Most restrictive program ($/ha) 
2 Restrictive in terms of legal aspect and 
land use permitted ($/ha) 
3 Only restrictive on legal aspect ($/ha) 
\\:'\.1-~ 
' 'l:lJJ ::>I ~ !'h 
'I,J :-.02 
' !~7'.'7 ) 
-:t- 1 •1 211 
I · c;,~ r, •) \.:\) 
scenario 1 = Covenant, no use permitted, tax relief, and fee for service technical advice 
scenario 2 =Covenant, no use permitted, upfront funding, free technical advice· 
scenario 3 =Covenant, limited use permitted, upfront funding, free technical advice 
$21.57 
(-$34/$77) 
$19.89 
(-$25/$67) 
-$7.02 
(-$9/$24) 
* For the figures shown in grey the variable for funding amount (Table 37) was not significant at the 5 
percent level. 
** The figure shown in brackets is the confidence interval 
Table 39 shows that the most restrictive incentive programs are least attractive to all 
forest owner groups. The coefficient for compensation funding is only significant at 
the five percent level for CLproduction owners only. 
The greatest difference between the two estimation methods can be observed for 
production owners and CLproduction owners, 101 although the coefficient for 
compensation funding is only significant in the logit method. The welfare change 
estimated using the logit regression method is only around $29 (21.57+7.02). Overall, 
the logit regression results for production owners would seem counter intuitive for a 
group of landowners who feel that establishing reserves will have a negative impact 
on production and believe that it has no beneficial environmental outcome. 
101 Although this is not surprising as the production owners in ti)e latent class model were not the same 
production owners as in the logit model. 
149 
The premise in this dissertation was that landowners have well defined preferences for 
incentive program attributes. These preferences are latent and the answers to both the 
choice and attitude questions are manifestations of those preferences. If tilis is true, it 
makes sense to use both the choice and attitude data to estimate ti1e preferences. 
The similarity in preferences for program attributes between the groups in the logit 
approach and the counter intuitive relative welfare implications for CLproduction 
owners also suggests that the latent class approach is more powerful in differentiating 
between the groups. After all, latent class analysis can simultaneously estimate the 
utility function using exogenous variables (attitudes and socio-economic 
characteristics) as well as choice data. 
Although both approaches are straightforward computationally, the infonnation that is 
inherent in the choice data and contributes to the difference between production 
owners and the other two groups cannot be incorporated in ti1e logit regression 
method. The logit estimation may, therefore, be less infonnative and lack richness 
and thus may potentially be a less accurate model of landowner preferences for 
incentive program attributes. 
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9 Discussion and conclusions 
Conservation incentive programs that encourage landowners to set aside areas of 
privately owned forest have existed in Australia for more than two decades (Figgis 
2004). Nevertheless, a comprehensive analysis of landowners ' decision framework 
has not previously been undertaken. This dissertation provides such an analysis by 
combining information on the socio-economic characteristics of landowners, their 
attitudes and property characteristics, with incentive program choice data, within an 
econometric model of landowner behaviour. 
Chapter 8 reported the results of estimating two models describing landowners' 
decision framework for the enrolment of forested land in conservation incentive 
programs using the latent class econometric technique. Chapter 9 further discusses 
these results with respect to the research objectives set out in Section 1.2. 
Specifically, it focuses on landowner preferences for incentive program attributes and 
the welfare implications of program design; it compares landowner preferences where 
entry is voluntary and forced; and it compares landowners' and program designers' 
perceptions of attribute importance. This chapter also focuses on a number of 
methodological issues and suggests direction for future research. The discussion 
begins with a brief summary of the latent class results for the 'forced choice' model. 
9.1 Landowner preferences for program attributes: the forced 
choice case 
The 'forced choice' model bad high-explanatory power and correctly classified more 
than 80 percent of observations which is high when compared to other studies (e.g. 
Scarpa and Thiene 2004; Popper, Kroll et al. 2004; Morey, Thatcher et al. 2006). An 
optimal number of three latent classes, multi-objective owners, environment owners, 
and production owners, was determined, and separate utility functions were estimated 
for three landowner classes. 
· Landowner classes could be characterised by their attitudes to the role and outcome of 
establishing conservation reserves on private land as described by two principal 
component attitude factors (Section 8.2). The largest landowner class, multi-objective 
owners, believed that establishing reserves did not negatively affect farm productivity. 
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In contrast, the smallest class, production owners, believed that reserve establishment 
negatively affected productivity. They also believed there were no positive 
environmental outcomes associated with establishing reserves. A third class, 
environment owners, believed there was a positive environmental outcome from 
establishing reserves (the results were reported in Table 26). 
Landowner classes were also described by their socio-economic characteristics. 
Environment owners were more likely to be female; multi-objective owners were 
more likely to be male. A relationship was found between the size of the native forest 
area and participation in incentive programs. Environment owners were shown to be 
more likely to own larger tracts of forest than other types of landowners. The largest 
forest owner class, multi-objective owners, was most likely to own smaller native 
forest areas. Production owners were least likely and multi-objective owners were 
most likely to have been involved in any conservation initiatives in the past. 
Separate utility functions were estimated for the three landowner classes, and results 
indicated that the characteristics of landowner choice differed between classes. The 
overall utility function was significant at the 5 percent level for all landowner classes 
(Table 24). The following discussion focuses on three facets of landowner choice: 
utility function coefficients; the relative importance of incentive program attributes; 
and estimated welfare measures. 
Economic theory suggests that incentive programs that offer higher levels of funding 
will be more attractive (Section 3.2.1). Higher participation rates in programs that 
c;>ffer greater monetary rewards were found empirically by, for instance, Osmond and 
Gale (1995), Lynch, Hardie et a/. (2002) and Stevens, White et a/. (2002). 
Smprisingly, in this research, where entry was forced, compensation funding had a 
significant impact on program choice for environment owners only (Table 27). 
Compensation funding was not a driver of program choice for the other two 
landowner classes. 
However, payment method did have a significant impact on program choice for all 
landowner classes. Moreover, this effect did not vary between landowner classes. All 
· landowners preferred programs that make compensation payments available upfront 
rather than via tax relief. This is consistent both with the notion that landowners have 
a positive rate of time preference (e.g. Gallagher and Andrew 1997) and with the 
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possibility that landowners place value on the " transaction" (Tversky and K.ahneman 
1984; Thaler 1985). That is, the transaction connects the action of setting aside an 
area of land and the payment for that action. Another possible explanation is that 
landholders did not pay enough tax to be able to take advantage of tax relief 
provisions. 
It was expected that less restrictive programs would be more appealing to landowners. 
Empirical evidence reviewed in Chapter 3 confirmed that shorter commitment periods 
were more attractive (e.g. Esseks and Kraft 1986; Gasson and Hill 1990; Stevens, 
White et al. 2002; Home 2004) as they allowed landowners to retain greater 
flexibility in terms of succession (Eggertsson 1990). Also, more land use options 
were retained with less restrictive programs, reducing the opportunity cost of 
reservation (e.g. Wilson 1997). 
Results confirm that program attributes that describe "restrictiveness" (legal 
arrangement and land use options) were significant determinants of choice for all 
three landowner classes. Both multi-objective owners and environment owners 
preferred programs that allowed them to keep land use options open for the future. 
However, production owners preferred incentive programs involving more stringent 
legal arrangements and allowing no alternative land use after reserve establishment. 102 
The results of the attitudinal survey indicated that production owners believed that 
reserve establishment negatively impacted productivity. Further, 80 percent of 
production owners believed establishing reserves would make management of their 
property more complex. Possibly, if forced to join a program, production owners 
preferred certainty of land use and permanency of legal arrangement as this allowed 
them to more easily incorporate the production consequences of reservation in farm 
plans. Production owners also favoured minimal ongoing third party involvement in 
management decisions regarding their property, and thus favoured programs that 
provide less flexibility. Even though more restrictive programs allow only 
"conservation uses" of the land, the outcomes are certain and require no further 
negotiation with incentive program staff or government officials. Another possible 
102 There is a probability of 59 percent that a forest owner who chooses to implement a legally-binding 
covenant on their forest is a production owner. Similarly, there is a 63 percent chance that if full 
restrictions on the use of the land are accepted, this is by production owners. These probabilities are 
calculated on the basis of the probability means shown in Appendix 8. 
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explanation may be that production owners preferred to "fence and forget" while 
other groups understood that active management was required. 
Although not significant for production owners or multi-objective owners, 
environment owners preferred incentive programs that offer access to free technical 
advice. The technical knowledge necessary to manage a conservation area can be 
specialised and extensive. Accordingly, landowners may not have the ability to 
manage reserves for environmental outcomes and, once committed to a scheme, may 
fmd their current knowledge inadequate. This is supported by anecdotal evidence 
from existing programs where landowners are given legal and administrative 
assistance to establish conservation covenants. Program managers often describe 
landowners as being concerned about the complexities of protecting land (e.g. 
changing the details on the title of the land or determining the optimal management 
options). These factors may therefore constitute real barriers to participation in 
programs (Jim Mulcahy, 2006, pers. comm.). Additionally, over 70 percent of 
environment owners surveyed believed that establishing a reserve increases landowner 
understanding of the environment, hence may simply want to learn more about 
environmental management. Environment owners did not appear concerned about 
ongoing third party involvement in farm management. 
Overall, there is clear evidence that program attributes do influence landowner choice 
behaviour in the context of forced entry. While choice behaviour was generally as 
expected, compensation funding seems to play a smaller role in program choice than 
anticipated. There is also clear evidence of significant differences in the choice 
behaviour of different landowner classes. In particular, only environment owners 
were driven in their program choice by compensation funding and free technical 
advice, suggesting a focus on the financial implications of incentive programs. While 
compensation funding was not a significant driver for production owners, they were 
the only class who preferred more restrictive land use and legal arrangements. 
The differences between landowner classes in their preferences for program attributes 
can be fwther explored by examining the relative importance of program attributes on 
program choice (Figure 5). The amount of compensation funding was most important 
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fi . t 103 'b . 95 h . or envzronmen owners, contn utmg over percent to program c o1ce. Program 
attributes that reflect the relative "restrictiveness" of the program together contributed 
less than 5 percent to their choice of program.1 04 
Figure 5: Relative importance of program attributes by landowner class for the 3-class 'forced choice' 
model. 
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Figure 5 shows that the "restrictiveness" of the program, in particular the legal aspect, 
contributed almost 70 percent to production owner choice. Compensation funding 
contributed less than I percent to the choice. The legal mechanism, land . use 
implications, and compensation funding each contributed approximately 30 percent to 
multi-objective owners' choice. Combined, payment method and technical advice 
contributed less than I 0 percent to program choice for all landowner classes. 
Estimated utility function coefficients (Table 27) were used to derive the welfare 
change in moving from a restrictive incentive program to a less restrictive incentive 
program (Table 33). The estimated welfare change was only significantly different to 
zero for environment owners. Although environment owners were driven in their 
103 Relative importance values are calculated on the basis of the probability means shown in Appendix 
8. The relative importance is independent of the level of the attribute. 
104 This importance measure is similar to that measured by the BW survey, in which the attributes were 
ranked according to their importance. In the BW results landowners ranked the land use implications 
as the most important, followed by compensation funding. The legal arrangements were ranked below 
technical advice which was ranked third most important. Thec:;e results were for all respondents and 
were not estimated separately for landowner attitude groups due to the small sample size. 
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program choice by compensation funding, the welfare gain from moving from a 
restrictive program to an unrestrictive program was only $2,494, less than half of the 
estimated average agricultural land value in Tasmania. This suggests that, if entry in 
incentive programs is forced, with relatively low amounts of compensation, 
environment owners are still likely to join 'restrictive' conservation programs. 
Although compensation funding for the other two landowner groups was not 
significant in their choice, the welfare gain in moving to less restrictive programs is 
real. 
9.2 Landowner preferences for program attributes: the voluntary 
case 
One of the aims of this research was to compare landowner choice behaviour in 
'voluntary' and 'forced choice' scenarios (Section 1.2). This involved presenting 
landowners with a second choice experiment in which it was possible to elect not to 
join either of the programs. As with the 'f?rced choice' model, the three landowner 
classes were characterised by their attitude to the role and outcome of establishing 
conservation reserves. 105 The estimated utility function coefficients for the 
'voluntary' model were reported m Table 32 (Section 8.4.2). The utility function was 
significant at the 5 percent level for all landowner classes (Table 29). 
When presented with the option of not joining either program, 67 percent of 
landowners chose not to joill (Table 30). 106 This may be because landowners, for a 
variety of reasons, are reluctant to change the basis of their land management (e.g. 
Morris and Potter 1995; Wynn, Crabtree et al. 2001; Hazell and Williams 2003). Of 
all landowner classes, environment owners were most likely to join a program. 
Production owners were least likely to join any program. Other studies have also 
found that individuals who had a strong conservation or environmental ethic are more 
likely to join a conservation program (e.g. Horne 2004). 
Table 40 shows the signs of the estimated utility function coefficients for the 
'voluntary' and 'forced choice.' models. 
105 Around 50 percent of respondents were classified into the same landowner group for both models. 
The size and attitude of the three landowner classes was similar in the two models. 
106 In the context of this research it represents the status quo. 
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Compensation funding ns + + + ns ns 
Legal arrangements + + 
Land use options + 
Payment method ns ns ns 
Technical advice ns ns 
ns = not significant at the 5 or 10 percent level. 
Landowner preferences for program attributes were broadly similar in the 'voluntary' 
and 'forced choice' models. For instance, compensation funding and legal 
arrangements remained significant drivers of program choice for environment owners 
when choice was voluntary. Production owners' preference for more restrictive legal 
arrangements was also con~istent across models. Overall, environment owner and 
multi-objective owner preferences showed strong similarities in both models, and 
production owners remained markedly different. 
However, there were a number of notable differences m the results. While 
compensation funding was not a significant driver of choice behaviour in the 'forced 
choice' scenario for multi-objective owners, results suggest that this class of 
landowner preferred higher levels of compensation funding when entry to programs 
was voluntary. 
In the 'voluntary' model both the direction and magnitude of landowner preferences 
for land use restrictions, payment method, and technical advice did not vary between 
landowner classes (Table 32). All landowner classes preferred to join programs 
where technical assistance was provided free of charge, whereas, when enrolment was 
forced, technical advice was not a significant driver of choice for environment owners 
and production owners. In_ addition, although payment method did not significantly 
influence choice in the 'voluntary' scenario for any of the landowner classes, more 
flexible payment arrangements were preferred in the 'forced choice' scenario. 
Environment owner and multi-objective owner preferences for less restrictive land use 
options did not vary between the models, however, production owner preferences 
differed. In the 'voluntary' scenario production owners preferred programs that 
retained limited use of the land; in the 'forced choice' scenario they preferred to use 
the reserved land exclusively for conservation purposes. 
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Differences between the two models can also be obseiVed in the relative importance 
of the attributes (Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Relative importance of program attributes by landowner class for the 3-class 'voluntary' 
model. 
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Overall, there was greater homogeneity between landowner classes in the relative 
importance of program attributes in the 'voluntary' scenario than in the ' forced 
choice' scenario (Figure 5). For instance, in the 'voluntary' scenario the legal 
implications contributed around 50 percent to the choice for all landowner classes. In 
the 'forced choice' scenario, the legal attribute made only a negligible contribution to 
the choice for environment owners. A possible explanation may be that this group 
assumed that being forced to join was synonymous with having legally binding 
restrictions, and therefore ascribed less importance to this attribute. 107 
A major change in the relative importance of compensation funding was observed for 
environment owners. When environment owners were forced to join a program, 
compensation funding contributed over 90 percent; in the 'voluntary' scenario this 
percentage fell to around 30. In contrast, compensation funding became more 
important to production owners in the 'voluntary' situation. 
107 It may also be that the differences between the model coefficients and the importance may be due to 
some "psychological reaction" when placed in a situation of being forced to choose versus one where 
the choice is voluntary. It is beyond the scope of this current research to further speculate on this issue. 
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In both choice scenarios, and for all landowner classes, the legal arrangements and 
compensation funding amount were more important to the choice than land use 
restrictions. Payment method and technical assistance contributed less than 10 
percent to the choice in both scenarios. 
Overall, the relative importance of program attributes remained largely the same for 
multi-objective owners. In the 'voluntary' scenario both compensation funding and 
the legal arrangements were equally important to environment owners. The relative 
importance of compensation funding and legal arrangements increased for production 
owners in the 'voluntary' scenario. 
The estimated utility coefficients were used in Section 8.4.3 to derive the welfare 
impact of different incentive program scenarios for both models (Tables 33 and 34). 
There is limited opportunity to compare the welfare changes between the two models 
for the different restrictiveness levels due to the different interpretation of the welfare 
change (Section 8.4.3). In the 'forced choice' model, the welfare gain from moving 
from a restrictive program to an unrestrictive one, for environment owners, was lower 
than the average agricultural land values. 
In the 'voluntary choice' scenario, the EV for joining a restrictive program for 
environment owners was also lower than the average agricultural land values in 
Tasmania perhaps indicating some non-monetary utility from joining. The EV of 
joining a less restrictive program for multi-objective owners was smaller in the 
'voluntary' scenario than the EV for environment owners. This may be due to the lack 
. of productive intentions that environment owners may have had for the land, hence 
experiencing relatively greater gains from more restrictive programs. Overall, for the 
small proportion of landowners who voluntarily joined a program the welfare losses 
were lower than the average agricultural land values, even though their preferences 
for program attributes differed. 
As shown above, landowner preferences for program attributes differed when they 
were forced to join a program compared to a situation where choice was voluntary. 
The difference in landowner preferences between choice scenarios and between 
landowner classes will be of interest in the design of incentive programs. The 
implication of the results of this research for program design is the subject of the next 
section. 
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9.3 Concluding remarks 
One of the contributions of this dissertation was the way in which the Best-Worst 
(BW) survey added to the analysis. Firstly, the BW survey assisted in reducing the 
number of program attributes to a 'manageable' number for the subsequent Choice 
experiment. The ten program attributes determined by the focus group were ranked in 
order of importance using the BW approach. 108 The five most important were used in 
the Choice survey. 
Secondly, the BW survey formed the basis for testing policy makers' understanding of 
landowner preferences for program attributes. · After all, if policy makers do not 
understand which program attributes are important in a landowner's decision process, 
poorly designed and implemented programs and promotion efforts may result. For 
this purpose, the BW survey was administered to both policy makers and landowners. 
Policy makers were asked to rate the most and least important attributes from a 
landowner's point of view. This allowed testing of policy makers ' ability to 
reproduce landowner ranking of at tributes. 
Results indicated no statistical difference in the ranking of attributes between groups. 
Both landowners and policy makers ranked land use implications as most important 
and compensation funding amount as second most important. The only difference in 
ranking suggests that policy makers believed landowners gave more weight to the 
legal implications of joining a program than landowners revealed they did (Table 3). 
At least in a BW experiment, based on this it may be concluded that policy makers 
had a good understanding of how landowners rank program attributes. 
As noted previously, most conservation incentive programs in Australia and Tasmania 
are based on voluntary participation (Section 2.4). However, in this research only 33 
percent of landowners were willing to take up these incentives and the obligations that 
went with them. Low participation in voluntary programs is one reason why 
Tasmanian reservation targets have not been met (Resource Planning and 
Development Commission 2003). The results of the current research confirm that 
108 In this current research the design of the Choice survey, using the BW ranking approach, was not 
compared to what the design may have been had the traditional focus group been used. Moreover, it is 
not known if members of the focus group and their respective 'class membership' may have biased the 
relative ranking of attribute importance. 
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relying on voluntary conservation programs may not attract sufficient participation to 
meet protection targets.109 
Increasing the amount of compensation funding offered by incentive programs has 
been perceived as the main, and most direct, avenue of addressing low program 
uptake by landowners. This research showed that when choice is voluntary, 
increasing participation was best achieved by offering programs that allowed 
flexibility in terms of the legal arrangements and other program attributes. The WTA 
compensation for joining programs with this level of restrictiveness was lower ~an 
the average Tasmania land values for two of three landowner groups (around $4,500 
per hectare for environment owners and $3,000 per hectare for multi-objective 
owners). This research also suggests that, when forced to enter, environment owners 
were the only class for whom compensation was important, and the welfare gain from 
having. less restrictive program attributes was only small. 
The results of this research also have implications for the design of conservation 
programs when entry is compulsory. In particular, the results suggest that welfare 
losses to landowners can be minimised by offering flexible schemes. Although 
compensation funding contributed to program choice only for environment owners, 
welfare gains from offering less restrictive programs were small. This landowner 
class appeared to be engaged in issues concerning conservation and seemed to need 
limited financial support, gaining more from legal and administrative assistance. 
Compensation was not a main driver of program choice for production owners but 
they differed in their preferences for the restrictiveness of the other program 
attributes. Production owners preferred programs that did not require them to 
combine conservation with productive land use and found more restrictive programs 
attractive. 
9.4 Recommendations for future research 
The research presented in this dissertation suggested a number of important directions 
for further enquiry, related to both policy and methodological objectives. 
109 In this it is assumed that low participation means low acreage protected. Obviously in some cases, 
where a small area is required for protection to meet conservation targets, 30 percent participation may 
be sufficient. 
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Firstly, the focus of this research was on investigating the way in which landowners 
traded off incentive program attributes in the conservation incentive program choice 
environment. While this improved understanding of landowner choice behaviour can 
inform the process of program design, there is clearly a need for comprehensive 
benefit cost analyses of both conservation targets and specific conservation policies 
and programs. The research presented here has shown that conservation targets may 
not be achieved by relying on the voluntary uptake of conservation programs alone, 
and that forcing entry, perhaps through the compulsory acquisition of land of high 
biodiversity value, might be required. In either case, landowners may be subject to 
high welfare costs and the question of appropriate compensation would require further 
investigation. In other words, is there a net gain to society from protection? 
Secondly, landowner beliefs about the role and impact of establishing conservation 
reserves on private land were shown to be important in determining participation and 
in explaining preferences for program attributes. Further research is needed to 
establish the way in which underlying values and general environmental attitudes help 
to shape these beliefs and to explore ways in which landowner beliefs can be 
modified, perhaps through better education and information provision about the links 
between reserve establishment and private and social outcomes. 
The use of choice modelling to explore responses to changes in the policy 
environment is still quite novel. This dissertation has shown how choice modelling 
can be usefully applied to exploring landowners ' behavioural responses to changes in 
the design of conservation programs. Extending the application of choice modelling 
for this purpose, in resource and environmental policy and in other areas, represents a 
third area of future research. Tl:Us method may also aid in program attribute 
development in other disciplines, such as the health sciences. Moreover, investigation 
into the effect of the 'psychological reaction' to placing survey respondents in a 
situation of 'forced' versus 'voluntary' choice on attribute preference may provide 
further insights that may be relevant to many disciplines. 
Fourthly, the use of a Best-Worst survey to complement the choice experiment in this 
research has highlighted the need for ftuther work in understanding the evaluative 
processes involved in alternative stated-preference decision environments. While the 
attribute rankings of landowner and program designers as revealed by the BW 
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experiment were not significantly different, landowner's ranking of attributes in the 
choice experiment did not mirror that of the BW. 
Finally, this research has demonstrated the potential of latent class regression analysis 
in the context of choice of environmental programs. The results suggest that it can 
provide a richer interpretation of choice behaviour than more traditional estimation 
methods 110, as was also found by Boxall and Adamowicz (2002) with respect to 
wilderness recreation behaviour. Future research may further establish the gains of 
using latent class over traditional methods. 
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110 The curiosity that the scores from the cluster analysis showed the same attitude pattern as latent 
class analysis, but that only about one third of the sample were classified in the landowner groups, is 
also worthy of further research. 
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Appendix 1 - Best-Worst experimental design 
The experimental design contains a total of 18 sets, 1 0 attributes, and 5 attributes per 
set. The design is shown below. 
t=10, k=5, b=18, r=9, A-=4, E=0.8889 
BIBD COMPLEMENT 
1 1 3 4 9 5 1 2 6 
2 2 9 10 6 3 2 1 4 
3 10 4 5 7 3 3 1 2 
4 3 6 1 8 4 4 2 5 
5 1 5 7 2 4 5 3 6 
6 4 2 6 8 5 6 1 3 
7 3 7 9 6 5 7 1 2 
8 5 8 10 7 6 8 1 2 
9 4 6 9 8 7 9 I 2 
10 7 10 3 1 8 10 2 4 
11 5 8 3 9 2 11 1 4 
12 6 10 1 4 9 12 2 3 
13 7 4 2 10 9 13 1 3 
14 8 9 1 5 10 14 2 3 
15 10 5 2 6 1 15 3 4 
16 6 7 3 2 1 16 4 5 
17 9 1 7 8 2 17 3 4 
18 10 2 8 3 4 18 1 5 
Where: 
(t) =program attributes 
(k) = number of attributes presented in a block 
(b) = total number of blocks 
7 8 
5 7 
6 8 
7 9 
8 9 
7 9 
4 8 
3 4 
3 5 
5 6 
6 7 
5 7 
5 6 
4 6 
7 8 
8 9 
5 6 
6 7 
10 
8 
9 
10 
10 
10 
10 
9 
10 
9 
10 
8 
8 
7 
9 
10 
10 
9 
(r) = Number of times the attribute appears in the experiment 
(A.) = Number of times an attribute appears in combination with each other attribute 
E = design efficiency factor 
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SE CTION 1 - INTRODU CTORY QUESTIONS 
Appendix 2- Best-Worst survey 
Question 1 
Which organisation do you work for? 
Question 2 
Approximately how many years have you· worked in 
jobs related to resource cons~rvation? 
_ Quest!~~ ~- __ . .. . . . .. .. _ 
How would you best describe you position? 
(tick only one) 
. Qu_estic;>~ 4 
How often do you spend time out in the field, 
working on properties of conservation significance? 
, (tick only one) 
Question 5 
. - . 
How often do you have face-to-face interactions with 
· landowners who own land of conservation 
. significance? 
; (tick only one) 
...... ~... .. - • ""' -r-"' •• 
............................................................ 
. - . - -
....................... .................................. ... Years 
o "scientiftc officer - --·~---- .... 
o Extension officer 
0 Policy officer 
0 Administration 
0 Management 
Q Other ....... _. ................. .. :.: .. · .. ·~ ··_ ................... . 
0 Frequently(3 times or more. per week) 
0 Regularly (once or twice per week) 
0 Not very often (on average less than . 
once per month) 
0 Never 
0 Frequentiy-(3 times or more. per-week) 
0 Regularly (once or twice per week) 
0 Not very often (on average less than 
once per month) 
0 Never 
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5 ECTI 0 N 3 - OUTCOMES OF INCENTIVE PROGRAM 
In this section we would like you to indicate what you think landowners believe the least 
important and the most important attributes of a conservation incentive program are. You 
are asked to do this 18 times, each time you are presented with a different set of 5 program 
attributes. Asking you to repeat this process 18 times will allow us to find out how you value 
each attribute in comparison to every one of the others. 
For example Tick only one 
/ 
Part XX Most important Tick only one Program attribute Least ~ortant 
0 Application procedure 0.,! 
0 Technical support availability 0 
0 Land use restriction 0 
/ 0 Legal mechanism D
0 / 0 Proqram duration Tick only one .__ ____ _ ___;_~2..:.,.=.;~=.:...;=:..:...:_ _ _ ____ ___;,__ ___ ....~ 
Which program attribute do you think is most important and which do you think is 
least important to a landowner who is thinking about joining an incentive program to 
protect native vegetation? 
Part 1 Most important lick only one Program attribute Least important 
0 Funding amount 0 
0 Funding agency 0 
0 Program duration 0 
0 Application procedure 0 
0 Technical support availability 0 
Part 2 Most important lick only one Program attribute Least important 
0 Payment method 0 
0 
·Application procedure 0 
0 Monitoring & survey requirements 0 
0 Funding allocation process 0 
0 Fundinq aqencv 0 
Part 3 Most important lick only one Program attribute Least imR_ortant 
0 1\'lonitoring & survey requirements 0 
0 Program duration 0 
0 Technical support availability 0 
0 Land use restriction 0 
0 Fundinq aqencv 0 
Part4 Most important lick only one Program attribute Least important 
0 Funding agency 0 
0 Funding allocation process 0 
0 Funding amount 0 
0 Legal mechanism 0 
0 Proaram duration 0 
Part 5 Most important Tick only one Program attribute Least important 
0 Funding amount 0 
0 Technical support availability 0 
0 Land use restriction 0 
0 Payment method 0 
0 Proaram duration 0 
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SECTION 3 - OUTCOMES OF INCENTIVE PROGRAM 
Which program attribute do you think is most important and which do you think is 
least important to a landowner who is thinking about joining an incentive program to 
protect native vegetation? 
Part 6 
Part 7 
Part 8 
Part 9 
Part 10 
Part 11 
Part 12 
Most im ortant 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Most im ortant 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Most important 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
' 
Most important 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Most important 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Most im ortant 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Most im ortant 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o .· 
Program duration 
Payment method 
Funding allocation· process 
Legal mechanism 
Technical su ort availabili 
Funding. agency . 
Land use restriction 
· · Application procedure 
Funding allocation process 
Technical su art availabili 
Tick only one Proqram attribute 
Technical support availability 
Legal mechanism 
Monitoring & survey requirements 
Land use restriction 
funding allocation process 
Tick only one Proqram attribute 
Program duration 
Funding allocation process 
Application procedure 
Legal mechanism 
Land use restriction 
Tick only one Proqram attribute 
Land use restriction 
Monitoring & survey requirements 
Funding agency 
Funding amount 
Legal mechanism 
Technical support availability 
Legal mechanism 
Funding agency 
Application procedure . · 
Pa ment method 
Funding allocation process 
Monitoring & survey _requirements 
Funding amount 
Program duration , 
A lication rocedure 
Least im ortant 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Least im ortant 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Least important 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 ,· r.;. 
Least inm_ortant 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Least important 
0 
0 
0 
0 
· 0 
Least im 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
ortant 
'· 
Least im ortant 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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5 E CTI 0 N 3 - OUTCOMES OF INCENTIVE PROGRAM 
Which program attribute do you think is most important and which do you think is 
least important to a landowner who is thinking about joining an incentive program to 
protect native vegetation? 
Part 13 Most important llck only one Program attribute least im_Qortant 
0 land use restriction 0 
0 Program duration 0 
0 Payment method 0 
0 Monitoring & survey requirements 0 
0 AQQiication procedure 0 
Part 14 Most im_Q_ortant llck only one Program attribute least im_Q_ortant 
0 Legal mechanism 0 
0 Application procedure 0 
0 Funding amount 0 
0 Technical support availability 0 
0 Monitoring & survey requirements 0 
Part 15 Most important Tick only one Program attribute Least im_Qortant 
0 Monitoring & survey requirements 0 
0 Technical support availability 0 
0 Payment method 0 
0 Funding allocation process 0 
0 Funding amount 0 
Part 16 Most important Tick only one Program attribute least important 
0 Funding allocation process 0 
0 Land use restriction 0 
0 Funding agency 0 
0 Payment method 0 
0 Funding amount 0 
Part 17 Most important llck only one Proqram attribute least important 
0 Application procedure 0 
0 Funding amount 0 
0 Land use restriction 0 
0 Legal mechanism 0 
0 PC!Y_ment method 0 
Part 18 Most important llck only one Proqram attribute least important 
0 Monitoring & survey requirements 0 
0 Payment method 0 
0 Legal mechanism 0 
0 Funding agency 0 
0 Prqg_ram duration 0 
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SECTION 3 - OUTCOMES OF INCENTIVE PROGRAM 
In this section we ask you to indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with 26 statements 
about the role and impacts of establishing reserves on private land. 
Conservation reserves on private land are: 
Please tick 0 only 1 of the 5 o~tions 
++ + +/-
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree 
A An effective way to ensure wildlife survival 0 0 0 0 0 
B Can be expensive as they lead to reduced 0 0 0 0 0 ~roductivi~ due to shading 
c Reduce the potential to eam income from 0 0 0 0 0 the rest of the {2r0{2ertv 
D Create a good image for landowners 0 0 0 0 0 
E Expensive to manage 0 0 0 0 0 
F Will benefit others as much as the landowner 0 0 0 0 0 
G Threaten the landowners' livelihood 0 0 0 0 0 
H Give the landowner a sense of fulfilment 0 0 0 0 0 
I Add to the beauty of the landscape 0 0 0 0 0 
J Will mainly benefit the future generation 0 0 0 0 0 
K Will increase the landowner's understanding 0 0 0 0 0 
of the environment 
L Provide a good way to protect species from 0 0 0 0 0 
extinction 
M Create a harbour for weeds 0 0 0 0 0 
N Increase the fire threat to the landowners' 0 0 0 0 0 ~ro~ertv 
0 , Of value for stock shelter and control 0 0 0 0 0 
p Increase the opportunities to earn income 0 0 0 0 0 from recreation/tourism 
Q Take up a lot of time to manage 0 0 0 0 0 
R Should be left alone with minimal 0 
management 0 0 0 0 
s Reduce the landowners' opportunity to 0 0 0 0 0 diversify 
T Best established where neighbours work 0 0 0 0 0 together to ~rotect areas 
u Will reduce the potential for soil erosion and 0 0 0 0 0 salini 
v Reduce the property value 0 0 0 0 0 
w Will make the management of the remainder 0 0 0 0 0 
of the ~ro{2ertv more com(21icated 
X Reduce the security of future income 0 0 0 0 0 
y Only desirable if there is no other valuable 0 
use for the land 
0 0 0 0 
z Create a harbour for animals that are a pest 0 to farming 
0 0 0 0 
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If you think that the "Funding amount" is most important and 
"Monitoring & survey requirements" are least important to you, your 
answer would look like the following: 
Most 
Part XX im 
Tick only one 
Tick only one 
For example 
Tick only one Program attribute 
Land use restriction 
Monitoring & survey requirements 
Funding agency 
Funding amount 
Leaal mechanism. 
0 
D 
D 
D 
ant 
Application procedure 
The administrative procedure involved in applying for incentive program funding. For example the 
landowner may need to discuss reservation options with a negotiator employed by an incentive 
program or may simply need to fill out an application. 
Funding allocation process 
The way in which the program determines eligiblllty for the funding. For example the agency may 
choose the best appllcation or the best and cheapest application. 
Funding agency 
Whether the agency that dellvers the incentive program is public or private sector. 
Funding amount 
The amount of money paid to the landowner for participation in an incentive program as a proportion 
of a "fair market value" 
Land use restriction 
The restrictions defining what the landowner is and isn't allowed to do with the land after reserve 
establishment. For example the landowner may be allowed to graze the reserve area occasionally or no 
productive use at all may be permitted. 
Legal mechanism 
The nature of the legal restrictions that are placed on the land after reserve establishment. For example 
the conservation values of the land may be protected by a permanent covenant or a temporary 
management agreement. 
Monitoring & survey requirements 
The flora and fauna monitoring and survey requirements for a landowner after reserve establishment 
Payment method 
The method by which the money (fundmg amount) is paid to the landowner. For example the money 
may be paid in a lump-sum or in instalments. 
Program duration 
How long the landowner is expected to participate in the program (i.e. representing the timeframe over 
which funding payments are made and over which monitoring is required} 
Technical support availability 
The availability and cost of technical support after reserve establishment. 
Appendix 3 - Choice survey 
What is the survey about? 
In Tasmania, government and non-government organisations have been 
running different incentive programs for landowners for many years. For 
example there exist a number of environmental programs that provide 
incentives to landowners to fence native vegetation, to plant trees to prevent 
erosion, and protect riverbanks. There are also conservation programs that 
offer money incentives to landowners to set aside areas of native vegetation 
as "formal reserves". 
Landowners across Tasmania are likely to respond differently to the different 
details (also called attributes) of the conservation incentive programs. Some 
landowners will base their decision of whether to join a program or not only 
on the amount of money they receive for the land they are setting aside as 
reserve. Other landowners may be guided more by the land use restrictions 
that would apply to the land if they were to join a program (they may not be 
able to graze the area any longer). Some landowners will want more money 
the more severe they believe the restrictions are. Other program attributes 
that are likely to have an impact on the decision to join a program or not, 
may be the way the incentive money is paid (in a lump sum or installments), 
or the technical support that's available after the reserve is established. 
We believe it is important to understand the landowners' views on these 
issues. In this survey we are interested in the opinion of both landowners 
who have native forest and those who don't and this includes your opinion. 
We want to know how a program would look that you would join, and what 
your overall requirements and standards are. You may feel that there is no 
program that you would join regardless of what's on offer. If so, we need to 
know. 
We hope you will take the time to participate in this survey so that incentive 
programs available in the future can take your views and opinions on board. 
How long it will take you 
We estimate that it will take you 10 to 15 minutes to complete the survey. 
Participation in this survey is entirely voluntary. The survey is anonymous, 
the researchers will be unable to identify participants and no participant will 
be identifiable in any of the research output. 
Returning the survey 
After you have filled out the survey please place it in the stamped envelope 
that is provided and mail it back to us by the 19th of August 2005. 
Thank you for helping make incentive programs more responsive to your needs. 
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Researcher contact details 
Dr. Sarah Jennings (sarah.jennings@utas.edu.au or (03) 6226 2828) and 
Ingrid van Putten (i.vanputten@utas.edu.au or (03) 6226 2820) can be 
contacted for questions and comments on the survey. Results from the study 
will be posted on the publicly accessible School of Economics website after 
completion of the study (see fcms.its.utas.edu.au/commercejecon). 
Type of survey questions 
To make it easier for us to understand your views, and to limit our demands 
on your time, this survey contains mostly multiple-choice questions. We use 
a repeated choice technique in section 2 which asks you to answer the same 
multiple choice question a number of times but each time with slightly 
different details. This approach is used because it makes your choice easier 
to understand. It is not used to test you or to test the consistency of your 
answers. 
We have included a separate sheet that explains some of the terms used in 
this survey. 
how the survey is laid out 
The survey consists of 4 sections. The questions in the 1st section are about 
your property and the management of your property. In the 2nd section we 
want to hear your opinion on the details that make up an incentive program 
that would appeal to you. In the 3 rd section you are asked to rate a number 
of statements about private nature reserves. The last section contains a few 
questions about you. 
Ethics approval 
The study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee 
(Tasmania) Network. If you have any concerns of an ethical nature about the 
st~dy, please contact the Executive Officer of the Human Research Ethics 
Committee (Tasmania) Network, Amanda McAully (Ph (03) 6226 2763). 
Thank you for helping make incentive programs 
more responsive to your needs. 
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(tick only one) . .Q~~stion 1 .. 
· Are you? 0 The owner and manager of the property 
D The owner (but not the manager) of the 
property 
D Other ······· ·· ······~· : ···· ~· · ····· ·· ·· ·· ··········· ·· ···· ·. ·· 
Question 2 
r: How-~loiig··-~ have you · owned. this 
: property? · . .. . . . . .. : ...................................................... ... _.Years 
Question 3 (tick only_one) 
, What are the ownership detaiis of the 0 Private ownership 
property? · . 0 Partnership 
o Famil·itrust 
· D Private or public company 
0 Other··· ··· ··.· · · ·· · ···.· .-.: ···· · ······ : ····· · ···· : ·.~· ··· ·· · · ··. · 
Question 4 
r bo you reside o,n the . propertY? . (tick only one) . o Yes 
o No 
·~. ·~ t .. . ... .. ' ... .. .. _., ..... 
. , ... 
, Q~estion_ 5 . _(del~t~ one) . 
. . . 
Approximately how l~rge .. is your · · · · · ·· ~. · 
_propertY? . .: ... . _. ..... : ... : .............. :·:··· .... .-:...' ... Hecta~esj Acres 
Question 6 (tick any that apply) 
~What ·agricultural activities do_ 'you .D Do·n-'t use it for 'any agricultural activitY 
f undertake on your property? · ·. . . ' . 0 Wool 
: · · o Meat · · .. · . t A• 
:._..! o Dairy _.· ._. · .. :· · .... · .. :· 
~ .·; o -cropping · · · · · 
· D Horticulture . 
l .. '. ' . ·· · 0 Other .............................. _ ... : .. ~·· ... ! • . ,; .... ~ .. : ··· 
Question 7 
' Which two ·numbers · does ·· your 
; telephone ·ri'umbef st~rl: with? . :· ' : _. 
~ ...... •• • ., , - ' • • ' • • • • ~ r. 
Question 8 (tick any that apply) 
... How· ~ many years -:. h~ive ·'you· .. been , ~ . ·:. · .·~ .... - . ~ 
involved in resource conservation and . .... :: .: ... . : .. ............ : ............................... .Years 
~ rnanagen:tent? · .; .. , D. I haye not been involved 
Question 9 (tick 1}!/Y t~a~ af.plyJ ·-· _ .. 
. :'Do you ·manage:· ·.areas on ... your -. 0 Erosion control I s~linity prevention 
; 'propertY for · the ::following non- · 0 Protection of vegetation on waterways 
; ·commercial -purposes? · o Shelter · 
1 0 Recreation 
L · 0 Personal firewood collection . . ~· . .. 0 h . .. 0 t er ...... ........ ............ : .................... ......... . 
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QUESTIO N S ABOUT Y OUR PROPERTY 
Qu~stion 10 (tickanythatapply) 
Have you received any of the following 0 Money for fencing 
. forms of support for managing areas on 0 Money for revegetation 
your property in the past 5 years? 0 Trees for revegetation } . 0 Labour assistance for revegetation 
0 Money for improving soil management 
0 Scientific advice (eg. identification of animals) 
0 Technical advice (eg. management of animals) 
0 Administrative assistance (eg. ti lling out form) 
0 Legal advice (eg. implication of covenants) 
0 Other ............. .. ... .. .... ............................ .. 
Q~estion 11 
. Is there any native forest on your 0 Yes (Please go to the next question - 12) 
· property? 0 No (Please go to question 19 on page 4) 
Question 12 
' Approxfmately how large is the area of 
(df!lete om;) .. 
. native forest on your property? ........... .. .... ........ ....... : ... .......... Hectares/Acres 
Quest.ion 13 (tick any that apply) 
· Do you manage areas of native forest 0 Don't use it for anything 
, on your property for the following D Grazing 
; commercial uses? 0 Commercial timber harvesting 
D Hunting . 
D Commercial seed collection ! i . . . 0 Other· .. ..... : ..... ................... ! .. .. . .. ..... ......... . .. 
Q~~s~i~n 14 . (tick only one) 
: Do you have any plans to harvest any 0 Yes 
of your native forest for commercial · 0 No 
purposes in the future? 0 Don't know 
Question 15 (tick only one) 
, Is there ·a formal conservation reserve 0 Yes 
anywher~ on your property? D No 
0 Don't know 
Question 16 (tic~onlyone) 
: Have you received funding to establish o Yes 
a conservation . reserve on your. 0 No 
property? 0 Don't know 
Question 17 (tickonlyone) 
! bo you manage any part of your DYes 
, property · specifically for conservation 0 No 
! without it being formally protected? 0 Don't know 
Please proceed to the next page and answer Question 18 
··- ... • .. .. ......... .. J 
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SETTING THE SCENE FOR THE NEXT QUESTIONS 
Question 18 
For landowners WHO OWN an area of native forest 
To set the scene for the next section of the survey we ask you to think about a 
particular area of native forest on your property that has some conservation value (it 
doesn't matter what the type of forest is or where it is on your property). If you don't 
own an area of forest with conservation values please think of any other tract of native 
forest on your land. Please answer these brief questions about that area of native 
forest. 
Approximately how large is the area of 
: natlve forest you are thinking of? 
(delete l?ne) 
............ .......... .. : ............. . Hectares/ Acres 
(delete '!ne) . 
In your opinion, what would be a fair · 
k t I ~ th' f t' ~ t? · $ ............ ...... .................. per Hectare/ Acre mar e va ue .or IS area o na 1ve .ores . · 
The estimate of the fair market value of 
• this area of native forest was made on the 
basis of 
, In your opinion, does this area have 
conservation value? 
... 
(tick_ any that apply) . 
D What I paid for the land 
D Value of similar land in the district 
D Government valuation 
D What I could get if I sold the timber 
D Other ........ : ....... ........ ..... .... ... .. .. ........ . 
DYes 
D No 
D Don't know 
For the next section please assume you could enrol the area of native forest you 
described above in a conservation incentive program. Enrolling the land may mean you 
will have to change the use of that land but you would retain ownership of the land. 
Please now proceed to page 5 and ans-wer all 8 parts of question 20 
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SETTING THE SCENE FOR THE NEXT QUESTIONS 
Question 19 
For landowners who DON'T OWN an area of native forest 
Even though you currently don't own any land with native forest, we are interested in 
your opinion about the sort of incentive program that would appeal to you if you did 
own forested land. 
To set the scene for the next two sections please place yourself in the position of 
someone who owns an area of native forest. Please imagine that 10°/o of your 
property is covered with one single· contiguous block of native forest. 
. -
. Approximately how large would the area of 
native forest be? ..... ............................... ... Hectares/Acres 
Say that similar forested land in your region has sold for around $5,000 per hectare in 
the past year. On this basis a fair market value for the area of native forest would be 
$5,000 per hectare times the size of the area you indicated above. 
Imagine that this forest has conservation value and is eligible to be enrolled in a 
conservation incentive scheme. Enrolling the land may mean you will have to change the 
use of that land but you would retain ownership of the land. Please keep this area of 
native forest in mind. 
Please now proceed to page 5 and answer all 8 parts of question 20 
1 
CHOICE OF INCENTIVE PROGRAM 
Question 20 
We would like you to tell us which of two incentive programs you would prefer if you 
could enrol the forested land described previously in a conservation incentive program. 
You are given the option of choosing between two programs that are different in a 
maximum of 5 possible ways. You are asked to repeat this exercise 8 times. The 
repetition will help you to think about the difficult tradeoffs between the various aspects 
of programs and help us to design programs that make better use of taxpayer's money. 
Please refer to the back of the glossary insert for an example of this question. 
There are two incentive programs you can enrol your land in (program 1 and 2 below). 
Which one would you choose? 
Part 1 
Funding amount 
Legal mechanism 
Land use restriction 
Payment method 
Technical support availability 
1\ Of these two programs 
my preferred one is 
Program 1 
V2 the market value 
Temporary management agreement 
No use permitted 
Tax relief 
Free of charge 
D 1 
Program 2 
3/4 of the market value 
Permanent covenant 
Limited use permitted 
Up-front lump sum payment 
Fee for service 
D 2 
8 I wouid voluntarily enrol 0 1 D 2 
. my land in program D Neither 1 nor 2 
Please check you have answered both A and B above 
Part 2 
Funding amount 
Legal mechanism 
Land use restriction 
Payment method 
Technical support availability 
1\ . Of these two programs 
my preferred one is 
Program 1 
Exactly the market value 
Temporary management agreement 
No use permitted 
Up-front lump sum payment 
Free of charge 
D 1 
Program 2 
1114 of the market value 
Permanent covenant 
Limited use permitted 
Tax relief 
Fee for service 
D 2 
8 : I · would voluntarily enrol 0 1 0 2 
. my land in program D Neither 1 nor 2 
Please check you have answered both A and B above 
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:HOICE OF INCENTIVE PROGRAM 
Part3 Program 1 Program 2 
Funding amount 1 V4 of the market value 112 the market value 
Legal mechanism Permanent covenant Temporary management agreement 
Land use restriction No use permitted Limited use permitted 
Payment method Tax relief Up-front lump sum payment 
Technical support availability Fee for service Free of charge 
' . . 
Of these two programs 
my preferred one is D 1 D 2 
~·· ..... - .. 
I would voluntarily enrol D 1 D 2 
my lang i!"1 p~ogram D Neither 1 nor 2 
Please check you have answered both A and B above 
Part4 
Funding amount 
Legal mechanism 
Land use restriction 
Payment method 
Technical support availability 
Of these two programs 
fl}Y p~ef~rred on~ is 
·-"· ... . .. 
I would voluntarily enrol 
my land in program 
Program 1 Program 2 
3/4 of the market value Exactly the market value 
Temporary management agreement Permanent covenant 
Limited use permitted No use permitted 
Tax relief Up-front lump sum payment 
Free of charge Fee for service 
D 1 D 2 
D : 1 D 2 
D Neither 1 nor 2 
. . 
Please check you have answered both A and B above 
Part 5 
Funding amount 
Legal mechanism 
Land use restriction 
Payment method 
Technical support availability 
, or·fhese ·· tWo programs 
my preferred one is 
I would voluntarily enrol 
my_lanflin. prog~am 
' . 
Program 1 Program 2 
Exactly the market value 1 V4 of the market value 
Permanent covenant Temporary management agreement 
No use permitted Limited use permitted 
Up-front lump sum payment Tax relief 
Free of charge Fee for service 
D 1 D 2 
D 1 D 2 
D Neither 1 nor 2 
Please check you have answered both A and B above 
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CHOICE OF INCENTIVE PROGRAM 
Part6 
Funding amount 
Legal mechanism 
Land use restriction 
Payment method 
Technical support availability 
A Of these two programs 
. fTlY preferred one is 
. . . 
Proqram 1 
3f4 of the market value 
Temporary management agreement 
No use permitted 
Up-front lump sum payment 
Fee for service 
0 1 
Prooram 2 
Exactly the market value 
Permanent covenant 
Limited use permitted 
Tax relief 
Free of charge 
0 2 
8 . I would voluntarily enrol 0 1 o 2 
' my land in program · 0 Neither 1 nor 2 
Please check you have answered both A and B above 
Part7 Program 1 Proqram 2 
Funding amount 1 Y4 of the market value 112 the market value 
Legal mechanism Permanent covenant Temporary management agreement 
Land use restriction Limited use permitted No use permitted 
Payment method Up-front lump sum payment Tax relief 
Technical support availability Free of charge Fee for service 
A ' o( these t:Wo programs - . '• .. 0 1 0 2 
my preferred one is 
8 ' I would voluntarily enrol 0 1 0 2 
: myl~nd in program 0 Neither 1 nor 2 
Please check you have answered both A and B above 
PartS 
Funding amount 
Legal mechanism 
Land use restriction 
Payment method 
Technical support availability 
fJ.. , Of these two programs 
· my preferred one is 
Program 1 
3/4 of the market value 
Permanent covenant 
Limited use permitted 
Tax relief 
Free of charge· 
0 1 
Prooram 2 
Exactly the market value 
Temporary management agreement 
No use permitted 
Up-front lump sum payment 
Fee for service 
0 2 
8 :· I would voluni:ariJY enrol 0 1 o 2 
r my land in program 0 Neither 1 nor 2 
Please check you have answered both A and B above 
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QUESTI ONS ABOUT THE ROLE OF CO NSE RVATI ON RESERVES 
Question 21 
We ask you to indicate how strongly you agree with 24 statements about the role and 
impacts of establishing conservation reserves on private land. 
Conservation reserves on private land: 
Please tick 0 only 1 of the 5 options 
++ + +/-
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree 
A Reduce the property value 0 
B Are of value for stock shelter and control 0 
C Reduce the potential to earn income from 0 
· the rest of the property 
D Create a good image for landowners 0 
E Are expensive to manage 0 
F · Will benefit others as much as the landowner 0 
G Threaten the landowners' livelihood 0 
H Give the landowner a sense of fulfilment 0 
I Add to the beauty of the landscape 0 
J Will mainly benefit the future generation 0 
K ' Will increase the landowners' understanding 0 
of the environment 
L Provide a good way to protect species from 0 
extinction 
M Create a harbour for weeds 0 
N; Increase the fire threat to the property 0 
0 Can be expensfve as they lead to reduced 0 productivity due to shading 
P Increase the opportunities to earn income 0 from recreation/tourism 
Q Take up a lot of time to manage D 
R ; Reduce the landowners' opportunity to 0 diversify 
5 , Will reduce the potential for soil erosion and 0 
· salinity 
T Are an effective w~y to ensure wildlife 0 
· survival 
U Will make the management of the remainder 0 
of the property more complicated 
V Reduce the security of future income 0 
W Are only desirable if there is no other 0 
· valuable use for the land 
X : Create a harbour for animals that are a pest 0 ~ to farming 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
D 
0 
D 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
D 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
D 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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QUESTIONS ABOUT YOU 
Some of the questions in this section are of a personal nature. This information adds to the 
completeness of our analysis. We assure the confidentiality of the information you provide. Even 
if you don't complete the whole section below, please mail us the rest of the survey as it will still 
provide valuable information. 
Question 22 
Gender of the person 
this survey 
{ttck only one) 
who filled out D Male 
Question 23 
How would you best describe your 
m~in occupation? 
Qu_estion ~4 
. How old are you? 
Q~es~ion 25 
. What is the highest education level you 
achieved 
Question 26 
! Please indicate if you regularly receive 
information from any of the following 
. organisations? 
Question 27 
What do you intend to do with your 
. property when you no longer want to 
manage it? 
. Question 28 
' NL!mber of dependent children 
Question 29 
. Do you or· a family member living on 
the property earn off-farm income? 
0 Female 
............. ........ ................ .... ... ................... years 
(tick only one) 
D Up to secondary 
D TAFE or trade training 
0 University or postgraduate 
(tick any that apply) 
D Greening Australia 
0 Local Coastcare I Landcare group 
D Private Forests Tasmania 
D Other .. ............................... ..................... . 
(tick only one) . . 
o Pass it on to a family member 
D Sell up 
0 Not sure 
0 Other ........................................................ . 
··· ·································································· 
(tick only one) 
DYes 
o No 
Question 30 
Do you earn the majority 
. income from farming? 
(tick only one) 
of your DYes 
Question 31 
,-How.big is .. the mortgage you have on 
the property? 
Question 32 
' What is you average annual gross farm 
o No 
(tick only one) . 
0 I don't have a mortgage on the property 
0 Less than 25°/o of the property value 
0 Between 25°/o - 50°/o of the property value 
0 Between 50°/o- 75°/o of the property value 
D More than 75°/o of the property value 
turnover? · $ ....................................................... per year 
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Thank you very much for participating in this survey! 
18 1 
Example 
This is what the two programs look like 
Part " Program 2 Program 1 
Funding amount 1 V4 of the market value V2 the market value 
Legal mechanism Permanent covenant Temrxxary rnanag:mrtagrwnent 
Land use restriction No use permitted Limited use permitted 
Payment method Tax relief Up~front lump sum payment 
Technical support availability Fee for service Free of charge 
~~------------- ~ 
You are asked to answer two parts A and B. In part A you are asked to indicate if 
you prefer program 1 or 2 (even if in reality you would not consider enrolling your 
land in either of them). 
You like program 1 best- tick this box 
A Of these two programs 
my preferred one is 
- ~ . 
0 1 . 0 2 
In part B you are then asked to indicate which program in reality you would enrol 
your land in. If you would choose not to enrol your land1 you can choose "neither 1 
nor 2". 
If you would enrol your land in program 1 - tick this box 
¥"' 
8 I would voluntarily enrol my land in program 
': 0 ' i " 0 2 
0~1nor2 
If you don't like either program - tick this box 
Funding amount 
The amount of money paid to the landowner for participation in an 
incentive program expressed as a proportion of the estimated "fair market 
value~~. 
Land use restriction 
The restrictions defining what the landowner is and isn't allowed to do with 
the land after reserve establishment. For example the landowner may be 
allowed limited use such as occasional grazing of the reserve area. If no 
use is allowed, the landowner will have to manage the area for 
conservation only. 
Legal mechanism 
The nature of the legal restrictions that are placed on the land after 
reserve establishment. For example the conservation values of the land 
may be protected by a permanent covenant, which means that the title of 
the land is changed. The land will be identified on the title as conservation 
reserve for ever. This title change will be retained when the land is sold. 
A temporary management agreement is a contract between government 
and the landowner that changes the use and management of the land for a 
maximum of 20 years. 
Payment method 
The method by which the money (funding amount) is paid to the 
landowner. For example the money may be paid in a lump-sum or by 
means of tax relief. 
Technical support availability 
The availability and cost of technical support after reserve establishment. 
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Appendix 4 - Choice survey experimental design 
This design has 5 attributes, the first 4 attributes have 2 levels and the last one has 4 
levels. All main effects and the interaction between the first 2 level attribute and the 4 
level attribute can be estimated independently of each other. There are 2 options (plus 
"do nothing") in each of the 16 choice sets and each row in the table below represents 
I choice set. 
.... ~~ 0 t:: E c;~ .... o.o .... 0 = s .... o.o ... 
"'0 __. .~ c..·- 0"0 <I) 0 ..- .~ C..·- t::"'' :::1 ·z: (";! t:: 0..:: 0 0 = t:: ::s ·.;:; ~a c.:: 0 0 t:: t:: 
"0 -~ ::S..Cl E..S ·- :::1 "'0 -~ ::S..Cl E-:l ·- :::1 0.0~ <n CIS "'0 0 <I) ~ "'0 0 t::- o..c 
·=-= 
::--o § e a~ CI)..C ~~ ::--o t:: ~ ~ ~ ....l 2 ..C CIS ~ E ....l 0 &! e tZ u > IJ.. CIS 
...:I ~ 0 0 > ~ ... s ~CIS E ~CIS 
Design 1 survey I Design 2 survey 3 
l 0 0 0 0 0 la l 1 1 1 1 
2 0 1 I 1 0 2a I 0 0 0 1 
3 0 0 1 1 1 3a 1 1 0 0 2 
4 0 1 0 0 1 4a 1 0 1 1 2 
5 0 1 0 1 2 Sa 1 0 1 0 3 
6 0 0 1 0 2 6a 1 1 0 1 3 
7 0 1 1 0 3 7a 1 0 0 1 0 
8 0 0 0 1 3 8a 1 I 1 0 0 
Design 1 survey 2 Design 2 survey 4 
9 1 0 0 0 0 9a 0 I l l l 
10 1 1 1 l 0 lOa 0 0 0 0 l 
11 1 0 1 l 1 lla 0 1 0 0 2 
12 1 1 0 0 1 12a 0 0 1 1 2 
13 1 1 0 1 2 13a 0 0 l 0 3 
14 1 0 1 0 2 14a 0 1 0 1 3 
15 1 1 1 0 3 15a 0 0 0 1 0 
16 1 0 0 1 3 16a 0 1 1 0 0 
As 8 choice sets were included in each survey, and the design above shows 32 choice 
sets, this was divided into 4 different surveys that were mailed out. A random order 
in the 16 choice sets of both designs was generated. 111 The first 8 of design 1 were 
then included in survey 1, 9 through I6 of design 1 were included in survey number 
2. I a to 8a choice sets of design 2 were included in survey number 3, and 9a through 
16a of design 2 were included in survey number 4. 
111 For design number one this was 2, 1, 4, 5, 12, 9, 11, 10, 15, 6, 13, 14, 16, 8, 7, and 3 
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Appendix 5 - Principal component analysis 
A PCA and the V ARIMAX rotation method (SPSS version 11.0.0) was used to 
condense the original 26 attitude variables to form a reduced number of interpretable 
variables (Mulaik 1972). Variables with extraction communality values smaller than 
0.2 were dropped from the PCA (fable i). STOCK, FUTGEN, and EROSION did 
not fit well with the factor solution. 
BEAUTY 0.531 
BENOTH 0.426 
COMPLEX 0.645 
DIVERSE 0.630 
EROSION 0.167 
EXPMAN 0.482 
FIRE 0.454 
FULFIL 0.716 
FUTGEN 0.114 
IMAGE 0.446 
INCOP 0.268 
INCRED 0.412 
INCSEC 0.686 
LEARNING 0.663 
LIVELY 0.634 
OTHERUSE 0.516 
PESTS 0.375 
PROPV ALU 0.539 
PROTECT 0.656 
SHADE 0.562 
STOCK 0.066 
TIME 0.474 
WEEDS 0.559 
WILDL 0.583 
With all communalities now greater than 0.2 the next step in the PCA is 
determination of the number of factors. There are several methods by which this is 
usually done, including Cattell's scree test, eigenvalues greater than 1, and 
interpretability of the resultant factors. Using a combination of these methods it was 
decided to extract 2 factors. 
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Tnblc ii: Total variance explained in PCA for all respondents (Choice survey data). 
lllh.:llt 
Total 
8.698 
2 2.519 
3 1.873 
%of 
Var. 
36.240 
10.497 
7.804 
Cum% Total %of %of Cum% Total v~ ~~ 
36.240 8.698 36.240 36.240 5.568 23.200 
46.737 2.519 10.497 46.737 5.139 21.414 
54.540 1.873 7.804 54.540 2.382 9.927 
Cum% 
23.200 
44.613 
54.540 
* Components with eigenvalues smaller than I and/or that contribute less than 5% of the variance are 
not shown. 
The first two components explain around 55 percent of the total variation of the 
original variables. Standard tests of the adequacy of the PCA indicate that a factor 
analysis is useful for this reduced variable set. A 0.878 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure 
of Sampling Adequacy indicates a high proportion of variance in the data explained 
by the underlying factors. Further the significance level of 0.000 for Bartlett's test of 
sphericity, with approximate Chi-square. of 44371.977 and 276 degrees of freedom, 
indicates there are significant relationships among the variables. 
The attributes with loadings greater than 0.400 (+ or -) in the rotated component 
matrix for two principal components are shown in Table iii. 
Table iii: Rotated component matrix (Choice survey data). 
Production 
: impact 
PCl 
PROPV ALUE 0.457 
INCRED 0.643 
EXPMAN 0.686 
LIVELY 0.652 
WEEDS 0.747 
FIRE 0.597 
SHADE 0.699 
TIME 0.725 
DIVERSE 0.671 
COMPLEX 0. 71 3 
INCSEC 0.706 
PESTS 0.498 
Environmental 
· impuct' 
PC2 
-0.469 
BENOTH 0.514 
IMAGE 0.647 
FULFIL 0.737 
BEAUTY 0.728 
LEARNING 0.750 
PROTECT 0. 799 
WILDL 0.775 
.Longtcm• 
opportunity lmpa~t .. 
PC3 
0.494 
OTHERUSE -0.494 0.562 
INCOP -0.486 
FUTGEN 0.649 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax 
with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
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The first component (PCl) has high positive loadings for all of the variables 
concerned with the perceived negative impact of reserve establishment on the 
production capacity of an agricultural enterprise. These attitudes reflect the effect of 
reserve establishment on both current income and property values, and future asset 
values. 
The second component (PC2) has high loadings for variables related to the positive 
impact of reserve establishment on the environmental values of the property such as 
increased beauty, wildlife protection, as well as personal fulfilment. The factor 
loading for the impact PROPVALUE ih PC2 is in the opposite direction to PCl 
suggesting a strong disagreement with the negative impact reserve establishment has 
on overall property values. 
The ·third component (PC3) has high loadings for variables indicating that 
respondents in this group do not believe the establishment of reserves on their 
property will be of benefit to them directly either in terms of agricultural production 
or environmental outcomes. This group focuses mainly on the longer term outcomes 
of reserve establishment. Additionally, the factor loading for OTHER USE is in the 
opposite direction to PC2 indicating that the PC3 group believe that reserves are only 
desirable if there is no other valuable use for the land. 
The first two components are similar to those developed for the BW survey attitude 
data112, although there are fewer variables included in both the production impact and 
environmental impact components in the BW survey. 113 
Scores for the three factors were calculated for each of the survey respondents in the 
sample and these were included as variables (prod_attitude, env_attitude, and 
oppor_att) in the latent class analysis (Section 8.4). 
The env_attitude and prod_attitude components are compared to the att_env and 
att_prod, and components from the PCA used in the 'voluntary' model in Table iv. 
112 As the attitude questions were included in both the BW and Choice survey this allowed a degree of 
cross checking of the results. A two tailed test of the independence of the samples (BW and choice) 
showed there was no significance difference between the two groups in the rating of the attitude 
statements. 
113 Both the production impact and environmental impact in the BW analysis contained seven variables 
that were the same as those in the choice analysis. The choice analysis contained an additional five 
variables for the production impact and three variables for the environmental impact. 
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Table iv: Comparison of components used in the 'voluntary' and 'forced 
choice' models (Choice survey data). 
I ~ ENV1RON?-.1ENT PRODUCTION 
'voluntary' ' forced choice' ' voluntary' 'forced choice' 
beauty 0.728 0.720 
benoth 0.514 0.625 
complex 0.713 0.7 18 
diverse -0.455 0.671 0.650 
expman 0.686 0.693 
fire 0.597 0.654 
fulfil 0.737 0.779 
image 0.647 0.668 
in cop *in oppor 0.517 
inc red 0.643 0.598 
inc sec -0.442 0.706 0.700 
learning 0.750 0.772 
lively 0.652 -0.509 0.61 2 
otheruse -0.494 -0.628 
pests 0.498 0.608 
propvalu -0.469 -0.579 0.457 0.451 
protect 0.799 0.78 1 
shade 0.699 0.677 
time 0.725 0.679 
weeds 0.747 0.748 
wild I 0.775 0.747 
Note: incop, fire, otlzeruse, stock, and futuregen comprised the future 
opportunity used in the 'voluntary' model and do not appear in the table. 
Table iv shows that the results for the two PCA are similar in terms of the variables 
that make up the environment and production groups. 
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Appendix 6 - Communalities for principal component 
analysis 
0.461 
IMAGE 0.382 
EXPMAN 0.427 
BENOTH 0.358 
LIVELY 0.625 
FULFIL 0.606 
BEAUTY 0.590 
LEARNING 0.604 
PROTECT 0.627 
WEEDS 0.560 
FIRE 0.448 
SHADE 0.570 
INCOP 0.283 
TIME 0.482 
DIVERSE 0.630 
WILDL 0.609 
COMPLEX 0.674 
INCSEC 0.697 
OTHERUSE 0.506 
PESTS 0.290 
EROSION 0.209 
STOCK 
FUTGEN 
All communalities greater than 0.2 were retained. 
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Appendix 7 - Correlation coefficients 
careg~; memberr 
cnv owner 0.3414 
farmsize 0.320 
fund 4 reserve 0.427 0.774 
ga member 0.343 0.305 
manage 4 cons 0.31 I 
no mongage 0.315 
OW!Lflf 0.363 
prod owner 0.3528 
reserve on_prop 0.336 
size nf 0.896 0.350 0.560 I 
size reserve f 0.860 0.552 0.928 
ten edu 0.316 0.365 
trees or labour 0.418 I 
veurotect 0.3 17 I 
years inv_cons 0.370 0.534 I 
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Appendix 8- Probability means 
The re-scaled parameters shown as column percentages in Table vii above can also be 
presented as row percentages. Row percentages provide information regarding the 
dimensions of the groups by showing class membership probabilities. The 
probabilities sum to one across landowner classes. Vermunt & Magidson (2005) 
report the formulas to obtain the reported probability means in detail. In summary, 
the probability of being in latent class x given choice a on "set" p. 
Table vii: Probability means for the 3-class ' voluntary choice' model (Choice survey d 
,,• 1 '{.~ , ~ 1, ~·"· ,. ".. 0 If ~ I ' ' 'i.Hl I 1\1 • I ': . 1 I I I f4 cr· ., ,. .... r·--  • ,\, " ~"';; ···~toc~~ :r; -iu\\2fr<i)~ 'it~1'fi · -~~u:tf J:~ ~.!.xS. -..It ., •.t., 7" • 'J ~ !~l ~~<\-~ 'f( · · _., .;;..._ ._.:~ ~ .. ;.-"' -~ .,.~ r .,."• .. _ ', 
rtr j·~. >~;N,i;, l:.~;>rk-1-tl'i jf'l:. "":·-;:.~."~} • 1 ~~-~-·;i:lWf{lm.,. , ;~.§:. ~ ·mw&iiw~ 
Compfund* NO fund 0.0454 0.0653 0.8893 
$2,500 0.245 0.293 0.462 
$3,750 0.3738 0.4075 0.2187 
$5,000 0.4598 0.4568 0.0834 
$6,250 0.5098 0.4615 0.0287 
Legal covenant 0.0324 0.0015 0.966 
managreement 0.2447 0.0091 0.7462 
NOlegalagreem 0.5008 0.4906 0.0087 
Land use limited use 0.4489 0.4281 0.123 
nousepennit 0.4489 0.4281 0.123 
UNlimiteduse 0.4489 0.4281 0.123 
Paymethod upfrontpay 0.4489 0.4281 0.123 
taxrelief 0.4489 0.4281 0.123 
NOpayment 0.4489 0.4281 0.123 
Techassist fee4service 0.4489 0.4281 0.123 
freetechadv 0.4489 0.4281 0.123 
NOadvice 0.4489 0.4281 0.123 
) . ~ ' .. ~· ,. ~-;a 1-E... • .( .. - • ' . •• ' ; 'U • " - .,:, .,- J::.~' t -~1::&-'"£{[ f~~a-=-·· BJt~fi~idtriijffifrl~ 
f ~~rti~~ .... ;· l.G~. 1 ~- P»l· . I i.lr9. ~.". • I I • • ~l<l' I ffi'lil~if·l 
Gender (female=O) 0.4185 0.4554 0.126 
(male= I) 0.4587 0.4193 0.122 
Tert_edu (no tertiary edu=O) 0.3616 0.5338 0.1046 
(tertiary edu=l) 0.6157 0.2263 0.158 
Region62 (not in south=O) 0.3852 0.5143 0.1005 
(south= I) 0.6543 0.1505 0.1952 
. . Note: * Values for the att1tude covanates are not shown as the probab1hty means are 
given at the mean value and cannot be interpreted in a meaning"ul way. 
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ata). 
Table viii: Probability means for the 3-class 'forced choice' model (Choice survey data) 
.. i\!tll) !i:<·t~l::<.!(t.;·t.~· ,1-,J~'.i~_il.lj_i_lt j_(;l (~i l.:lr:ol!,l) (!tft!JJo 
t f"!)?'_;('f! • !)i?l.C.9]\) -~~~\"! @.~· ',!).YJlt;li'.) 
Compfund $1,000 - $32,000 0.7531 0.0000 0.2469 
$33,000 - $50,000 0.7556 0.0000 0.2444 
$51,000- $70,000 0.7594 0.0000 0.2406 
$71,000- $97,000 0.7671 0.0000 0.2329 
$98,000-$137,000 0.7827 0.0128 0.2045 
Legal covenant 0.2812 0.3472 0.3716 
managreement 0.6854 0.2761 0.0384 
Landuse limiteduse 0.5718 0.3475 0.0807 
nousepermit 0.4714 0.1650 0.3636 
Paymethod upfrontpay 0.6462 0.1680 0.1858 
taxrelief 0.4698 0.4017 0.1285 
Techassist fee4service 0.5461 0.3006 0.1533 
freetechadv 0.5461 0.3006 0.1533 
't!;tv:l@lj(l ,,~)~'' ~'~~ I!.IJJ:(itJjJ:ti•J}.•.:p l]i.l)l•,iJ~.Vll.i;tl!lltl l~f.•.l.H H!lflll i.l 
o.'(i)_f:~i! (t\i~·Jl;ff.'i \!X\·~JJ.:l_i [,, tt)ij'i \_1.\ ~.) 
Gender (female=O) 0.343 0.445 0.212 
(male=!) 0.610 0.255 0.135 
Tert_edu (no tertiary edu=O) 0.453 0.344 0.203 
(tertiary edu= I) 0.661 0.247 0.093 
Logsize 1-8 (ba) 0.633 0.229 0.138 
9-15 (ha) 0.847 0.031 0.122 
16- 27 (ha) 0.641 0.209 0.150 
28- 37 (ha) 0.340 0.456 0.204 
38- 51 (ha) 0.293 0.562 0.146 
Note: *Values for the attitude covariates are not shown as the probability means are 
given at the mean value and cannot be interpreted in a meaningful way. 
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Appendix 9 - Standard errors 
Table ix: S1nodnrd errors for lhc quo1ico1 of two \':tri:thl t:' fl1r lhl· · t~~r.:t:, l 
( choice' model (Choice sur\'cy d:Ha). I. \ 'I L:--. I li .\'S t ll I Sl 1.\ \ I I \ \\\ •. :~ \: .:; .. u;·; ·~ , ' , 
Co\'/$ (mulli) 55.0 1S ~ ( I Cl.l.~·l) ~ !•.SO 
nou~c '~ (mulli) ..t-1.(195 $ (5.17) s S-1.~~ 
lnx/S (mulli) 7.2\0 $ (12.1lS) ~ l .·ll· 
fcc4~cr.$ (mulli) ·1. 2·15 $ (·1.27) ~ ·1..~2 
Co,·IS (en,·) 0.1 OS $ (0.2:") s ( ( 1.1 1·1) 
oou~c'S ( <.:rl\') 0.122 s O.:'il $ 0. 7(· 
lax!$ (ern') o.o.w $ (0. 10) s ( (l,(J2) 
f<.:l'·ISI.'r.$ (I-'ll\') 0 . \.l(• $ (O.:'i·l) ~ (0.27) 
Co,· ·s (pr0d) ~lOS,% I $ (ll 13.027) ~ <)(l.!Ji!l:\ 
n0usc: •S (pr0d) 2·H1,25.l $ (2·1:".151) s 2·17.355 
lax/$ (pwdl 102.3(·7 s ( \0 I,OOil) s 102,1\25 
fi.:~.·..t scr:S (pn,d) ~"" o- .... 
.... \, '·' s (5·1.21·1) s 53,7J2 
Table x: S1andard c:rr0rs f0r I he quolicnl 0f 1\\'0 \';Jri;~hlcs fM the '\'Cl1untnry 
I 
choice' mcHid (Choice sur\'cy daln). 
I . . \TI:~ · I ( ·1 .\SS (\ '( ' ) 'll\ y; I"'\ ~.· r "-'" .. uprl'l ll:'" .. 
Co,·:s (mulli) 0.22 1 s (2.1\0) $ (2.3(1) 
i"dan'$ (mulli) 0.201 s (1.31) $ (0.90) 
Limusc ·s (mulli) 0.\MI s 0.10 $ OA-t 
Nousc 1S (mulli) 1.100 $ ( I.S I) $ 0.39 
Tax:'$ (muhi) 0.057 ~ (0.02) s 0.10 
Upfwot S (muhi) 0.1 (i5 $ (0.1-t) s 0.19 
fcc-lscr. S (multi) 0.1(14 s (0.32) s 0.01 
frcc::-td,·icc S (mulli) O.MS $ (0.3(i) s 0.9S 
Co\'. S (em·) 1.2S..t s (5AO) $ (2.S3) 
~!:In ·s (em·) 0 . 13~ s (2.97) s (2.t19) 
Limusc S (co,·) 0.112 s 0.19 s OAI 
No usc S (CO\') 0.\ 10 s (0.1\9) s (0.(17) 
Tax:$ (crt\') 0.074 s (0.03) s 0.12 
Upfwnl·S (crw) 0.152 s (0.12) s O.IS 
fee-t scr. S (em') 0.\07 s (0.21\) s (0.0{1) 
frccad,·icc 'S (en,·) 0.113 s O.:!.l s OA:" 
Co\·iS {prod) 5.%3 s (I·I.Ml) s (2.7-t) 
!\Inn 'S (prod) OA77 s ( 1.0(1) s (0.11) 
Limu~c 1S (prod) 3.i..t5 s (:\.35) s 2.1-t 
Nousc S (prod) ..t .03(1 s 0.1·1 s l\.2 1 
Ta:vS (prnd) ·I A 53 s 1-l ,{IO) s ·1.22 
Upfront:s (prod) 3.0 19 s 0.17) s 2.1\7 
fcc..t:;cr.'S (pr0d) 3.SM, s (:!.0(,) s ·l.i7 
frccad,·icc :s. (prNI) ..t .002 s (5 .S2) s ~ . 1 R 
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Appendix 10 - Cluster analysis 
Cluster analysis is a multivariate analysis technique that seeks to organise information 
about variables into groups, or clusters, which are highly internally homogenous and 
highly externally heterogeneous. The cases are initially assigned randomly to K 
clusters. Cases are then moved around between clusters iteratively in order to 
minimise some measure of cluster variability. Cluster variability is measured with 
respect to the mean value of the cluster for the classifying variables, hence the name 
K-means clustering. If more than one classifying variable is used to define the 
clusters, the distance (dissimilarities) between clusters is measured in multi-
dimensional space (e.g. Euclidean distance). 
More formally, the heterogeneity between the data for a given partition P(M,K) of M 
cases into K clusters, where each of the M cases lies in just one of the K clusters, is 
measured by an error e[P(M,K)] . Suppose the ith case of the jth variable has value 
A(i,j) such that i= 1, ... M and j = 1, .. . N. The mean of the jth variable over all the cases 
in the l'h cluster, such that 1 = 1 , ... K, is denoted by B(lj). The number of cases in the 
lth cluster is N(I). The distance between any two clusters n and 1 is: 
N 
D(l,L) = (L[A(l,J)-B(L,J)Y)1' 2 
J=l (30) 
and the error of the partition is: 
M 
e[P(M ,K)] = LD[I, L(I)]2 
(31) 
1=1 
where L(i) is the cluster containing the ith case. The general procedure in K-means 
clustering is to search for a partition with a small error by moving cases from one 
cluster to another. The search ends when no such movement reduces e (Hartigan 
1975). 
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Appendix 11 - Binary-choice models 
Binary-choice models assume that individuals are faced with a choice between two 
alternatives and that the choice made depends on identifiable characteristics of the 
decision-maker and/or the choice. The objective in binary-choice modelling in this 
instance would be to predict the likelihood of an individual choosing to join an 
incentive program with given characteristics. More generally, the aim of binary-
choice modelling is to find a relationship between a set of attributes describing a 
choice and the probability that the individual will make a given choice. 
Following Gujarati (1988) and Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998), the Linear Probability 
Model (LPM) of binary-choice expresses the dichotomous dependent variable (Yi) 114 
as a linear function of the explanatory variables (Xi). The conditional expectation of 
Yi, given Xi. can be interpreted as the conditional probability that the event will occur 
given Xi; in other words Pi = E(Y=11Xi). However, although it is the case a priori 
that the conditional probability must lie between 0 and 1, estimated probabilities in 
the LPM often lie outside the unit interval. 
In addition, as the name suggests, the LPM assumes that the conditional probability 
of an event occurring increases linearly with X. In other words, the marginal or 
incremental effect of X is constant throughout the range of X. In reality, one would 
expect that the conditional probability of a particular event occurring would be non-
linearly related to X, reflecting the fact that at both ends of the distribution of X the 
probability of an event occurring will be virtually unaffected by small increases in X. 
This suggests the need for a binary-choice model where (i) the conditional probability 
of an action being taken increases as X increases but never steps outside the unit 
interval and (ii) the relationship between Pi and X is non-linear. 
The binary logit and binary probit 115 models achieve non-linearity and restrict 
predicted probabilities to the unit interval by using an S-shaped cumulative density 
114 Y, is equal to 1 if a particular action is taken or choice is made; Y, is equal to 0 if the action is not 
taken or the choice is not made. 
115 The probit model (known also as the nonnit model) transforms the data using the cumulative 
normal probability function. The higher computational demands of this model and the generally weak 
theoretical justification for employing a probit specification mean that the logit model is more widely 
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function to transform the dichotomous 0 - 1 dependent variable of the binary choice 
model. In the case of the logit model the transformation uses the cumulative logistic 
probability function and is specified as: 
p = 1 
I 1 + e-z, (32) 
where e is the base of natural logarithms and Zi = a + px. A and p are the estimated 
parameters of the logit model. 
The regression equation estimated m logit analysis ts derived after simple 
manipulation of equation 33 giving 
L = ln(_!LJ = z. 
I 1-P I 
I 
(33) 
where the dependent variable in the regression equation is the natural logarithm of the 
odds that a particular choice will be made and the right hand side of the regression is 
linear in the parameters of the model. When only one or a few observations on each 
decision maker is available, estimation of the parameters of the logit model must be 
made using the maximum likelihood estimation procedure. The maximum likelihood 
procedure has a number of desirable properties. All parameter estimates will be 
consistent and efficient asymptotically. In addition, all parameter estimates are 
asymptotically normal, so that a t test of parameter significance can be applied. Tests 
of the significance of all, or a subset, of the coefficients can be performed using the 
likelihood ratio (LR) test. 
Estimated coefficients of equation 34 do not indicate the increase in the probability of 
the event occurring, given a one unit increase in the value of the independent variable. 
Rather, these coefficients reflect the effect of a change in an independent variable on 
ln[P/(1-Pi)] or the log of odds ratio. The marginal probability effects for the logit 
model are derived as follows: 
(34) 
used in empirical work. The predictive powers of the logit and probit specifications are generally 
comparable. 
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where j denotes a particular independent variable. Given the non-linearity of the logit 
model specified in equation 39, the marginal effects will depend on the original 
probability and the values of all other independent variables and their coefficients. 
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